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Introduction
Olga Goriunova
Darling sweetheart
You are my avid fellow feeling. My affection curiously clings to your 
passionate wish. My liking yearns for your heart. You are my wistful 
sympathy: my tender liking.
Yours beautifully
M. U. C.1
In 1949, when the Ferranti Mark 1, one of the first computers, was manufac-
tured for Manchester University, Christopher Strachey was a school teacher. He 
received the computer’s manual from his former university friend Alan Turing, 
and began the activity for which he was later proclaimed one of the originators: 
programming. Strachey created an algorithm that would enable the computer 
to play draughts (checkers): he wrote the program on paper and was given 
access to MUC (Manchester University Computer) for one night only, to load 
the program onto the machine and try running it. In the morning, when staff 
returned, MUC was playing draughts.2
Strachey sent his programme for punching beforehand. The programme was 
about 20 pages long (over a thousand instructions), and the naivety of a first-
time user attempting a programme of such length caused not a little amusement 
among the programmers in the laboratory. Anyway, the day came and Strachey 
loaded his programme into the Mark I. After a couple of errors were fixed, the 
programme ran straight through and finished by playing ‘God Save the King’ 
on the ‘hooter’ (loudspeaker). On that day Strachey acquired a formidable 
reputation as a programmer that he never lost.3
On the basis of this project, he acquired a job in the Computer Department of 
Manchester University, where he worked alongside Alan Turing, and proceeded, 
in 1952, to write the Love Letter Generator, an ephemeral, even flippant, poetic 
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program that can be retrospectively seen as one of the first text-generating 
algorithms.4
When David Link, an artist who reconstructed the Love Letter Generator 
in an eponymous art project, was giving a talk to the Computer Conservation 
Society in London about the hurdles of the process, including trying to read 
the program in faded pencil on the few papers archived in Oxford’s Bodleian 
Library and locating the remaining original switches from the operation 
console, a member of the audience stood up. This gentleman said that he had 
been a student at Manchester University in the period discussed and remem-
bered seeing nonsensical love-letters printed out on paper stuck to the walls. He 
went on to say that he and fellow students would never have thought that their 
‘Gods’, such as Turing and Strachey, might have engaged in such a nonsensical 
activity.
This example provides an easy route into one scale of the concept of fun 
that this book proposes. The fun that most readily comes to the fore here is 
that which we are most aware of, the fun of ‘geekiness’, wit, the humour and 
extravagance of mathematical geniuses and their material processes of thinking 
and making. Humour comes before pragmatic application and, as things are 
being developed and tried out, it forms a part and serves as material of thought. 
Such fun, programmers’ humour, can be seen as related to the culture of the 
humour of the exact sciences, where, for instance, in the Russian and Soviet 
reverence for mathematics and physics, books such as Physicists Joke became 
national bestsellers in the 1960s.5 Humour here is indicative of the pleasure of 
breakthrough, of thought experimentation, of unconstrained and purposeless 
but intense and curious and materially specific enquiry.6 Many a Soviet child, 
including me, from as early as they could remember, heard tales about their 
parents’ attempts to pass Mathematical Analysis and had their bookshelves lined 
with the volumes of Mathematics Can Be Fun and Physics for Entertainment. 
Yakov Perelman, a great Russian popularizer of the sciences, published the latter 
in 1913. Perhaps the first thing to do to advance the idea of fun discussed here 
is to imagine that fun of physics, algebra, geometry, of a pre-World-Wars era. 
Fun is a problematic word, requiring qualification or defence as soon as it is 
introduced, as it readily connects both to the complex machinery of exploitation 
through creative enjoyment and to stupefaction through consumption. But it is 
also a word that cannot be avoided, which unites pleasure and wit with affective 
engagement, conceptual, social and cultural practices and vivid, disturbing and 
inventive modes of thinking and making.
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When manifest in particular hacker performances and objects, fun may 
come in the guise of wit, becoming a game of intellect where it can be operative 
as an ‘intelligence test’. The ways in which humour and technical ability are 
deeply interconnected in hacker cultures can be interpreted as almost a struc-
tural similarity between a mode of thought imbued with a good sense of wit 
and technical or mathematical proficiency. Expressions of wit are judged on the 
economic scale: Freud in particular used economic thinking to judge wit, where 
the most successful joke relies on scarce means to achieve the richest outcome. 
There is a direct connection here to ‘coding elegance’7 and ‘the art of computer 
programming’.8 Wit can become a skill, a training program and a grading tool 
to teach, learn, progress in and evaluate hacking.9
It is important that clever tricks and elegance are not the same: Dijkstra 
especially warned against a culture of ‘clever tricks’, asking for discipline and 
humbleness.10 Fun does not equate to intellectual superiority and perfection. 
Fun can be modest, misleading, a noisy chimera. Here, there is a sense in which 
software ephemera, digital folklore – as a variety of cultures that use, adapt and 
produce software that make and ‘change’ sense in relation to labour conditions, 
states of work, certain aesthetic normalities, software operations and allowances 
– always stay minor. At the same time, aspects of such cultures of using and 
misusing conventional software, along with digital art and software art, have 
made their way into the world of apps and handheld devices, where they are 
often severed from their idiosyncratic operationality, and of the ways in which 
the formation of a shared subject always hung in between the dysfunctional 
desktop computer and its tense user.
There is an alignment of the ways in which exploratory material imagination 
proceeds in geek cultures and art work, garage cultures11 and in the aesthetic 
mode of work. There is a certain artistic nature to geekiness, the way in which 
objects and processes, even artistically thrilling projects, are produced within 
systems of coordinates which are often not interested in art at all. Fun here 
manifests in a certain proximity of ways of imagining, making and thinking, 
and of enunciating things with a dose of audacity. There is a metaphysical 
braveness that is traditionally discussed in relation to art, in critical accounts of 
creativity or in the feminist distrust of ‘genius’, that has contrarily also recently 
been hungrily grabbed at by the managerial discourses of more efficient value-
extraction. What this book suggests is to reclaim and think such fun in relation 
to computing in all its specificity, thus opening it up to radically varied interdis-
ciplinary criticism and thinking.
4 Fun and Software
Images of enquiry into fun
The master algorithm designer Donald Knuth speaks about his attempts 
to answer ‘puzzling questions that have no immediately obvious relation 
to any practical applications of mathematics or of computer science’.12 The 
non-obvious and not immediately applicable, non-instrumental or straight-
forwardly confounding aspects of computing, such as Turing’s deliberately 
erroneous manuals,13 or Knuth’s ‘monstrous’ algorithms, shed further light 
on the kind of fun that this volume seeks out. Fun in computing as a mode 
of thinking, making, experiencing is about a mode of reasoning, and as such 
it convolutes the question of rationalism, the qualities of logical reason, the 
autonomy of computation and relates to the sensibilities and creative drives 
of computing. Fun is ambiguous about the modes of knowledge and their 
distributed nature. Fun, within and with logical reason, relates to paradox, the 
incomputable; it produces sense differently, complementing formal logic while 
being generated by it. Exceeding the structures of the production of sense, fun 
is an excess, linking to instability and ambiguity both outside and within the 
computational, running diagonally across them.
The problem of reason manifests where there is incongruity, growing 
out-of-scale data quantities, material affections. Such conditions may be 
found within formal logic, in paradox and the incomputable, and the coupling 
with real-world processes, and transversally, across the political, experiential 
registers, and in the computational feeding on the computational. Across the 
scales at which computation is distributed across society and culture, such 
modes of knowledge and practice necessarily draw upon and into itself the 
living material cultures, the bodily, affective practices of programmers and 
users, social circulatory diagonals, ontological and individuating processes, 
all feasting upon the centrality that calculative infrastructures attain today. 
In such a condition, the question of fun is one of metaphysics, enquiring 
how certain ontological processes are being constructed and enter into 
conditioning relations with each other. Fun cuts across multiple scales and 
connects to what drives desire and creates the conditions of the mode of work 
and life.
Computational culture has fun as its medium.14 Such fun traverses the 
formal logic governing computing, and the larger systems of thought and 
practice within which it is nested, it cuts through hackers’ pleasure, pain and 
computing’s social lives and it is not by chance that it also becomes captured in 
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exploitative devices employed by late capitalism to extract maximal value from 
subjects labouring in computational infrastructures.15 Capitalism constantly 
shifts its boundaries to include further lines of escape: ‘its lines of escape are …
the very conditions for its operation’.16 Fun that includes pleasure, humour and 
play, but also paradox, incongruity, ambivalence and pain, and that takes part 
in the construction, maintenance and use of those computational machines 
through which creative populations produce value, is part of the spirit of today 
that we have to problematize.
It is easy to criticize a neoliberal impetus to be creative and unpaid and lead 
a meaningful life by purchasing unique experiences to report on websites or by 
obeying the prompts to pleasurably play (with funware, game-like mechanics 
on websites) when shopping, filling out forms, etc. What is significant is that 
there is a larger fun that partakes in going beyond oneself, thinking from 
bare, breaking outside within repetition, along with the luxury of excess17 
and the vertigo of play,18 disturbance, despair and purposelessness. Fun as 
a jaw-dropping, dopamine-releasing exercise, the fun of learning and being 
happy, as captured by neuro-imaging, continuously colonized and monopo-
lized is intermingled with fun enjoyed in the form of the process of actual 
occasions (algorithmic processes) in their determinacy via indeterminacy 
(Parisi, Fazi), the fun whose possibility arises out of the processuality of 
computation (Fuller) and the fun rooted in the inherent excess of real-world 
functionality bringing the affective into computing or the structures of code 
and computing practices functioning aesthetically (Goffey), to name just a 
few approaches. Not only the unserious or the defiance of the self-disciplinary 
order of rationality can be called fun or be captured (as discussed above), 
fun in computational practices helps us consider computing as affective, 
ambiguous, autonomous – to just begin with a few qualities whose linguistic 
codification starts with an A.
This book proposes that there is a distinctiveness of fun in relation to, broadly 
speaking, computing and computation. Fun here is related to abstraction and 
notation, formal logic and experience, singularity and repetition, contingency 
and practice, incomputability and paradox, to the question of where computa-
tional processes start and end and which assemblages they construct and are 
part of, to the subjects and experience of and by computing, to how algorithms 
model and are modelled by the world and how they couple with other processes, 
within and outside computation, to the cultures and aesthetics of software, to its 
building upon itself, to its politics, desires and legal projects.
6 Fun and Software
About this book
The starting point of Fun and Software adheres to the proposition of software 
studies: today, computational structures undergird, enact and take part in 
actualizing nearly all societal formations and fields of action and hence it 
is urgent that we investigate software critically.19 With the promise of big 
data, with mass surveillance and individualized measurement across scales, 
new regimes of governmentality use calculative infrastructures and give 
preference to new forms of decision-making predicated upon the analysis of 
data. Political and social formations and belief are produced, maintained and 
governed through calculative devices and models, which move on to manifest 
as intimate companions rather than bureaucratic monsters.20 There is significant 
work focusing on the unpacking of the informationalization of finance.21 The 
cultural, aesthetic and existential forms of production are not untouched by 
computation: to exist, relate, enquire, think, take pleasure and suffer is struc-
turally coupled with computational machines, mathematical models, rankings, 
networks, database management systems, code, algorithms and formal logic. 
The production of subject and subjectivity is not only a process in which 
computation takes part; it also becomes unclear what kind of subjectivity and 
subjecthood is produced and whether the position of the subject itself is eroded 
enough to be contested by other forms of living, reasoning and processing. 
Subjectivity also links very closely to objectivity, between which fun becomes a 
curious method of connection.
Computation here must not be seen as an opponent infiltrating supposedly 
pure prior states of being. As computation takes part in becomings, we must 
look for the ontological specificity of the computational. To do so, the forces of 
the humanities and arts, philosophy and cultural theory must be called upon. 
The crisis of humanities demonstrates a mismatch between the necessities 
and the capabilities of today. Substantial currents in the humanities and social 
sciences still often regard computing as both a black-box and an insurmountable 
fortress guarding the gates of formal reasoning. These disciplines and the arts 
are also under attack for their lack of supposed utility or financially incentivized 
functionalism, for the genesis of which computational infrastructures, as they 
have been recruited by cognitive capitalism, can partially be blamed. However, 
computing is not exhausted within the framework in which neoliberalism puts 
it to use. What this book aims to do is to create conditions in which computing 
can be seen as an excessive and intensive scale and order, which can and do 
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take part in forming and acting in transversal ensembles that are more than 
those of the neoliberal machinery, administrative applicability or calculative 
completeness and functionalism.
This book draws programming, software and computation back into social, 
cultural, philosophical investigations. What we attempt to do is to foster cross-
disciplinary forms of attention to software and computational processes that 
look at how software and computing are imagined, thought, made and experi-
enced. The volume also focuses on how computing takes place, makes sense, 
recruits and extends, folds upon itself, exists. This book is an attempt to expand 
computing, to inhabit it through becoming open to the arts and humanities, 
social sciences and less disciplinarily defined modes of enquiry.
However improbable it might sound for today’s all encompassing dullness 
of forms, databases, schedules and processors, ‘fun’ has informed and guided 
the development of computing from its very inception. In a book on the history 
and secret of scent, Luca Turin writes that smell, a sensory dimension that most 
people experience daily, is exclusively described and researched either in relation 
to war (gas attacks) or commercial use (perfumery).22 A certain similarity can 
be found here to the ways in which software and computation are researched. 
The history of computers is largely seen as emerging out of military impera-
tives, cold war, threat, violence and death. And in many ways it does emerge 
from war, as do many other things, including me or Donna Haraway, which she 
describes as following: ‘I have a body and mind as much constructed by the Post 
Second-World-War arms race and cold war [as women’s movements]’.23 Paul 
Edwards, in The Closed World, suggests that there are two versions of the history 
of computing: one that is the history of logic and symbols and the other that is 
a history of computers as information-processing machines.24 Michael Castelle 
argues for a history of computing that takes into account administration, statistics 
and bureaucracy.25 Military, industrial, logical histories, however accurate they 
are, contribute to constructing the illusion of pragmatism and necessarily omit 
other stories affined in their non-teleological thrill.
The concept of fun helps bring together the ways of thinking and experi-
encing computing and the modes in which computation acts, which are usually 
presented as marginal and seen as unrelated to its ostensibly more serious or 
useful dimensions. In Fun and Software, software is taken out of its exclusive 
corner to be looked at as a field of thought and practice informed and guided 
by paradox, ambiguity, affect, which produces agents, subjects and practices 
of new ontological orders. Fun and Software suggests that fun is a means of 
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production and multiplication of sense in and of software – something that is 
only supposed to have one, useful meaning, or to be solely serious, precise and 
spotlessly operative, whereby fun becomes both a concept and a method, an 
‘onto-epistemological’ enactive device.
Fun as desire emphasizes the extent to which the investment and coupling 
of desiring-production with the computational structures is central to today’s 
society, its forms of expansion and repression and is therefore politically crucial. 
As computation has found a way to everywhere in society, the texture of such 
desiring necessarily outstrips and feeds the formal logic of computing while 
being organized by and into it. Emphasizing and exploring the multiple scales 
of fun in computing creates conditions in which forms of critical, political and 
collective expression of desiring fun can be seen and given voice.
In reclaiming fun, and especially fun in computing, there is a chance to 
imagine that the world does not only run following a deadly logic of economic, 
military and other forms of violence, but has trajectories that follow bizarre, 
complex, joyful and open vectors and enquiring passions which are also both 
ontologically and epistemologically embedded or latent within the computa-
tional. It is when fun is had that the world is invented. Without imagining this, 
futures we would like to inhabit cannot be enacted. In some way, the aim of this 
book is to carve a breathing space for subjects of different orders and kinds. ‘The 
Gods are dead, but they died from laughing’, says Deleuze for Nietzsche.26 The 
fun to be explored in this book is the noble, audacious enquiry that imagines 
the world in ways that deserve recouping.
Complicating fun
Peter Berger notes that modernity has a comic sensibility: ‘the turn in philosophy 
from a negative to a positive assessment of the comic only came in modern 
times’, with Erasmus’s In Praise of Folly ‘serving as a bridge between the comic 
culture of the Middle Ages and modern understanding of the comic’.27 Comic 
becomes a signal of transcendence. In The Gay Science, Nietzsche talks about 
laughter and the ability to laugh, withstanding meaninglessness, as an ability 
to transcend ‘values’ that assign reason to life. Such laughter does not have any 
purpose (such as development); it signifies a new era of a ‘gay science’ taking 
place after the tragic is over.28 Nietzsche proclaims that the tyranny of science 
and truth will raise the value of falsehood, and the tyranny of prudence will 
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force into being new kinds of nobleness, ‘nobleness to be capable of follies’. In 
such laughter the value of folly is raised in a way that enables reason to be multi-
plied and changed. Nietzschean laughter here is about a pure difference with the 
energy to trigger change.
The fun this collection explores is such a fun that breaks and makes meanings, 
passions and actions. Not, or not only, a Bergsonian confirmation of value, or a 
Freudian resolution of conflict or an estrangement device, fun does not operate 
through synthesis or catharsis. Fun as an operational mode is more intense 
than the displacement traditionally ascribed to humour (though fun is not 
afraid of humour and may include it as its integral part): whereas humour takes 
on estrangement, incongruity or relief, an abstract relationship to reality that 
allows for re-evaluation of the latter, fun has the potential to disturb the status 
quo and operate at a more profound level, at a tangent. Fun, akin to Nietzschean 
laughter, includes disbelief, undoing;29 ‘to laugh means to love mischief, but with 
a good conscience’.30 This mischief is the transversal paradigm of cutting across 
and assembling in incongruously radiant ways.
Fun shares affinities with humour, play, wit and laughter, which all have 
a relationship with the true through existential conditions. Kierkegaard in 
particular regards humour and absurdity as a separate existential stage, the last 
state before faith, a kind of leap31 – and it is interesting in this respect that when 
Haraway introduces ‘A Cyborg Manifesto’, with a discussion of irony, she also 
deems it a blasphemy.
Fun can be seen as related to a specific history of thinking laughter, explored 
by thinkers such as Nietzsche and Bataille, as an ability and a condition of 
staring at the limit of the possible, beyond the accepted or agreed and without 
an immediate resolution. Such a path is particular in its inclusiveness of a very 
profound kind of joy and passionate sadness that are emotional as much as they 
are active, powerful and conceptual.
The above-mentioned Edsger Dijkstra noted that ‘a clever programmer [is 
always on a task to]… squeeze the impossible’, but the impossible is not about 
better efficiency or clever tricks per se. The task of such an understanding of fun 
is not simply to equate powerful abstract thought, ways of thinking and doing 
software with ‘testing the impossible’, but to understand and, most importantly, 
recognize and construct such histories, working through the being and practices 
of computation, modes of thinking, hacker ethics, cultures related to software, 
aesthetic work which themselves have a unique and powerful ontological force. 
Such a force is the idiosyncratic vector of fun along which human-technical 
10 Fun and Software
ensembles are brought to life and develop, which works across scales, subjects 
and materials, without losing the differentiating quality that is particular to it.
There is a particular fun that finds its fascination in logic. The acquisition 
of language, notation and the establishment of the practice of programming 
include fun as a mode of production that oscillates between abstraction, norma-
tivity and paradox or the absurd. Computation contains the incomputable. 
Paradox and incompatibility exist as forms of friction between computing and 
mathematics, and between abstraction and the real, and found one of the forms 
of computational experience where fun resides. Ambiguity, thus, is an essential 
mode of the aesthetic of computation, connecting to the processuality and 
collective physicality of computing.
On the other hand, the extreme limit of the ‘possible’ requires insane 
courage, for which, to paraphrase Bataille, madness can be the repayment. 
Fun is a process, the price of which could be illness, and folly. There is a tragic 
fun, the dark side of fun as formally aligned with anguish. ‘Humour has the 
same formal structure as depression’,32 where the humour is about suffering, 
sublimity, inauthenticity, impotence or violent ecstasy.
Fun can itself become a capability of folly, can make folly manifest or be a 
mode of dealing with it. The ways in which fun as desire can and does couple 
with the organization of power, social, technical and material bodily machines, 
can imply a subtractive logic, can make weak and diminish. Indeed that is the 
common knowledge within the cultures of striving for, building, embodying 
and carrying out the material encounters and interminglings with computa-
tional processes, and is often described as such in critiques of computational 
capitalism.33 Fun is related to intensification, obsession, dreams, exploitation 
and abuse. Fun can be manic, tragic and evil. Malware and evil media,34 psycho-
pathic and neurotic lives and the schizophrenia of capitalism,35 also gild and 
frame the complexity of fun as a manner of action in the world.
It is important to remember that fun is not an abstract principle; it is formed 
by material relations and actions. Fun is a processual unfolding found in 
movement – distributed and machinic – it is in amalgamations, splits, working 
through bodies, objects, structures, data and actions. Fun constantly negotiates 
between subjectivities and collectivities; it is a technical individuating force. The 
processual dynamics, the mode of performance of fun can be expressed as data 
and worked upon by algorithmic structures or can be enunciated in computa-
tional forms inhabited socially and collectively. As software enunciates, takes 
part in affection, becomes a rhethorical, legal and ethical project, fun performs 
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and circulates, governing specific forms of spontaneity, liveliness and sociality 
and organizing time–space.
Overall, fun is of different scales and types: here in this book it relates to 
forms of reasoning and the becoming of computing; it is experiential, affective 
and collective; it is a desiring process and a sensibility, a mode of thinking and of 
working; a horizon, an idea, a passion and an action. Fun should not be under-
stood correctly or in one way: its strength is in its multiplicity.
Summaries and relations between chapters
As becomes clear when reading this volume, every author approaches fun in 
a distinct way. As this is a collective project, the chapters also construct fun as 
a multiplicity, with several themes complementarily explored across chapters.
Recurringly, authors address the question of whether it is possible to 
move away from the human subject as the one experiencing fun or formu-
lating a logical procedure and look for fun that belongs to programming 
structures, practices and real-world contexts, where its subject is distributed. 
Addressing the processual and contextual character of computing, it becomes 
possible to contemplate experience, ambiguity and incongruity as residencies 
of fun. This draws attention to the experience that is locatable in the body of 
the programmer, the affects and passions of the practices of programming. 
However, experience is also something more widely constructed by compu-
tation and constructive of computation and arises from larger assemblages 
not necessarily fully related to the human arranged as the proper subject. 
Here, the question of the subject is shifted to that of operation, and whereas 
reason and formal reasoning are still linked to the subject, the nature of 
logical reason can also be seen as enjoying some autonomy, while computing 
becomes intertwined with design, art, passion for data and playfulness, 
among other things.
Constructing the subject of the programmer, user or player in the bodily 
passions of achieving singularity through repetition, the acknowledgement of 
bodily enjoyment and pain, psychic energy, the practice of programming raises 
the question of power. Negotiating political relations between the subject and 
the object, enunciation and exploitation, production and diminution, fun is 
seen by a number of authors here in relation to multiple vectors and coales-
cences of power. The themes of code and action, both bodily and symbolic, in 
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their political potentiality also cut across chapters. As an example of shifting 
value from code to practice and context, free software is often discussed as well 
as the enunciative qualities of code.
The role of paradoxes, the incomputable, the inclusion of ever-growing 
real-world data producing interruption and introducing unpredictability to the 
algorithmic processes form an important line of thought fleshed out by many of 
the chapters. Necessarily rather than predictably, humour, play, jokes and games 
are also finely attended to. Many chapters also stress the importance of consid-
ering experience, context, collectivity, bodily material contexts and practices of 
programming and surpluses of formal system.
Chapter 1 is a programmatic chapter; it asks for how we can step beyond ‘the 
formal-logical categories of mechanized mathematics’ and draw upon comput-
ing’s connections to art, virtuosity, free speech and play. While criticizing the 
efficiency and utilitarianism of a strand of ‘funology’ in human–computer 
interaction (HCI) (linking to the history presented by Kaltenbacher), Goffey 
questions the assumptions of instrumentality, rationalism and utilitarianism rife 
in the epistemology of techno-science. Criticially re-reading Marvin Minsky’s 
work, Goffey looks for a connection between fun, programming practices and 
the structures of software. There is a ‘margin of decoding’, an inherent excess 
of real-world functionality that brings the affective and the material back into 
computing. Elements and structures of computer code and coding practices in 
relation to the real world also function aesthetically, as exemplified most clearly 
in the messy enunciative qualities of software.
Chapter 2 takes the reader on a journey through the philosophical, 
mathematical, logical, notational, literary and aesthetic genealogies of 
computing via some of the key figures in the establishment of the disci-
pline of programming: Dijkstra, Knuth and Kaufman. Tracing the shaping 
of programming paradigms, Yuill moves through the liberal philosophy of 
Mill and Bentham (Knuth’s inspiration) and Wittgenstein (Dijkstra’s inspi-
ration), Knuth’s jokes and A Fortran Coloring book, Turing, Bourbaki and 
Rotman, FORTRAN and ALGOL. The human becoming machinic and vice 
versa are traced alongside their embodiment in programming paradigms via 
the pleasure of humour or the monstrous, among other registers (symbolic, 
notational, rhethorical, educational). Yuill explores deep connections between 
mathematics, programming and aesthetics, questioning computing’s ontology 
and the specificity of human-machinic assemblages of computationality, that, 
first of all, laughs.
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Chapter 3 addresses fun through the concepts of experience in the culture 
of mathematics and the machinic fun of certain computer games. For Fuller, 
paradox and ambiguity arise from within computational forms as they move 
between scales and contexts. Whether fun arises in experience, the texture of its 
processuality and the locus of such experience and the assemblage producing it 
are the questions that the chapter pursues. Reading Turing with Brouwer, Fuller 
suggests that calculation is always a relational process, occurring in time. The 
processuality of computation exposes it to the entry of experience, reflexivity, 
time and things formally outside mathematical logic which become part of its 
living assemblage. Drawing upon the examples of MMORPGs, the art project 
Human Cellular Automata and the celebrated sandbox game Minecraft, Fuller 
argues that paradox and ambiguity are aesthetic modes through which compu-
tation itself becomes a form of distributed and machinic fun that is ambiguous, 
preposterous, tautological, perverse or delightful.
Chapter 4 delves into the possibilities of autonomy for mechanized thought 
(as found in computation). Parisi and Fazi ask whether algorithms can be said 
to enjoy themselves while processing data, where fun is not about breaking free, 
but about the fulfilment of procedures and thus the achievement of autonomy. 
Grounding their work in Whitehead, the authors look at algorithms as actual 
occasions. Not only a discrete set following a procedure until completion, 
algorithms also relate to the indeterminacy of eternal objects through incom-
putability, where ‘completion cannot always be attained’. Drawing on Turing’s 
formalization of the incomputable and Chaitin’s description of algorithmic 
randomness, Fazi and Parisi establish that, for the completion of the algorithm 
to be achieved, the procedure must rely on the incomputable being intrinsic to 
computation itself, where fun is the unfolding of determinacy via indeterminacy.
Chapter 5 focuses on the ways in which programmers embody data struc-
tures as the latter channel, fold, slice and sort subjectivities as much as other 
kinds of realities. Relying on the psychoanalytical literature on aggression 
and eroticization, Mackenzie looks for ‘energized forms of excitement’, where 
the ways in which psychic structures complexly interrelate with desire may 
be thought of in relation to software and data through the example of the 
statistics-oriented programming language R. The data structures and statisti-
cally informed models that R extends into desires, actions and beliefs transform 
data, simultaneously seeking to control it while making it more volatile. The 
tensions between aggression and free association multiply with a modelling of 
modelling, where a desire of data munging is processed to hallucinate about 
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data productivity. Coding and populations are brought together, posing the 
question of whether ‘bodies of code themselves can become population aggre-
gates and micro-multiplicities’.
Chapter 6 explores the practice of programming and offers an analysis of its 
truly Spinozist passions. Caught between ecstatic singularity and conformity to 
convention, particularity and abstraction, programming practice is a passionate, 
painful bodily experience. The striving for concise expression and logical singu-
larity is coupled with the recursive: the craft of programming is grounded in 
repetition. Programming frameworks are ‘condensations of practice’ and the 
establishment of the pattern is embodied in the practising programmer. Arguing 
against the idea of programming as disembodied, Murtaugh discusses extreme 
programming (here his chapter links to Chapter 8) and the dark, unspecified 
and absurd that join forces with the logical. Transposing attention from code to 
the practice and context makes computing not a precise and singularized logical 
abstraction, but something messy and perpetually incomplete.
Chapter 7 starts with an overview and interpretation of a set of seminal 
literature on humour, jokes and laughter including Freud, Deleuze and Virno. 
Evaluating the innovative roles of humour against its instrumentalization, Cox 
and McLean analyse humour as deviation from the normativity of coding 
practices and focus on the social dimensions of jokes in code. Diversion and 
semantic ambiguity, breaking the rules of coding practices and norms of source 
code interpretation, jokes, which are code and action, can release productive 
desiring-machines. Multilevel interpretative work on source code, where both 
software and human are interpreters, produces software development with a 
body, and breaking the rules allows political potential to intensify. Cox and 
McLean discuss the specificity of such geek humour through the analysis of the 
brainfuck language and a series of art projects, to name just a few examples.
In Chapter 8 Chun and Lison propose a conception of fun as a dialectical 
battlefield, between subject and object, bodily enjoyment and obsession, ‘good’ 
and ‘bad’ programming, where the question of the boundary between these 
states creates the ethics of fun in relation to power. For them, fun manifests 
through the figure of the user, whether such a user is a gamer or a programmer 
(a user of ‘structures for organizing complexity’), who in turn becomes used 
by affective structures of the conditions of immaterial labour. For Chun and 
Lison, the bodily passions of pleasure and pain, related to the uncanny striving 
for power, empowerment and disempowerment produce programmers, and 
the chaotic surplus of fun may destroy them. Freedom then is a question of 
 Introduction 15
becoming disempowered in a good way, when programming is not logos. 
Chun and Lison draw upon the history of software and the rise of structured 
programming, and use a rich range of examples, varying from the NetHack 
game and rave parties to dot-com-era’s office design and the Obfuscated C Code 
Contest.
Play as a multivectorial investigative activity relying on the engagement of 
the body in relation to sense-making and work is explored by Andersen in 
Chapter 9. The frivolity of play is mined by an analysis inspired by Deleuze, 
with the concepts of demonstration and manifestation in humour, which 
disrupt signification. Such new logics of sensation emerge in relation to 
context, to those who play and the absence of their bodies. Andersen explores 
the game Spacewar! as a response to cybernetics and the human mediation 
of control in cybernetic systems. Here, the game and play are a pop cultural 
parody of SAGE and everyday work, but a parody that draws upon the 
workspace and its leading conceptual frameworks. The post-war subject, 
the computer scientist experiences the shifting processes of the production 
and maintenance of subjectivity and reasoning, and here game production 
challenges the emerging status quo through demonstration and manifestation, 
through aesthetic practice.
In Chapter 10 Kaltenbacher looks for fun in the history and practice of 
HCI. She accounts for how the cybernetic origin of HCI, exemplified in the 
production of the human subject in terms of its correspondence to rationalism, 
automation and prediction, gives way to the understanding of (user) experience 
and emotion. Usability, user-friendliness and emotional design supersede each 
other, and new concepts come on stage: pleasure, surprise and enjoyment. Fun 
here is rooted in the complexity of emotions and the ways in which emotions 
form part of cognition, in learning, play and engagement. Kaltenbacher uses the 
concept of flow as intensely engaged experience to arrive at a staging of fun that 
includes experiential learning, experimentation and play. Pleasure and fun here 
derive from creativity and collaborative experience, and also active and involved 
participation, which is more pleasurable the more it gains depth, something that 
Kaltenbacher articulates through situated cognition, new media literacy and 
implicit learning.
In Chapter 11, Dekker focuses on art and an aesthetic of fun. She enquires 
into fun as an aesthetic method through the analysis of works by artists, such as: 
John Körmeling, Aram Bartholl, JODI, Cory Arcangel, Evan Roth (F.A.T. Lab) 
and Constant Dullaart. Exploring the plasticism of code to reveal the processual 
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performance of coding, the works instruct the fusion of aesthetics and politics. 
Here fun aligns with upsets to the materiality of computational structures. 
The methods and material of releasing and documenting the making and the 
structure of the art work and the ways in which it gauges its functionality are 
decided differently among those artists. Manual gesture, pleasure of working 
through the computational material link to the questions of openness, whether 
legal or viral. A collective, iterative production of fun is part of its aesthetic 
methodology and nonsense enters the discussion of fun through a light touch, 
rich in idiotic, ambiguous gestures. The banal and rubbish, as well as the coarse, 
are mobilized as responses and affects intensify and circulate across the scales 
of art’s existence.
The concluding chapter reflects on fun in the material and constructive imagi-
nation of the future as enacted by the avant-garde movements. This take on fun 
(which is, to an extent, purist) links art, avant-gardes, digital and software art, 
time and computation. The recursive avant-garde becomes looped and delayed 
in a perpetual present where the projected future of past avant-gardes becomes 
our only available future, in the form of the future-in-the-past. Such morphing 
of times is produced not least by the computational mediation of time, which 
is analysed through time-based effects in digital signal processing. Focusing on 
sonic realities allows for an enquiry into the structure of the digital delay line 
in the production of the off-now. The scintillating unattainability of the crafting 
of the future performed by Russian sound technology pioneers partially shares 
its sensibility with the net art and software art of the 1990s and early 2000s, and 
it is the call for the multiplicitous futures constructed through such multiplica-
tions of the present, coming from the avant-gardes, that this chapter presents 
as a mode of fun.
To conclude, this book brings together a collection of reflections, histories 
and propositions from academic researchers alongside those of programmers, 
artists, curators, designers, art theorists and combinations thereof. We hope 
that in this movement across the fields in and around software the discourse 
collectively produced is varied enough to entice everyone to find something of 
fun for themselves in this book: let your curiosity cling, with avid fellow feeling, 
to its pages.
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1Technology, Logistics and Logic : Rethinking 
the Problem of Fun in Software
Andrew Goffey
Introduction
Having emerged in the conflict-ridden, military-industrial complexes of the 
Cold War world, computation was not a likely contender as the technology 
most likely to mobilize affective energies in the frivolous, wasteful expendi-
tures of pleasure. From the meticulously exacting requirements of its physical 
structures and logical architecture, through the disciplined hierarchies of its 
operation, to the thanatopolitics of its command-and-control end uses, there 
was perhaps little that was more refractory to the formal-material calculus of 
computation than fun. Whether one considers computation in terms of the 
development of something approaching a science (underlining its connec-
tions with changing paradigms of knowledge production), in terms of the less 
obviously but no less important history of bureaucracy,1 or, indeed, from the 
point of view of the gender-freighted qualities of its division of labour, the 
initially predominant affective qualities of computer programming are grey, 
both ethically and aesthetically. Indeed, with its implication in the logistico-
semiotic calculation of missile ballistics or workplace automation, as well as its 
eventuation in a software industry organized around business administration 
and data processing, computer programming seems to carry to an extreme an 
understanding of technology as a utilitarian tool predicated on a reframing of 
the world as a set of calculable quantities.
Framing accounts of the history of software in terms of the governmental 
‘mechanization of discourse’ (Agar),2 the technocratic logistics of a military-
industrial complex or the intensification of Taylorist practices of ‘scientific 
management’, it is difficult to see how a story can be told about software that 
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does anything other than ratify its heavily logistical and, at best, utilitarian 
underpinnings. As a set of technologies, techniques and practices centrally 
implicated in the reshaping of power relations in the workplace and beyond, 
this becomes something of a problem, particularly for accounts of computation 
that might seek to address ways to escape from the unreasonable exactness of 
algorithms and the implication of computational technologies in the extension 
of logics of state and work to society more broadly. And yet, as a number of 
accounts of the development of the computer games industry have pointed out,3 
from an early stage in its modern development, computing has not only known 
a series of more or less surreptitious subversions of these dominant trends in 
its development but has also, in debates around what programming is or might 
be, demonstrated an interesting refractoriness to purely formal-rational under-
standing.4 Considered as an art or at the very least as artful, there are aspects 
of computer programming that require different historical reference points and 
conceptual framings in which the literal and metaphorical margins of the devel-
opment of programming and programming practices start to point towards a 
way of thinking about their technologies.
Drawing on an alternative set of conceptual resources, this chapter offers 
a theoretical discussion of how one might start to address the problematic 
question of fun in software. It asks whether in principle it is possible for 
software to become a technology of enjoyment. In practice, of course, software 
and the computational technologies it powers has become a central element 
in the reshaping both of leisure time pursuits and of work as something that 
should also be ‘fun’– not least of all in the tech sector itself.5 So, the question 
might sound a little odd, especially given both the rigorously formal-logical 
nature of computation as it appears in dominant accounts and the historically 
predominant sense of software as a technical embodiment of an epistemological 
worldview. Yet there is a philosophical – even speculative – element to compu-
tation, both in theory and practice; and the recurrent references to ideas of 
art, to virtuosity, even to free speech that can be found in accounts of software 
and its development call for an understanding that entails addressing it in 
terms that are more nuanced than the formal-logical categories of mechanized 
mathematics.
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In software
Given the specifics of the history of the development of computing and 
software, it is hardly surprising that formal reflections on the place of fun, 
pleasure and emotion in computing came along somewhat late in the day. In 
the field of research into human–computer interaction, ‘fun’, or variants thereof, 
appears not to have started to become much of a consideration until the early 
1980s. By the time Carroll and Thomas published their well-known article on 
fun,6 the modern computer had already acquired a familiar place within the 
workplace and was starting to make serious inroads into the domestic spaces 
of Western nations. The pleasures of computer games – at that point largely 
confined to arcades – had been recognized and some of their potentials cannily 
noted among researchers eager to understand and replicate the interactional 
successes of the gaming interface.7 When the hierarchical structures of work 
and the pragmatic necessities of discipline could not be relied upon to compel 
obeisance, and increased processor speeds made it possible, it was perhaps 
not surprising that experts in the field of human–computer interaction might 
seek to explore aesthetic questions of affectiveness and pleasure as a bolt-on 
motivator to make personal computing software packages more appealing. Fun, 
in this optic, was not simply confined to gaming but was crucial to subjective 
judgements of usability. Read outside of the psychologistic framework in which 
the early ‘funologists’ understood it, the identification of fun as something 
that would potentially make equivalent tasks more interesting8 sounds mildly 
cynical. While they later acknowledged that using the fantasy element of 
games to make information processing jobs more interesting, ‘to overcome 
the boredom and vigilance problems’ that inhere in routine work, might seem 
‘exploitive [sic]’ to workers, Carroll and Thomas’s early proposals for building 
‘fun’ into computing initiated something of a trend to blur the boundary 
between ‘tool’ and ‘toy’ that continues apace.9 In any event, it is difficult not to 
read some of these studies as at best market research or advocacy of methods 
for keeping a workforce happy, and therefore not really as rigorous explorations 
of the pleasure and pain of code.
However, rather than seek to address the broader implications of the 
way that ‘funologists’ sought to inscribe enjoyment within the interfaces of 
computer programs, this chapter looks to contest the implication of what we 
have contended so far, i.e. that fun is somehow anathema to the essence of 
computation. Close consideration of computational devices and a cursory 
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understanding of the onion-like layering of abstractions that distance the 
programmer and, even more so, the end-user, from the underlying architecture 
of a machine that requires the minutest and most exacting of instructions about 
what to do, do tend to suggest that pleasure could only ever be a perfunctory 
addition, a token consideration, for a subject implicated as the last stage in a 
set of machinic operations from which he/she is architecturally excluded and 
increasingly distant. If there is subject of enjoyment in computing, he/she might, 
from this technical point of view, be considered the mere residue of a techno-
logical infrastructure to which she can only relate by accepting her position as its 
potentially untrustworthy – and typically presumed stupid – end point. Between 
the output of some computational process received by him/her as stimulus and 
the input that he/she provides to some other such process as a response, the 
end-user would in this view merely form a behavioural arc feeding the machine 
with data to process, as he/she processes the data it supplies in return.
To avoid the problem of making ‘fun’ an issue for more sophisticated user 
acceptance testing, the question needs to concern the kind of affordance, within 
the technical logic of software itself, that might allow us to make more sense 
of the idea of fun in software, more sense of the possibility of their being some 
kind of intrinsic connection between the formal programmatic structures of 
code and the possibilities of enjoyment, or if not an ‘intrinsic’ connection, at 
least a connection that does not rely on an individualized psychology in which 
the software itself is largely irrelevant. What, indeed, might be the compu-
tational determination of fun? One may take it as read that there is often an 
intense investment of programmers in their work, and a pleasurable aesthetic 
to their practices.10 Yet it is all too easy to focus on the end points of that 
enjoyment, the human element that is presented with the finalized artefact, 
and overlook the broader set of arrangements, the assemblages, of which that 
element is a part, and thus fail to consider the broader socio-technical deter-
minations of the politics of enjoyment at work here. Focusing on individual 
psychology misses the affordances of code itself as well as the broader organi-
zational context within which software is operative. Considering computers as 
media, for example, makes it a little too easy to pour old wine into new bottles 
and to understand the subjects of computation as the end points of a chain of 
communication, a consumer or at best an interactive audience member, but this 
would miss crucial aspects of the ways in which fun or enjoyment lurks quite 
crucially within computation, pointing towards an aspect of the software that is 
otherwise readily overlooked.
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A technology of enjoyment?
As has already been pointed out, the rather desultory, belated development 
of ‘funology’ as an approach to exploring frivolous delight in the workings of 
software is no surprise, given the genealogy, the lines of descent, of software.11 
Equally, it is of little surprise that figuring out the place of enjoyment in 
the interactions between humans and computers should pose such thorny 
conceptual problems when they are tackled. Given the historical connections of 
HCI with the experimental psychology and behaviourist paradigms of the kind 
of cognitive research that informed technology developments in the US military 
after World War II, the research labs of the burgeoning giants of corporate 
computation,12 as well as the framing of its agendas in terms of a widespread 
efficiency concern over how to make computers more useable, it is difficult 
to see how one could avoid thinking through the pleasures of computation in 
terms of an underlying set of assumptions about efficiency and utility. But one 
should not be too quick in rushing to blame the psycho-logistic framework of 
HCI research here for making such assumptions. Broader reflections in the 
philosophy of technology more generally make it clear to what extent thinking 
about technology is imbued with an instrumental-rational, utilitarian calculus 
concerning useful work. Indeed, as the German philosopher Gernot Böhme 
has argued, the self-evident connection between technology and usefulness has 
become so engrained that we find it difficult to understand technology in ‘any 
other way than in terms of the particular goal it serves’,13 a conceptual problem 
that Böhme attributes to Marx. Yet Böhme claims that the ‘intrinsic relationship 
of technology and usefulness is a product of the theory of technology, not of its 
actual history’,14 a view that should interest us here.
Developing a line of thinking that directly implicates computation in 
economic strategies of exploitation and control, George Caffentzis has proposed 
a reading of the logic of the Turing Machine that suggests that computation 
is intrinsically bound up with the capitalist understanding of technology as 
about work.15 In Turing’s account, qua logical model, a computer program is a 
materially effective representation of some real-world entity or set of entities. 
Qua real-world entity, a computer program is a materially effective replication 
of human labour, each execution of which is formally equivalent. And the 
possibility that the computer program presents of the perfectly calibrated and 
calculable repetition of a pattern of action, without tempestuous militancy, 
absenteeism or complaint, makes it ideally suited, as dead labour, to replace 
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human work. To the extent that computerized technical machinery has histori-
cally been centrally implicated in substituting for human labour, prolonging a 
major tendency of the capitalist mode of production, with its replacement of 
living by the dead labour of machines, Caffentzis’s account seems fundamentally 
correct, and it indirectly confirms Böhme’s argument, at least in part. However, 
while such an account, at a certain level of abstraction, makes good sense, one 
might question whether or not it tells us everything, whether the means-ends 
rationality it presupposes is adequate for an exhaustive understanding of the 
technologies of computation. The formal structure of the Turing Machine tells 
us very little about what programming as a practice is, how computational 
structures function in practice or indeed how work is transformed by machines, 
except at the most general of levels.
Böhme’s broader historical contextualization of understandings of technology 
questions the way in which it has predominantly been framed in the utilitarian 
terms of its position in the instrumental practices of means-ends rationality. 
Indeed, the ancient Greek term ‘mekhane’, from which the modern term 
‘machine’ derives, displays a range of meanings of which the idea of a ‘useful 
effect’ is only one. Discussing Salomon de Caus’s Of Forceful Motions. Description 
of Divers Machines Both Useful and Enjoyable in precisely these terms, Böhme 
has argued that alongside classic examples of technology adduced in favour of 
the instrumentalist view – mining, metallurgy, construction and war – there are 
myriad examples that demonstrate the existence of playful technologies, aimed, 
as he puts it, ‘at instruction and entertainment’.16 Technology is not always and 
everywhere about extracting useful movements from nature. Historically it has 
sometimes been about movements that are ‘para phusin’– i.e. that run counter 
to nature – and this suggests that a fuller understanding of such technology 
and its history requires situating in the context of a different kind of economic 
thinking.
Where useful technologies, in Böhme’s account, developed in tandem 
with the bourgeois ascendancy of the nineteenth century in the emergence 
of modern industrial capitalism, enjoyable technologies developed princi-
pally in the courts and palaces of Europe. For Böhme, these are two distinct 
historical lineages that have become confused in contemporary understandings 
of technology. Wasteful expenditure on the ridiculous or absurd is the key 
historical indicator that one is dealing with a technology of enjoyment. As 
Böhme puts it,
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a great many technologies were originally developed for purposes of display, 
popular entertainment, prestige or sport before any potential for a useful, 
i.e. economically profitable, application could be found in them. Air travel, 
electronics and the automobile all spring to mind.17
While one might not want to contest the historical record that demonstrates 
the obvious connection between computation and work, as in, for example, 
its pressing into service for workplace automation,18 Böhme’s insistence that 
there is another line of descent in technology than the utilitarian might offer an 
interesting lens through which to reconsider computing and the technological 
aspects of the military-industrial complex that developed in post-war America. 
Indeed, Georges Bataille – whose ideas Böhme draws on – sees American 
post-war economic development (its massive investment in military material) 
as exemplifying the problem of ‘general’ economy, that of the expenditure or 
discharge of energy (not its extraction), arguing that the US economy is an 
economy that ‘is in fact the greatest explosive mass the world has ever known’.19 
The fascination with automata evinced within Department of Defense-funded 
research in artificial intelligence (AI) could perhaps be adduced as evidence 
that technologies of enjoyment were alive and well at the heart of the strategic 
considerations of the US military machine, forming something of a compromise 
solution to the useful/wasteful distinction noted by Böhme, represented as part 
of the pursuit of a techno-scientific ideal, functioning as a sponge for excess 
energies.
It is thus important that one at least acknowledges that the ‘useful’ is not the 
only way in which to frame an understanding of technology, any more than 
is ‘imitating’ nature. Of course, as the example of AI suggests, in practice, it is 
exceedingly difficult to make clear-cut distinctions between the useful and the 
enjoyable. Indeed, the sumptuary expenditure of the post-war military-indus-
trial complex, out of which so much early development in software emerges, 
seems to point instead towards a kind of monstrous enjoyment in the exces-
sively and lethally functional, or better still, suggests a search for ways in which 
to functionalize the flows of excess energy generated as part of this general 
economy of which the new technologies of computation were to become such 
a significant part. So, what is required here are some more refined conceptual 
resources for helping us think through the ways in which computational 
technologies and the practices associated with them do not fulfil their heavily 
codified, highly functional remit.
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Ineffective thought processes
An understanding of technology in terms of the useful is a deep-rooted and 
enduring legacy of the growth of capitalism and it is one that frames, implicitly 
or explicitly, much work both on software and on the historical development of 
computer programming. However, it is important to bear in mind the possibility 
of an alternative reading, and it is towards a development of this alternative that 
I would now like to turn, using Marvin Minsky’s 1980 paper on ‘Jokes and Their 
Relation to the Cognitive Unconscious’20 as my starting point.
The interest of Minsky’s essay in this context is considerable, because his is 
an account that is heavily, if not explicitly, informed by the material state of 
computational technology and the practices associated with it. By addressing 
the question of humour in direct relation both to Freud and to computation, he 
offers us a way in to considering more directly the question of how we might 
understand the connection between enjoyment and software, and this time, not 
quite from the point of view of an end-user whose discontented, workplace-
induced boredom must be countered.
Written at approximately the same time as the first studies discussing the 
place of fun in software, Minsky’s essay seeks to complement Freud’s account of 
humour in terms of a breakdown of the censoring of affectively charged contents 
of unconscious thought processes by means of a more direct consideration of 
reasoning as such and the nature of intelligence. Minsky argues for the existence 
of a cognitive unconscious and for an understanding of humour that provides it 
with an important function in relation to the faulty reasoning of commonsense. 
In his account, humour and the pleasures it affords are to be understood in 
evolutionary terms, as an outgrowth of the keying in of the neural impulses of 
cognition into survival and the circuits of stimulus and response characteristic 
of behaviour. Jokes and, more specifically, logical paradoxes in this respect have 
survival value. Drawing on his own well-known theory of frames to explore the 
problematic nature of commonsense reasoning, Minsky argues that, viewed in 
terms of cognition, the role of jokes and humour is to help us avoid the potentially 
destructive consequences of the errors – or bugs – to which such reasoning is 
prone. From his point of view faulty reasoning is just as ‘naughty’ as the repressed 
wishful thinking that is central to Freud’s view of the unconscious, and calls out 
for a similar kind of censorship, albeit for reasons of the survival of the species.
Setting aside his rather typical and heavily utilitarian understanding 
of evolution (in which life forms evolve exclusively in terms of adaptive 
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self-interest),21 what is interesting and important about Minsky’s argument, at 
least for the purposes of this chapter, is the way in which it allows us to make 
a connection between fun, computer programming practices and the struc-
tures of software. Although his essay begins with a reference to the well-known 
logical paradox of the Cretan Liar, it is largely in terms of the ‘bugs’ evident in 
commonsense reasoning that Minsky seeks to develop his argument. Bugs, as 
he puts it, are ‘ineffective or destructive thought processes’ and they arise when 
the cognitive censors that prohibit us from following cognitively ‘harmful’ paths 
of reasoning fail. A logical paradox such as that of the Cretan liar, who states ‘I 
am lying’, of course leaves us puzzling, and is not in and of itself destructive, but 
for Minsky it points towards the thin ice of ‘self-reference’ and the unproductive 
meandering of faulty reasoning. That such reasoning might, in his words, do 
us ‘some vaguely understood cognitive harm’ makes sense, but the leap from 
there to ‘ineffective or destructive thought processes’ (emphasis added) could 
be considered overkill, or as pointing towards the possibility that his text is 
addressing a broader problem than might at first seem to be the case. Indeed, 
it is not even evident that the paradox of the liar posed quite the problem in its 
original context it has done for modern logicians.22 However, Minsky’s point is 
that like the bugs to which it is related, the self-referentiality of the liar paradox 
has the propensity to leave us spinning in circles. And yet there are contexts, of 
course – that of a computer program used to guide missiles, for example – in 
which this kind of self-referentiality could indeed be destructive, and there are 
people – computer programmers – for whom bugs are indeed a bit more than a 
simple intellectual problem. In this respect, the reference to ‘bugs’ as ‘ineffective’ 
or ‘destructive’ in Minsky’s account suggests that there is a much more concrete, 
technological aspect to the problem with which he is concerned. Characterizing 
commonsense reasoning as ‘buggy’ makes perfectly good sense if the underlying 
frame of reference of one’s argument is computer technology (and not simply 
AI). Indeed, while one might take the broad sweep of the claims made about a 
cognitive unconscious at face value and accept the validity of Minsky’s qualified 
characterization of reasoning in terms of the efficacy of AI ‘goal structures’ and 
‘plans’, his further references to ‘administrative structures’ do rather compound 
the impression that for Minsky the problems of the cognitive unconscious are to 
be understood against the background of the kind of technocratic, command-
and-control horizon that accompanied AI from the outset.23
Framing the bugginess of commonsense reasoning and the humour it 
generates in terms of the effective and the ineffective tends to suggest, then, that 
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being ‘inscribable within the formal-material calculus of computation’, or more 
bluntly ‘programmable’, is the ultimate arbiter of what is and is not reasonable. 
But the broader issue is that, with his goal structures and plans, it is evident 
that for Minsky the enemy is thinking that is without purpose, ‘unproductive’ 
thinking, an enemy that must be actively and vigilantly combated. Play and the 
pleasures of humour are of value only in so far as they facilitate the recognition 
and avoidance of bugs, and the point of code – whether glossed as the effective 
commonsense reasoning of individual psychology or the axiomatic structures 
of AI – is to serve some sort of higher end. As he puts it pithily, ‘jokes are 
not really funny at all, but reflect the most serious of concerns; the pursuit of 
sobriety through the suppression of the absurd’.24 Left unchecked, common-
sense reasoning might dissolve in absurd and pointless puzzles, so it is better 
to recode humour within the functional calculus of the work of programming.
Minsky’s essay is of interest then because if it is read as dealing with the 
technological issue of how to write effective computer code, it can be construed 
as developing a concern about the appropriate disciplining of thought among 
computer programmers, as much as being about cognitive processes. Like the 
computational psychology that developed concurrently with the rise of compu-
tation, there appears to be something of a technological underpinning to the 
pleasures and pains of the unconscious in Minsky’s text, an underpinning that 
points to the broader social and political context of production. Without greater 
subjection to the command and control structures exemplified in the closed 
world of AI, computer programmers would not only spend even more time 
debugging code, they might become ineffective and create problems in mission-
critical military software.
While such a reading does a little violence to Minsky’s text, it makes good 
sense from the point of view of the sociology of knowledge, because it suggests 
his concern to make a tacit case for the continuing investment in academic 
computing and more specifically in AI research. Yet the account also points up a 
problem that has been recognized in more historically contextualized accounts 
of the development of programming as an activity. What kind of intelligence is 
needed in order to be a programmer, what kind of thinking is best adapted to 
the structures of software, and must programming ultimately be informed by 
the diktats of technoscience? Questions about what made a good programmer 
were common with the emergence of the software industry, and the theme 
of programming as a ‘black art’ was not uncommon in the 1960s, before 
computing science as a properly academic discipline had emerged. Ensmenger 
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has underlined the extent of discursive connections between the programmer 
and the poet, both of whom are seen to share a demiurgic (or, better, semiurgic, 
as working with signs) capacity for conjuring up something out of nothing. And 
in this respect, Fred Brooks’s reference to the ‘exertions of the imagination’ of 
the programmer (in his classic text The Mythical Man-Month) reminds us of the 
tenacious insistence of the aesthetic on the fringes of the rational under condi-
tions of the latter’s instrumentalization.25 Taking these references together with 
Minsky’s later opening up of the question of humour, one might want to look for 
a rather different reading of the pleasures and pains of programming, a reading 
that, while more openly speculative, takes the question of the fun in software in 
different directions.
Coding for coding’s sake
In the world of computer programming, the computational equivalent of 
paradoxes like that of the Cretan liar would perhaps be something like an 
infinite recursive loop. In this respect, the uncontrolled use of self-referential 
statements is obviously problematic, something that undergraduate students 
learn in Programming 101. But technological determinations of the problem of 
self-reference aside, there is nothing particularly new in the kind of anxiety that 
Minsky feels – and thinks that others should feel too – over the ambiguities and 
inconsistencies in logical, or perhaps, semi-logical thought. In the wake of Frege 
and Russell, developments in symbolic logic in the first part of the twentieth 
century exemplified a suspicion, even hostility, towards the natural languages 
in which such paradoxes as that of the Cretan liar are uttered. Alfred Tarski, for 
example, was moved to claim that there is something ‘evil’ about such languages, 
thereby pointing to the difficulties to which their free use can give rise.26 The 
problem with natural languages is that they offer little in the way of well-
regulated control, and more particularly, do not admit the kind of stratification 
of levels of languages that, by differentiating between object language and meta-
language, would disambiguate self-reference. One cannot avoid the problems 
that speaking for the pleasure of speaking generates other than by a translation 
of one language into a meta-language that re-reads one’s statements as making 
some sort of logically disambiguated truth claim. Yet with Minsky, who does not 
frame the issue as a purely logical one, we learn that the situation is a little more 
complicated than it might at first appear. It is by means of the kind of paradoxes 
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that natural language excels in generating (and which formal systems, albeit in 
a very different way, as we know since Gödel, cannot dispel) that one can learn 
to avoid the useless, purposeless thinking that becomes so ruinous in the devel-
opment of computer software, putting algorithms and data structures at risk of 
wasting memory, never halting, or grinding to a halt where and when it is least 
expected. But we could equally read such paradoxes as pointing towards a kind 
of ‘surplus value’ of code, the idea that the statements of a language (whether 
natural or formal) bear within them a margin of possibility for use that can not 
only upset the existing norms which govern the way that language is or can be 
used, but generate alternative kinds of functioning. In this sense, what logicians 
are inclined to see in terms of ruinous deductive inconsistency might be treated 
as pointing towards a source of change and invention that formalization per se 
struggles to understand.
In this respect, the broad intuition, that logical paradoxes, jokes and 
nonsense tell us something important about computational intelligence is 
correct, but only partially so. There is an unthought connection, which 
Minsky’s text points towards, between the kinds of logical paradoxes explored 
in Ancient Greek philosophy, Freud’s understanding of humour and the 
possibility of coding errors. Humour and the pleasures it generates, it might 
be suggested, arise where codes are played with for coding’s sake, where the 
references of statements recede in importance and the ordered norms of 
cognition lose sway. In this respect, the possibilities of the surplus value of 
code glimpsed in paradox and combated in bugs, suggests a way of under-
standing programming practices and the development of computational forms 
that are not slavishly submitted to ‘goal structures’, ‘plans’ and ‘administrative 
structures’. The development of programmatic structures without real-world 
referents, the possibilities of simulations without any models, might from this 
point of view, be considered key aspects of a ‘black art’, an ‘exertion of the 
imagination’, which a strictly cognitive point of view, anxious about any excess 
of code not correlated in a model referent, does not clarify. It is tempting, in 
fact, to point towards the need for a strictly aesthetic reading of this aspect of 
computation and of the place of fun in software it illuminates. If the project of 
AI was, as Joëlle Proust has claimed, ultimately, a philosophical one, analogous 
to that of Kantian philosophy,27 Minsky’s bugs, and the problematic situation 
of pleasure in relationship to computation they point to, lead us straight from 
software to earlier historical marginalization of aesthetics and enjoyment in 
philosophy. From this point of view, the difficulties of conceptualizing the 
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place of fun in software become a little clearer – the recurrence of some kind 
of aesthetics of experience is almost inevitable when one set of fundamental 
standards – such as that which is entailed in computational formalism – seeks 
to impose itself across the board. Aesthetics, and the painful and pleasurable 
qualities of the affective experience from which it arises, is necessitated 
where cognition fails to capture the ‘wild’ things of the world in determinate 
concepts,28 and in this domain there are ‘no rules, methods, foundations, or 
criteria’.29
But what happens when code is generated for coding’s sake? And what 
might that code consist of? Here the heavily science-inflected accounts of 
computation that stress the way in which it models real-world processes 
hamstring us. Coding for coding’s sake entails exploiting the ‘play’ inherent in 
the structures, types and other elements of computer code that enables them to 
be turned to other, perhaps less work-like, ends. It suggests that the dominant 
view of computation only captures part of the story about software, the part 
that connects most easily with the generally utilitarian understanding of 
technology examined earlier in this chapter, an understanding on which it has 
conferred considerable theoretical sophistication, as exemplified in notions of 
techno-science, cognitive capitalism, immaterial labour and so on. Reframing 
computation and the question of fun in software in terms of code or coding 
for coding’s sake shifts our attention. The particular abstracted theoretical 
terms of the dominant view tend to preclude any appreciation of the material 
specificities of practice or the technical details of structure and function (mere 
implementation details of mechanical-mathematical formulae). By contrast, 
considering the question of fun in software in terms of coding for coding’s sake 
brings the affective and the material back into the picture, linking technical 
structures with everyday practices. The de facto, historical positioning of 
computing and software engineering as instrumental practices does not in and 
of itself ground what these practices might be, or might become, and reading 
coding as ultimately cognitive obscures forms of practice that can then only be 
articulated as a ‘black art’. Exploring software in terms of the ‘play’ of code, the 
excess of possibility it bears within it, is a way of taking this idea of a ‘black art’ 
seriously.
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Enjoying artefactuality, or the politics and pleasures of 
free speech
By reframing the problem posed by Minsky as one that arises because of the 
existence of a kind of ‘play’, a margin of ‘decoding’ inherent in any kind of 
code – manifesting itself in natural language in the paradoxes of self-reference, 
in formal logic as incompleteness – we have a way back to the problem of 
fun in software. As software development became more sophisticated in 
the 1970s and into the 1980s, it becomes less plausible to maintain the view 
that what computer programs do is provide a model of some real-world 
process or set of processes. To put this in slightly different terms, while much 
early work in software engineering was indeed about modelling real-world 
processes (whether that be developing missile guidance systems, airline reser-
vations or some other logistical command-and-control system), the functions 
and routines, algorithms and data structures that make up programs and 
programming possess a margin of decoding that places them in inherent excess 
over the well-structured and organized, useful models of real-world function-
ality. And this, in turn, makes possible those aspects of computation that cannot 
be understood simply as about the extraction of some useful effect from the 
existing world, returning us to that understanding of ‘mekhane’ as a movement 
against or beyond nature, ‘para phusin’, that was mentioned earlier in relation 
to technologies of enjoyment. Computer programs are for the most part heavily 
functional and decidedly functionalized entities, both internally and externally, 
in the sense that they are largely designed for specific purposive activity, to do 
specific things, and in order do these things must be carefully organized as a set 
of algorithms and data structures that function effectively. However, there are 
differences in the kind of functioning that might be obtained from and through 
computer programs, qualitative differences that the strangely abstracted idea of 
software as modelling real-world processes allows us to ignore.
Strictly speaking, many of the things that software models are not real-world 
processes at all, they are things that are brought into being by computational 
technologies themselves. Pointing with a mouse or using a joystick might be a 
bit like real-world processes and they might be implicated in practices that seek 
to replace real-world processes, but we miss what is specific to what software 
itself does if we make some set of assumptions about its successful connection 
to real-world processes our starting point. One might consider that writing on a 
screen using a stylus captures enough of the ‘essentials’ of what writing is to make 
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a claim about modelling plausible, but one would have to forget a great many 
concrete aspects of the experience of writing, as well as the other technologies 
to which it is connected, to do so. Similarly, as hacker history shows us, many 
of the early developments in programming as a set of practices arises from an 
exploration of the technologies themselves, for their own sakes. More pointedly, 
by focusing on the explicitly formalized and the cognitive, it becomes easy to 
forget that a great deal of the work of programming is ultimately a work on and 
with sensibility, a kind of activity that is tacit and cannot be explicitly formalized. 
In this respect, the question of fun in software, and the limitations in cognitive 
and/or formal-logical accounts of computation that have been explored here, 
suggests the need for some fine-grained distinctions in the way in which one 
attempts to account for the connections between technology and enjoyment. 
There is an element of artifice within software that becomes invisible when it 
is approached from within the epistemic framework of logic, at the broadly 
‘molar’ level of organized, functional purposiveness. The ‘demiurgic’ quality of 
software noted by Brooks, its capacity to produce something that did not exist 
before, entails a more detailed focusing on ‘molecular’ processes that are neces-
sarily brought into play in the generation of code: clever tricks with assembly 
language, manipulating the side effects of an algorithm, devising workarounds, 
the smoke and mirrors of user interface design, and so on. The virtuoso smarts 
of programming practice that get software working can of course eventually be 
explained logically if the code compiles, the app works and users accept it. But 
in doing so, the process disappears into the product and the experimenting, 
the ‘bricolage’ gets forgotten.30 And similarly the algorithmic operations of the 
code itself, when software is used, are not exhaustively explained by the tasks 
for which they are devised and employed. Anyone can get hypnotically captured 
by the pleasures of algorithmic repetition, endless scrolling or clicking-through, 
linking, ticking, pointing, clicking … The point is that the technical affordances 
of code, its margins of possibility, the practices that follow these possibilities 
in the construction of software and the broader connection between software 
and the real-world situations in which it eventually gets used entail a kind of 
functioning that operates aesthetically, a functioning that is difficult to under-
stand within the dominant ways of exploring computation.
However, those aspects of software that are marginal in the formal-logical, 
epistemological views of computing science take on a major importance 
when considered in other fields of knowledge and other kinds of practice. It 
is not just that the virtuoso pleasures of programming practice become more 
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readily visible when one casts, say, an ethnographic eye over open-source 
software development – as E. Gabriella Coleman has done – but that struc-
turally important aspects of software as such come to the fore. Legal debates 
around software considered in terms of freedom of speech suggest that a 
politics of rights, albeit a liberal one framed in terms of US law,31 recognizes 
precisely what formal logic prefers not to: that computer programming must be 
understood as a kind of enunciative process. Free software, such as the Debian 
distribution of the Linux operating system discussed by Coleman, is legally 
analogous to the freedom of speech protected by law in the United States by 
the First Amendment. The development of licensing practices that allow source 
code to be used, modified and distributed ‘as if ’ that code were ‘actual’ speech 
discloses a broader fact about the formal-material code of software: it is a set 
of ‘utterances’ that take place in the world, that are connected to agents who 
‘do’ that uttering. The fact that the history of software and its development is 
one that has been dominated by proprietary jurisdiction that ties software in 
to heavily commercial, highly capitalised organizations should not preclude 
recognition that software is a semiotic artefact, a set of operations in and on 
codes that implies the ongoing, repeated fact of enunciation. Something gets 
‘expressed’ in software, and legal discourse around the First Amendment 
captures and frames it, as Coleman puts it, in terms of ‘personal control and 
autonomous production’.32 US law then, is attentive, in its own individualistic 
way, to a dimension of software – its quality as enunciation – to which coding 
for coding’s sake has also drawn our attention, because the kind of play that 
we have argued becomes visible with paradox is closely linked to enunciation. 
Contemporary logic has a tendency to exclude the ‘fact’ of speaking, uttering 
or articulating from its framework, or at least to capture it in its own terms. 
To acknowledge enunciation per se risks bringing back into the codes of logic 
something – often a ‘subject’ that would threaten the absoluteness of the logic 
one is advocating. The claim of formal logic (and hence the explanatory ground 
of computation) is to have escaped the experiential starting point presupposed 
in natural language. Yet as has been seen, enunciation cannot really be so easily 
excluded. The problem of self-reference that was discussed earlier demonstrates 
this readily. Enunciation is problematic for theories of language and logic that 
seek to frame those languages – formal or otherwise – in purely self-consistent 
ways, because the fact of enunciation, of the act of speaking, uttering, inscribing, 
marks what is spoken, uttered, inscribed with an excess that cannot be captured 
within formally explicit structures. In this respect, relying on a formal-logical 
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account of software precludes the development of an attentiveness to both the 
enjoyment that is afforded within and by software, the ‘expressive’ dimension of 
the experimental exploration of the possibilities inhering in coding languages, 
structures and technologies, and the politics of it. Yet law thinks otherwise, and 
it feeds back into programming practices, adding an interesting constraint on 
the way in which free and open-source software gets developed. Enunciation 
brings the messiness of the world back and forces us to connect coding or 
programming with practice in more rigorous ways. Indeed, it is precisely to the 
enunciative dimensions of programming that the virtuosity that is so frequently 
extolled within programming communities draws our attention. Programmers 
get a kick out of the code they write and the aesthetic qualities it displays. But 
at the same time, that aesthetics, and the pleasure and pain that comes with it, 
forms the starting point for an investigation of the politics of software freed 
from the epistemological trappings of modern techno-science.
Conclusion
This chapter started by pinpointing some of the historical and conceptual 
obstacles to developing an understanding of the place of fun in software. Those 
obstacles, it was suggested, necessitate a somewhat speculative, philosophi-
cally oriented set of tools to make it possible to develop an understanding of 
the connections between computational technologies and enjoyment that does 
not marginalize the technical as such. Unfortunately for the question of fun in 
software, it is rather too easy to rationalize away those aspects of computation 
that can’t be readily parsed in terms of the discourses of computing science, 
because computing science typically provides a broad set of abstractions for 
the selective exploration of programming and for software engineering more 
generally. One of the consequences of this has been that the question of fun and 
enjoyment in computing more generally has been marginalized and misunder-
stood in terms of individual psychology: it is not easy to think through the set of 
processes – both technical and social – that shape the possibilities of enjoyment 
in computational technology, when one’s conceptual framework abstracts 
pleasure and pain into subjective judgements of usability. The philosopher 
of science Isabelle Stengers has argued, with regard to modern science more 
generally, that ‘the favourite vice of our tradition [is] to construct a perfectly 
convincing argument that, as if by chance, has the capacity to dissimulate or 
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condemn a question that it doesn’t feel very certain about’.33 This is a claim with 
direct implications for the way in which software and software development gets 
understood, as one layer of formal-logical abstraction after another shapes the 
increasingly sophisticated Taylorist scrutiny that team leaders, project managers 
and consultants bring to bear on the development of software. It would be easy 
at this point simply to conclude that as far as fun in software goes, the possi-
bility of a different reading of programming practices and coding structures 
– one in which enjoyment is more than a little bit of an add-on, a sweetener to 
make exploitation easier to bear – has missed the point. Indeed from the point 
of view of the hyperfunctional quality of many digital technologies, this has a 
plausibility that borders on the self-evident. Yet something does not quite add 
up in the techno-scientific worldview, and the abstracted starting point it offers 
for considering computation makes it easy to forget the ways in which code and 
coding practices form matters of expression in their own right, which can be 
played with, twisted and bent beyond the diktat of instrumental norms and so 
lend themselves – in principle, if not always in practice – to frivolous pleasures 
that might escape the unreasonable exactness of algorithms.
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2Bend Sinister : Monstrosity and Normative 
Effect in Computational Practice
Simon Yuill
To learn programming is to embark on years of practice, learning to engage 
with the unknowable, while battling with complex and sometimes unhelpful 
theory.
Alex McLean, ‘Exclusion in Free Software Culture’1
What pleasure does programming give? This daunting summary given by Alex 
McLean neatly summarizes all that may dissuade someone from taking up 
the challenge, although for others it may be all the incentive required. Beyond 
mere masochism, or intellectual bravado, in what forms does pleasure arise in 
the labour of coding? A common response is that offered under the guise of 
elegance, that there is a certain satisfaction derived from writing an algorithm 
that performs its task in a particularly effective and clear manner. Such elegance 
is often postulated as something understood aesthetically, as something that is 
both an intuitive sensuous response and also a matter of cultivated taste. Such is 
the position put forward in Donald Knuth’s The Art of Computer Programming. 
For McLean this pleasure is found by coding in nightclubs. feedback.pl is a 
Perl script by McLean that enables a programmer to perform live improvised 
music by writing and editing simple algorithms that are executed in realtime 
– a practice known as livecoding. In providing McLean a means of colliding 
programming and dancing, the xterm2 and techno, feedback.pl unleashes a 
previously unknown pleasure that situates the arduous labour of coding within 
the hedonistic monstrations of clubbing: ‘with hundreds of people dancing to 
my Perl, jumping about to my subroutines, whooping as I started up a new 
script’.3 As such it challenges many norms of programming practice and societal 
expectations of what programming is, and reverses the established (non)
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physicality of the programmer.4 Even while making this challenge, feedback.
pl remains a highly skilful exemplification of Knuth’s elegant coding which, as 
Knuth describes it, ‘can be an aesthetic experience much like composing poetry 
or music’.5 McLean’s program itself is brief and conceptually succinct. In an 
article presenting the project, Hacking Perl in Nightclubs, McLean provides a 
coding example based around a modulo operation on a divisor of four, creating 
a basic four-four rhythm against which more complex polyrhythms are played, 
both encapsulating and transcending the quintessence of modern dance music 
in a few short lines of code:6
sub bang {
 my $self = shift;
 my $note = 100;
 $note += 50 if $self->{bangs} % 4 == 0;
 $note -= 30 if $self->{bangs} % 3 == 0;
 $note += 60 if $self->{bangs} % 7 == 0;
 beep($note, 40);
 $self->code->[0] = ‘# note: ’ . $note;
 $self->modified;
}
But things could turn another way. With minor modifications a program such 
as feedback.pl could direct the programmer’s text not to the Perl interpreter 
but in some other direction such as /dev/dsp, the basic audio output on UNIX 
and Linux systems. This would result in a situation in which text typed into 
a computer terminal, rather than composing an algorithm, would instead be 
directly rendered as raw sound, as used by ap/xxxxx in their performances.7 The 
exact same text that in McLean’s hands produced a highly danceable minimal 
techno would now be heard as seemingly random, and sometimes painful, 
noise.
Another twist might take us in a different direction, like that of Amy 
Alexander’s extreme whitespace which injects blank characters into the command 
line terminal as you type.8 Also written in Perl and operating according 
to a similar principle of feedback between terminal input and background 
process as McLean’s program, extreme whitespace quickly turns the normally 
stable environment of the terminal screen into a swirling vortex of characters 
reminiscent of early video art.9 These works, of ap/xxxxx and Alexander, also 
exploit a situational incongruity in their delivery, they exhibit a behaviour we 
might not expect, in a form we might not predict. They do so, however, through 
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a practice of coding that is less aligned with Knuthian elegance and more closely 
associated with those used in system hacking and debugging. These bring forth 
an entirely different set of pleasures, ones that turn from the dexterous to the 
sinister.
Perhaps, ironically, it is Knuth who best explains such sinister pleasures. In 
his essay ‘The Errors of TEX’, he outlines the process of creating what he calls 
‘torture tests’:
Instead of using a normal, large application to test a software system, I generally 
get best results by writing a test program that no sane user would ever think 
of writing. My test programs are intended to break the system, to push it to its 
extreme limits, to pile complication on complication, in ways that the system 
programmer could never have consciously anticipated. To prepare such test 
data, I get into the meanest, nastiest frame of mind that I can manage, and I 
write the cruellest code I can think of; then I turn around and embed that in 
even nastier constructions that are almost obscene. The resulting test program 
is so crazy that I couldn’t possibly explain to anybody else what it is supposed to 
do; nobody else would care! 10
It is significant how much of the ‘torture test’ embodies the inverse of Knuth’s 
own paradigms of elegance, in particular that the torture code is so complex 
as to be unintelligible and impossible to explain. If elegance is dependent 
upon a certain adherence to or construction of norms, the performance 
of programming itself is dependent upon the cruel and obscene.11 These 
monstrosities are the forms in which the materiality of computational process is 
convulsed into view, confronting us with disturbing presences that disrupt our 
normative expectations of how code should operate. For a norm to be effective 
it must demonstrate, must prove in performance, its ability to transcend such 
monstrosities. But there is little horror in Knuth’s torture, for it seems that it 
is not so much that he seeks pain but laughter, that moment when physical 
composure becomes unravelled and erupts into the social.
Throughout his career, Knuth has emphasized that often seemingly pointless 
but pleasurable activities are an important aspect of how a programmer comes 
to develop their craft.12 A recent publication, Selected Papers on Fun and 
Games, documents many of his own such activities. These include gathering 
photographs of various diamond-shaped road signs, collecting number plates 
with mathematical puns in them and his first published writing, the fictitious 
Potrzebie System of Weights and Measures, printed by his school journal and then 
MAD magazine in 1957.13 Indeed, The Art of Computer Programming is littered 
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Figure 2.1 Flowchart from ‘Procedure for Reading This Set of Books’
Source Knuth, Donald E., The Art of Computer Programming, Volume 1: Fundamental Algorithms, 3rd edn, 
p. xii–xiii. ©1998. Printed and electronically reproduced by permission of Pearson Education, Inc., 
Upper Saddle River, N J. 
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with various jokes, games and pranks. The first volume of the series opens with 
a section entitled ‘Procedure for Reading This Set of Books’ which is set out in 
the form of an algorithm accompanied by a flowchart. The reader is admonished 
to ‘follow the steps faithfully’, and these include instructions such as:
14. Are you tired? If not, go back to step 7.
15. Go to sleep. Then, wake up, and go back to step 7.14
For a book that is regarded by many as one of the defining texts of computing 
science, and that, for Knuth, constitutes a major life’s work (he began writing 
in 1962 and is yet to complete all seven volumes), this is perhaps not what we 
might expect. While the style of humour may be particular to Knuth, the fact 
of humour being so integral to the practice of programming goes deeper than 
just one writer’s authorial manner. Jokes, humour and the absurd have a relation 
to programming that is not only cultural but also constituent to its very being.
A symptom of professional immaturity
Released by MIT Press in 1978, Roger E. Kaufman’s A FORTRAN Coloring Book 
is the first published computing text to use cartoon and comic strip drawings as 
a pedagogic medium.15 Its approach has been adopted by a number of other texts 
on languages such as C, Pascal and Lisp, and, it could be argued, is the archetype 
to the entire For Dummies series and all its numerous imitators.16 There is, 
however, something dark within Kaufman’s text that sets it apart from the more 
anodyne humour of these later works. The For Dummies books primarily draw 
upon humour as a means to grease the wheel of cognitive capital, facilitating 
the ever-recurrent re-skilling (and de-skilling) of the contemporary IT worker. 
They represent an end-point in the transformation of the use of humour to 
aid production within the workplace, which has devolved from being a liberal 
characteristic of privileged workers such as scientists and creatives, as explored 
in Arthur Koestler’s The Act of Creation (1964), to being a general form of 
managerial control known as ‘structured fun’.17 Stylistically, A FORTRAN 
Coloring Book most resembles the world of Dr. Seuss, and rather than offering 
a series of ironic platitudes such as stalk the pages of For Dummies books, it 
engages in a scatological satire that positions the reader in a somewhat Freudian 
relation to its subject. The opening pages describe the computer as ‘like your 
Mommy’s Bureau Drawers’, illustrated as a piece of ornate Gothic furniture 
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that looms over the accompanying text. Input/output routines are explained 
in reference to a part-human, part-bird-like character sat upon the toilet, and 
arrays are introduced through a short example called FONDLE that traverses 
the bureau drawers. For all its invocation of the format of children’s literature, 
A FORTRAN Coloring Book is not a book for children. Its use of cartoons and 
Figure 2.2 ‘A Computer is like Your Mommy’s Bureau Drawers..’.
Source Kaufman, Roger, A FORTRAN Coloring Book, p.1, © 1978 Massachusetts Institute of Technology, by 
permission of the MIT Press.
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the particular bite of its humour have more in common with the unofficial 
fanzine culture of graduate research communities. These publications, produced 
on Xerox machine and photo-stencil, were a staple part of environments such 
as the AI Labs at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), and their 
humour can be seen in the various cartoons that adorned the pages of AI Lab 
memos, including the early EMACS manuals written by Richard Stallman.18 
Although based at George Washington University, Kaufman gave classes on 
FORTRAN at MIT, and it was for these that A FORTRAN Coloring Book was 
originally written.
In an essay of 1975, entitled ‘How Do We Tell Truths that Might Hurt?’ 
Edsger Dijkstra dismisses the use of anthropomorphisms in computing as ‘a 
symptom of professional immaturity’.19 While not addressed to Kaufman, such 
might be the description given to the animate bureau drawers and various 
hybrid creatures of the Coloring Book. From Dijkstra’s perspective, this kind of 
heavily metaphorical presentation of programming merely causes confusion 
between what programming is and is not, between what it should and should 
not do. In responding to this critique, McLean has argued that ‘metaphor neces-
sarily structures our understanding of computation’, and elaborates this through 
Alan Blackwell’s analyses of different metaphors invoked by programmers, 
in which ‘components were … described as actors with beliefs and inten-
tions, being social entities acting as proxies for their developers’.20 Blackwell’s 
findings echo the encouragement that Knuth gave to students that in writing 
programming documentation they should find suitable metaphors in which to 
express how the code works, openly dismissing Dijkstra’s position in doing so.21 
But the significance of Kaufman’s book is not that it simply provides us with 
a set of engaging and entertaining metaphors through which we can learn to 
program. We can read A FORTRAN Coloring Book in ways other than those 
of an instruction manual. Its relation to Dr. Seuss is not merely one of shared 
drawing styles but also one of literary and narrative genres. As a literary work, 
A FORTRAN Coloring Book belongs to the tradition of absurdism and fantasy, 
of Bakhtinian carnival, that includes the inverse logics of The Land of Cockaigne, 
the hybrid creatures of medieval bestiaries, various works of Lewis Carroll 
and Douglas R. Hofstadter’s Gödel, Escher, Bach.22 As this summary of literary 
associations suggests, A FORTRAN Coloring Book is a work that should be read 
as an assemblage. In its internal structure it does not conform to a singular 
genre, it is not purely an instructional manual, nor is it a fully developed satire 
or, arguably, even that much of a colouring book, but rather as an emergent 
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example of its own genre, it assembles different forms and figurations into itself. 
The book is also itself an element within a much larger assemblage of other 
texts, objects and practices. This is an assemblage that includes Kaufman’s other 
writings, programs and engineering projects, but also those of others within the 
emergence of computer science and the much more circuitous co-evolution of 
modern humour, logic and computational practices.
Whereas Dijkstra and Knuth contributed to the development of computer 
science itself, Kaufman has been primarily involved in the application of 
software to engineering issues. Kaufman came to engineering through work in 
designing and building theatrical stage equipment, including early experiments 
in digital control systems.23 One of his main contributions to computing was 
KINSYN (KINematic SYNthesis), originally developed in the late 1960s and 
1970s, written in FORTRAN and running on an IBM 1130.24 Developed out of 
Kaufman’s theatre work, KINSYN is regarded as the first visual simulation tool 
for designing kinematic mechanisms.25 Early applications of the tool included 
the design of an orthotic knee brace and, following from this, the development 
of assistive technologies has been an ongoing area of interest for Kaufman.26 His 
other main book, Introduction to Burmester Theory, provides a theoretical and 
mathematical background to kinematic synthesis. It was originally produced in 
1973 as a hand-written duplicate and featured cartoons similar to those in A 
FORTRAN Coloring Book.27
Like Dijkstra and Knuth, Kaufman began working at a time when much 
of the standardization and norms of programming languages and practices 
familiar to current-day programmers were not fully established. He had to 
implement his own FORTRAN compiler in order to support the calculation of 
complex numbers required for KINSYN, and in his initial work using SNOBOL 
(an early symbolic manipulation language developed at Bell Labs) he exposed 
numerous bugs and errors in the core language implementation.28
FORTRAN was developed at IBM in the 1950s, and derived its name from 
The IBM Mathematical FORmula TRANslating System.29 The emphasis within 
the original language design was on providing a means of converting mathe-
matical formulae into assembly code instructions. As such it retained many of 
the features of assembly language programming that explicitly reference the 
computer memory and hardware, and early versions did not provide the kinds 
of higher-level abstractions that simplify program structure such as recursion 
and sub-routines.30 This also resulted in a lack of standardization across different 
hardware implementations, with certain routines, such as a DO loop, outputting 
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different results depending on the particular machine they ran on.31 Writing 
FORTRAN programs therefore required familiarity with the internal mecha-
nisms of the computer, in order to understand issues such as memory allocation 
and addressing, output formatting, etc. However, as access to computers was 
limited during this period (prior to the rise of personal desktop systems), many 
programmers often had little hands-on experience with the machines they 
wrote for.32 A program was typically written by hand on paper, known as a 
coding form, and typed onto a set of punch-cards which were then fed into the 
computer. To program, it could be said, was to compose a form of formalized 
literature directed to an imaginal machine.
The humour of Kaufman’s book is endemic to this situation, not merely as a 
response to its practical frustrations and absurdities, but as a kind of theatrical 
praxis which mediates between the various manifestations of the human and 
machinic that constitute its assemblage: the encounter between mathematics, 
machines and aesthetics. This is based within the theatrical for it depends upon 
a ‘bringing into view’ of disparate forms and actions from which a theory of the 
computational might develop, yet which is not yet fully defined.
First published in 1900, Le Rire: Essai sur la signification du comique 
(Laughter: An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic) has been described as 
Bergson’s only text to attempt a systematic treatment of aesthetics, primarily 
drawing upon dramatical forms of comedy such as Molière.33 What is distinctive 
about Bergson’s text is that it situates the humorous, the comedic, within a 
zone of contagion between the vitality of the human subject and the functional 
performativity of the automata, between spirit and matter:
This soul imparts a portion of its winged lightness to the body it animates: 
the immateriality which thus passes into matter is what is called gracefulness. 
Matter, however, is obstinate and resists. It draws to itself the ever-alert activity 
of this higher principle, would fain convert it to its own inertia and cause it to 
revert to mere automatism. It would … imprint on the whole person such an 
attitude as to make it appear immersed and absorbed in the materiality of some 
mechanical occupation instead of ceaselessly renewing its vitality … Where 
matter thus succeeds in dulling the outward life of the soul, in petrifying its 
movements and thwarting its gracefulness, it achieves, at the expense of the 
body, an effect that is comic.34
Bergson’s attitude towards automatism sits within his broader critique of the 
mechanical, which, in certain aspects, follows from that of Romantic thinkers 
such as Herder in positing an opposition between the mechanical and the 
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organic, the material and spiritual.35 The mechanical, as that which is an artificial 
assemblage of disparate elements not normally related to one another in ‘nature’, 
contrasts with the organic as that which is constituted from innately related 
elements forming an integrated whole in which each performs its ‘naturally’ 
given role or, in Bergson’s conception, the integrity of their common duration.36 
The machinic has materiality and motion, but no spirit or grace, for its motion 
derives from the spatialization of time as number. This takes the mechanical as 
comprising both physical machines and institutional forms – the examples in 
Le Rire include both the operation of machines and the formalistic behaviour of 
bureaucrats. Bergson contends that the comic lies in the exposure of a repetition 
in behaviour which, like mathematics, exists outside the experience of time, 
contradicting the accrual of difference embodied in his notion of duration. 
However, while he touches upon the role of repetition in poetry, he does not 
make a clear distinction between repetition that is comical and that of, say, 
dance or music, which may similarly contradict our sense of time as duration 
yet be elegant, joyous or grave.37 As his examples demonstrate, it is not the 
fact of repetition in itself from which the comical arises, but rather, that the 
repetition appears incongruous in regard to existing social norms. Humour here 
performs a normative role, it ‘corrects men’s manners’ and differentiates society 
according to that which is desirable and undesirable within a given social order:
Laughter must be something of this kind, a sort of social gesture. By the fear 
which it inspires, it restrains eccentricity, keeps constantly awake and in mutual 
contact certain activities of a secondary order which might retire into their shell 
and go to sleep, and, in short, softens down whatever the surface of the social 
body may retain of mechanical inelasticity. Laughter, then, does not belong to 
the province of esthetics alone, since unconsciously (and even immorally in 
many particular instances) it pursues a utilitarian aim of general improvement.38
Humour relates the aesthetic to the moral. That which becomes comical is that 
which fails the judgement of ‘good sense’ – Bergson’s Le Bon Sens addresses 
issues similar to Le Rire.39 This ‘good sense’ includes examples that today’s reader 
might consider merely prejudicial, such as the discussions about the hunchback 
and Negro as objects of laughter. Humour and its morals are historically and 
culturally situated, and similar examples are to be found in Schopenhauer’s 
treatment of humour in The World as Will and Idea (1819) and Lewis Carroll’s 
Symbolic Logic (1896).40 As an instrument of social differentiation, humour 
delineates the terrain of discrimination from which dominant groups and 
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classes operate. It may also, however, facilitate practices through which various 
alternate assemblies seek to constitute themselves against that.
Eric Raymond’s The Jargon File is a compendium of slang, peppered with 
various jokes and re-instrumentalizations of language through which the 
‘old school’ hacker culture, in which Kaufman worked, identifies itself.41 In 
her study of hacker culture, Gabriella Coleman defines humour as integral 
to hacking practice, not only as a form of social differentiation, but also as a 
modus operandi. Coleman argues that the structure of the hack, as the bringing 
together of unrelated elements so as to produce an unexpected functionality, 
parallels that of the joke, citing Mary Douglas’s definitions of joking as a 
practice that combines ‘disparate elements in such a way that one accepted 
pattern is challenged by the appearance of another’.42 She illustrates this with an 
example of a succinct Perl hack that, in its attentiveness to the aesthetics of the 
language, is analogous to those of McLean’s feedback.pl and Alexander’s extreme 
whitespace:
#count the number of stars in the sky
$cnt = $sky =~ tr/*/*/;
The code counts the number of asterisks (stars) within a piece of text held by 
the variable named $sky compressing what might normally be six lines of code 
into one by exploiting ‘certain side effects found in the constructs of the Perl 
language’, and thereby creating a kind of poetical play within the source code 
of a program.43
In his theory of the joke as a ‘diagram of innovative action’ Paolo Virno 
describes the joke as an empirical use of language that tests the contingency of 
normative behaviour and grammatical constructs.44 The joke is a playful use of 
language that performs unexpected twists of meaning, short-circuits of logic 
and, in so doing, disrupts both linguistic and social norms. In developing this 
theory, Virno adopts a set of terms from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics:
a.) phrónesis, or practical know-how; b.) orthós logos, the discourse that 
enunciates the correct norm according to which the action in one single case 
takes shape; c.) the perception of kairós, of the proper moment for performing 
an action; d.) éndoxa, that is, the opinions prevalent from time to time within a 
community of speakers.45
In particular, the joke applies innovative, or unexpected, forms of know-how, 
phrónesis, in order to test the viability of given éndoxa, and thereby expose the 
52 Fun and Software
contingency of ‘all situations’ and ‘the way in which these situations are to be 
dealt with’.46 As such, Virno’s theory is entirely the opposite of Bergson’s, in 
which the joke serves to establish and reinforce prevailing éndoxa.
Among his personal engineering projects, Kaufman demonstrates a hacker-
inventiveness in his PantsPutterOnner and ShirtPutterOnner devices which, at 
first glance, have the appearance of Heath Robinson or Rube Goldberg contrap-
tions, made, in one case, from elements that look to be adapted from household 
plumbing. These are a ‘pair of dressing machines … designed and built … for 
a student born without arms’.47 Their construction epitomizes the elegance of a 
hack that, taking existing materials and given existing norms, makes possible 
that which might otherwise not be. Susan Leigh Star has questioned the way in 
which technologies are brought to address such needs, as though it simply ‘were 
a matter of expanding the exhaustive search for “special needs” until they are all 
tailored or customized’.48 She calls instead for a questioning of the ‘distribution 
of the conventional’, asking, ‘What is the phenomenology of encounters with 
conventions and standardized forms, as well as with new technologies?’49 Unlike 
cosmetic prostheses, however, Kaufman’s devices do not seek to standardize 
the body in conformance with societal norms (such as we would impose if we 
were to give the student prosthetic arms and insist he dress ‘like everyone else’) 
but rather accept and accompany the given physicality of their user. Seemingly 
arising from the joke and the very forms of that which is derogated in Bergson’s 
‘utilitarian aim of general improvement’, the automata and the ‘deformed’ body, 
the dressing machines instead demonstrate that even the most mundane of 
activities, that of getting oneself dressed, can bring into action numerous forms 
of phrónesis entirely outside existing éndoxa.
The orthós logos announced by Bergson, that it is laughable for a living body 
to incorporate the machinic (the becoming-machine), mirrors that of Dijkstra, 
that it is immature for the machinic to be given human qualities (the becoming-
human).50 What emerges between the elements assembled across Kaufman’s 
practice, however, between the dressing machines and the colouring book, is 
neither simply mecha-morphic nor anthropomorphic, but rather that which 
‘affords opportunity for realising that an accepted pattern has no necessity’.51 
The hack/joke replicates the structure of the machinic. Each constitutes an 
assemblage of elements that are not ‘normally’ brought into relation – whether 
in terms of societal norms, linguistic standards or conventions of the ‘natural’. 
Kaufman’s work does not succumb to the criticisms of Bergson or Dijkstra, 
however, but rather exposes their contingency. Virno ascribes the ‘violence’ 
 Bend Sinister 53
of human language to its potential to negate being, to say that a person is a 
not-human. In his critique of Hegelian dialectic, Bergson dismisses the category 
of the negative as the construction of a ‘false problem’ that constructs criteria 
that cannot exist, and yet laughter in Le Rire is itself the performance of such 
‘violent’ negation.52 Here, laughter responds to and identifies the not-human 
within the human, just as Knuth’s torture test identifies the not-computational 
within his own software code. For Virno, however, humour can move beyond 
such first-order negations to not only expose the contingency of such patterns 
but also, as in Kaufman, to become the negation of negation.53
Kaufman constructs a comedic theatre that operates through a ‘bringing into 
view’ of all that which is positively regarded (that which constitutes ‘theory’, the 
thing we choose to contemplate) and that which is negated (the not-human, the 
not-computational) and presents them as an ad hoc assemblage that is prior 
to any such selection or normative structure. In Greek tragedy the body of the 
dead hero would be revealed upon the ekkyklêma, a piece of machinery wheeled 
onto the stage, exposing a truth that might otherwise be hidden.54 In comedies 
the body would spring to life, or something entirely unexpected would appear. 
Kaufman’s play brings on stage the machinery of computation and its concom-
itant desires and ambiguities. His characters perform the hybrid agency of 
human and non-human actors, the ‘promises of monsters’ of which Donna 
Haraway wrote: ‘Their boundaries materialize in social interaction among 
humans and non-humans, including the machines and other instruments that 
mediate exchanges at crucial interfaces and that function as delegates for other 
actors’ functions and purposes’.55
The promise is not entirely made good in Kaufman, however, for there 
are conflicting tendencies within his satire that echo the ‘unequal struc-
turing’ between objects, science and nature whose problematic Haraway maps. 
Kaufman delights in the base corporeality of the computational in a form 
of Bakhtinian grotesque, yet, at the same time projects ambivalent anxieties 
through the construction of the computer as the mother-bureau hybrid, both 
desired and feared. This Oedipal configuration invokes the female-monster 
figures of eighteenth-century satire, such as Swift’s Goddess Criticism and 
Spenser’s Errour. These, as Susan Gubar has argued, allegorize what their 
authors considered to be forms of dangerous and unruly writing conflated with 
uncontrollable natural processes of endless eating, defecating and childbirth.56
This suggests a different reading of the anthropomorphic in regard to the 
computational, one that expresses both that which gives a human form to a 
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non-human object but also that which shapes the human. The ‘hurtful truth’ 
pronounced by Dijkstra was directed against what he considered to be the false 
claims of John von Neumann that human brains were a form of computing 
machine that a computer could mimic and the ideological ambitions of AI.57 
Dijkstra’s critique can be understood as an accompaniment to the distrust of 
machinery that haunts his other writings, and in response to which he enacted his 
own anthropomorphism. Dijkstra performed computation itself as an inherently 
human action, insisting on working out programs in long-hand writing rather 
than on a machine (long after coding forms became obsolete) and arguing that the 
true computer for which the programmer wrote was not the compromised physi-
cality of hardware but the pure intellectual ‘machine’ of the programming manual:
Eventually, there are two ‘machines’. On the one hand there is the physical 
machine that is installed in the computer room, can go wrong, requires power, 
air conditioning, and maintenance and is shown to visitors. On the other hand 
there is the abstract machine as defined in the manual, the ‘thinkable’ machine 
for which the programmer programs and with respect to which the question 
of program correctness is settled.... Originally I viewed it as the function of 
the abstract machine to provide a truthful picture of the physical reality. Later, 
however, I learned to consider the abstract machine as the ‘true’ one, because 
that is the only one we can ‘think’ ...58
There is an irony in Dijkstra’s practice for it is almost as though he were unable 
to escape the mise-en-scène of Turing’s description of the problem of compu-
tation as that of a human ‘computer’ sitting at a desk writing and erasing marks 
on an endless strip of paper, not knowing when, or if, he can stop.59 There is a 
double irony in that Dijkstra pioneered the interrupt mechanism, an element 
relating external hardware, such as keyboards, to the internal processing system. 
The interrupt enables a programmer to write and run code interactively on a 
computer, a key innovation that rendered the coding form obsolete, and without 
which McLean’s feedback.pl would not be possible.60 Dijkstra’s distrust also 
echoes that of many mathematicians towards computer-demonstrated proofs, 
such as evidenced, famously, in the lukewarm response to Appel and Haken’s 
proof for the Four Colour Theorem (1976). The theorem seeks to determine 
whether or not all the countries on a map can be coloured in using only four 
distinct colours and ensuring that no two neighbouring countries are coloured 
the same. This was the first major theorem to be proven using software assis-
tance having eluded purely human analysis since it was originally conjectured 
in 1852, yet its solution was not celebrated.61 The negative response of the 
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mathematics community is epitomized in the words of one critic, Ian Stewart, 
who argued that this approach did not explain why the proof was correct:
This is partly because the proof is so long that it is hard to grasp (including 
the computer calculations, impossible!), but mostly because it is so apparently 
structureless. The answer appears as a kind of monstrous coincidence. Why is 
there an unavoidable set of reducible configurations? The best answer at the 
present time is: there just is. The proof: here it is, see for yourself. The mathema-
tician’s search for hidden structure, his pattern-binding urge, is frustrated.62
The Appel-Haken proof confounded the aesthetics of mathematicians for the set 
of 1,482 different map configurations required to verify it could not be grasped 
by human imagination.63 It was not succinct. It was not elegant. In combining 
human and mechanical means it transgressed the prohibition against crossing 
between different disciplines such as that between arithmetic and geometry, the 
metabasis ex allo genos, as established in Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics.64 The 
proof exuded an excess of computational materiality, it had contagion, it could 
not be given human shape.
Dijkstra’s long-hand computations can be fully understood as anthropo-
morphic in the dual sense of that which gives human shape to something, and 
as that which shapes the human. Elsewhere in the essay critiquing anthropo-
morphism Dijkstra argues: ‘The tools we use have a profound (and devious!) 
influence on our thinking habits, and, therefore, on our thinking abilities’.65
The choice between computational machine on the one hand and pen and 
paper on the other is, for Dijkstra, a conscious choice of how the programmer 
himself is shaped.66 The expression of such a choice is also the projection of 
a particular becoming-human onto the tool itself, and therefore a form of 
anthropomorphism. As Paul de Man writes, the anthropomorphic is that which 
seeks ‘to reconcile the pleasures of the mind with those of the senses and to 
unite aesthetics with epistemology’.67 Barany and MacKenzie argue that the 
persistence of chalk and blackboard within mathematical practice, long after 
digital displays and PowerPoint have dominated all other areas of academic 
presentation, is that the physical writing of the equations constitutes a form of 
performance through which mathematical proofs are given material validity.68 
It is as though the equation must be written out, rather than simply shown 
on a slide, in order for it to come into being as an object that we can perceive 
(aesthetics) and comprehend (epistemology). When aesthetics and episte-
mology fail to coincide the effect may either be monstrous or comic.
56 Fun and Software
Figure 2.3 One of Prof. Dr Edsger W. Dijkstra’s handwritten papers, discussing 
‘polite’ notation, EWD1300
Source Full text: http://www.cs.utexas.edu/users/EWD/ewd13xx/EWD1300.PDF
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Selfish computers of happiness
Knuth’s ‘Computer Programming as an Art’ was originally presented as 
his acceptance speech for the 1974 Turing Award.69 It takes the form of a 
survey of different discussions about art and aesthetics in relation to compu-
tation and number with references that range from a definition of logic by 
thirteenth-century philosopher Duns Scotus to a nineteenth-century manual on 
accountancy. Within this there are two philosophers whom he quotes at length 
and gives particular prominence to: Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill.70 
From Bentham he derives the concept of utility as the best measure of good and 
bad: ‘There is no taste which deserves the epithet good, unless it be the taste for 
such employments which, to the pleasure actually produced by them, conjoin 
some contingent or future utility…’71
Bentham’s concept of the good as that which is both measurable and pleas-
urable, and given algorithmic expression through his felicific calculus, underlies 
and gives a moral dimension to Knuth’s concept of programming elegance 
and its more pragmatic expression, explored at some length in The Art of 
Computer Programming and other texts, of seeking to quantitatively measure 
the scale and efficiency of a given algorithm in terms of its running time and 
use of resources.72 From Mill he derives the argument that art and science are 
complementary, that all disciplines have both an art and a science to them, with 
art supplying the capacity to judge that knowledge produced by science which 
has greatest value to practice: ‘Art … brings together from parts of the field of 
science most remote from one another, the truths relating to the production of 
the different and heterogeneous conditions necessary to each effect which the 
exigencies of practical life require’.73
Here, art is that which defines the conditions under which knowledge 
becomes productive. For Knuth these conditions are both economic, the effective 
use of resources, and aesthetic, a sense for that which is harmonious and ‘good’. 
Bentham and Mill help define what may be described as Knuth’s ethics of 
production, the behaviours and moral values under which programming is 
practised. The realization of this in elegant code gives material shape to the 
larger project of Literate Programming which Knuth has advocated throughout 
his career and created software tools to facilitate. Just as these ethics draw upon 
the ideas of English liberal philosophers, Bentham and Mill, the practice of 
Literate Programming also adopts the aesthetic medium most closely related 
to the expression of liberal thinking, the essay: ‘The practitioner of literate 
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programming can be regarded as an essayist, whose main concern is with 
exposition and excellence of style’.74
For the Earl of Shaftesbury the essay was the ideal vehicle through which 
to define and disseminate the new subjectivity of the self-possessing liberal 
individual.75 This was given form through Shaftesbury’s concept of politeness as 
a mode of cultural and political action. Acquired through appropriate education 
and demonstrated through exhibiting appropriate taste, politeness offered a 
means of acquiring authority within the transactions of daily life and commerce 
that did not derive from the institutional power of the monarchy or the 
Church whose influence had fallen in the wake of the English 1688 Revolution. 
Depending as it did upon access to a privileged means of education and 
consumption, the practice of politeness retained social differentiations while 
being able to operate across all contexts, assuring both liberty and distinction 
to those who had it. Politeness was both a literary and theatrical practice for it 
was disseminated through particular modes of writing, and applied as a kind 
of extemporary performance on the social stage. This gave voice to a moral 
philosophy that was conversational and concrete rather than speculative and 
overly abstract, and whose aesthetic was its means of appeal: ‘The author 
wrote in an agreeable English. He punctuated the discourse with humour. He 
preserved moral scale, eschewing, at one end of the spectrum, excess detail and 
elaboration and, on the other, mysterious depth and abstraction’.76
While politeness gave qualitative polish to the emerging discourse of English 
liberalism, it was conjoined with another mode of writing that gave it an effect 
of quantitative rigour, that of mercantile and scientific numerical writing. This 
is described by Mary Poovey as a gestural mathematics, the use of mathematical 
language to describe philosophical concepts and thereby suggest a correlation 
between the methods of mathematical proof and philosophical argument.77 
Rather than defining the aesthetic as an opening to pure sensuality (as the 
Romantics would later do), the mathematical precedes and shapes the aesthetic 
as defined in this era, for it is from the potential of mathematical thought to 
consider things in the abstract that the notion of the disinterested contem-
plation of the aesthetic derives. Similarly, the concept of the beautiful derives 
from analogy to the harmony of mathematical proportions. This abstract basis 
of aesthetic judgement appears to run counter to the tangibility of discourse 
promoted by Shaftesbury. For Shaftesbury, however, this is resolved in terms of 
class. The aesthetic is not that which is abstract from the world but rather from 
labour, for those who work with their hands, absorbed in materiality through 
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their labour, are unable to think in terms of either the abstract or the disin-
terested; they are, in a word, unaesthetic.78 Aesthetics here is a moral-political 
practice, it makes the abstract concrete and gives it value, for it seeks to instil 
behaviour that is proportionate and ‘true’.
Humour is integral to the realization of this. In ‘Sensus Communis; an Essay 
on the Freedom of Wit and Humour’ (1709), Shaftesbury argues that irony 
and satire (what he calls ‘raillery’) are an ideal means of testing the logic and 
substance of debate:
They may perhaps be Monsters, and not Divinitys, or Sacred Truths, which 
are kept thus choicely, in some dark Corner of our Minds: The Specters may 
impose on us, whilst we refuse to turn ’em every way, and view their Shapes 
and Complexions in every light. For that which can be shewn only in a certain 
Light, is questionable. Truth, ’tis suppos’d, may bear all Lights: and one of those 
principal Lights or natural Mediums, by which Things are to be view’d, in order 
to a thorow Recognition, is Ridicule it-self, or that Manner of Proof by which 
we discern whatever is liable to just Raillery in any Subject.79
In subjecting ideas to the test of ridicule, humour acts as an ‘instrument of 
reason’ exposing that which claims to be proportionate and true yet which rests 
upon a logic that is deformed and ugly.80 As in Knuth’s torture test, raillery 
debugs theory.
For the second edition of Characteristicks of 1714 Shaftesbury commissioned 
a series of engraved iconographies to illustrate its subject matter from the artist 
Simon Gribelin and worked closely with the printer, John Darby Jr, to produce 
the publication to exact standards ensuring that no ink showed through the 
pages as had happened with the first edition.81 Dismayed by the poor quality 
of the electronic typesetting of the second edition of The Art of Computer 
Programming, Knuth set about writing his own software to typeset his books. 
Intended as a short sabbatical project, the work stretched to more than ten years 
and culminated in TEX, now one of the most widely used digital publishing 
tools.82 The first book to be fully typeset in TEX was Concrete Mathematics 
(1989). Written in collaboration with Ronald L. Graham and Oren Patashnik, 
the book grew out of a course taught at Stanford on the mathematical analysis of 
algorithms, started by Knuth in 1970 and first set out in the opening chapter of 
The Art of Computer Programming. A new font, called AMS Euler, was specially 
commissioned from designer Hermann Zapf to typeset the mathematics in the 
book. Echoing Dijkstra’s preference for writing on paper, the font was designed 
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to ‘capture the flavour of mathematics as it might be written by a mathema-
tician with excellent handwriting. A handwritten rather than mechanical style 
is appropriate because people generally create mathematics with pen, pencil, or 
chalk’.83
This explicit evocation of the handwritten can be read in relation to the 
authors’ statement that the book is ‘a kind of manifesto about our favourite 
way to do mathematics’.84 A manifesto that is also expressed in the book’s title, 
Concrete Mathematics, emphasizing the practical applicability of what it taught 
and consciously rejecting the Abstract Mathematics then in vogue in US univer-
sities and the New Math educational systems.85 The book also evokes another 
entirely different practice of inscription. Running throughout the margins of the 
book are various jokes and comments gathered from students on the course that 
the authors call ‘graffiti’:
Some of these marginal markings are merely corny, some are profound; some 
of them warn about ambiguities or obscurities, others are typical comments 
made by wise guys in the back row; some are positive, some are negative, some 
are zero. But they all are real indications of feelings that should make the text 
material easier to assimilate.86
This might seem a little idiosyncratic and self-indulgent, yet, in the light of the 
role of humour in Shaftesbury’s doctrine of politeness and the authors’ own 
explanation, it can be understood as integral to Knuth’s ethics of production. 
It is as though the authors, in a display of polite self-deprecation, wish to 
demonstrate that the subject matter has been subject to the ‘raillery’ of the 
classroom. It also points towards a possible awareness on the authors’ part of 
the role of humour in establishing and cultivating, what might be called, the 
normative pleasures of their practice. This connects to Bentham, in relating 
the intrinsic ‘good’ within a practice to the investment of pleasure and also to 
Knuth’s support for recreational mathematics and toy problems as a means for 
developing that practice through disinterested, pleasurable activities. As Stanley 
Grean puts it in his study of Shaftesbury, humour here is ‘both a method and 
a state of mind’.87 Whereas, however, the Shaftesburian text gestures towards 
the mathematical so as to construct a sense of legitimizing order beneath its 
discourse, the graffiti of Concrete Mathematics and the jokes that punctuate The 
Art of Computer Programming are a form ‘gestural comedics’ whose role is not 
that they entertain or make us laugh, but rather that they correlate the subject 
matter of the texts to a particular temperament and sensitivity. It is through 
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the gesture of the comedic that the graffiti construct and reinforce a particular 
éndoxa, ‘the opinions prevalent from time to time within a community of 
speakers’. Literate Programming, therefore, is not simply a method for writing 
programs, but also of making programmers, of shaping subjectivities. Humour 
constructs a kind of class ethics. As though to paraphrase Shaftesbury: ‘For 
without Wit and Humour, software can hardly have its programmers or be 
programmed’.88
Both Knuth and Kaufman reflect upon the teaching situation through their 
humour, but whereas for Kaufman this negotiates the jointly corporeal and 
imaginal relation between human and machine, in Knuth it negotiates the roles 
of student and tutor. The pedagogical context for Knuth is not simply one phase 
within that process but rather intrinsic to programming itself. Knuth describes 
the act of writing programs as like teaching somebody else to do a task. The 
programmer teaches the machine. The machine, however, also teaches the 
programmer through the way it enforces greater precision on the ‘tutor’ than a 
purely human teaching scenario might require.89 The teaching situation was a 
recursive one, and this recursion gives rise to a new social formation: ‘I thought 
about how it would be to live with such a machine and with the new tools that 
I was creating – sort of like living in a new subculture’.90
Like the Shaftesburian essay, Literate Programming teaches one how to 
behave in a new social order. Knuth’s humour sits within the genealogy of 
polite liberal humour that stretches from Shaftesbury to Bergson for it serves to 
inform the normative conditions under which such a social and cultural order 
comes into being, a ‘social gesture’ that ‘pursues a utilitarian aim of general 
improvement’. It does so through the construction of an ethics of production 
which is also a ‘class’ ethic, that, as explored in the work on Gabriel Tarde, 
links the schoolroom to the economic structure.91 Elegant code, in this context, 
articulates the identity of the programmer within a particular professional 
class, equivalent to the English liberal conception of the ‘order of ranks’ and the 
French professional cadres.
While Shaftesbury was a leading influence upon and advocate of Whiggism, 
he was in certain respects reactionary in regard to his times and the later radical 
liberalism of Bentham. Looking back to the older concepts of virtuous repub-
licanism of the pre-revolutionary writers he criticized those who embraced the 
explicitly quantitative values of emerging mercantilist society as ‘selfish Computers 
of Happiness’.92 Despite the references to Bentham, Knuth does not give over to a 
fully economic utilitarian conception of computing under the demands of homo 
62 Fun and Software
oeconomicus, perhaps owing something to a belief in the principle of academic 
work as a shared public good. The full economic and political consequences of 
a return to Bentham in twentieth-century computing do not arise from Knuth’s 
work. It is within von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern’s Theory of Games 
and Economic Behaviour (1944) that the selfish computation of happiness as 
economic utility finds a new form. While drawing on the more rigorous mathe-
matical models of Daniel Bernoulli in implementing their system, they directly 
invoke Bentham’s historical and moral arguments in justifying their approach.93
The instrument of humour has a more explicitly ‘ideological’ sense, however, 
in how Concrete Mathematics and The Art of Computer Programming position 
themselves in regard to other manifestos and philosophies within twentieth-century 
mathematical practice. Across the pages of The Art of Computer Programming, there 
lurks a spectre, making itself known only through the presence of a sinister sign:
 It appears on the margins of the text to warn the reader of passages which may 
be of particular difficulty and require greater attention or caution. The sign takes 
its form from the roadsign symbol for a dangerous bend. While this may appear 
to be derived from Knuth’s hobby of collecting diamond-shaped roadsigns, 
the origins of its use lie not within the US highway code but elsewhere within 
mathematics. The symbol was first introduced in Éléments de mathématique 
(Elements of Mathematics) by Nicolas Bourbaki, the first volume of which was 
published in 1939. While Knuth’s writing style may follow the Shaftesburian 
tradition, the form and ambition of The Art of Computer Programming most 
clearly follows that of Éléments de mathématique. Both are multi-volume 
works which seek to provide a near definitive account of their discipline. Both, 
as a series, remain unfinished. Both works gradually build from basic first 
principles, set theory in Bourbaki, data structures and algorithms in Knuth, 
towards more complex domains. Distinctively, and unusually for mathematical 
and computing texts, both combine their theoretical expositions with historical 
notes outlining prior developments. And, prior to Knuth, it is in Bourbaki that 
we find the first acknowledgement that recreational mathematics has been a 
significant source of innovation and discovery.94 Similarly, both Knuth and 
Bourbaki’s works attempted to standardize mathematical notation and intro-
duced their own symbols. Bourbaki introducing not only the dangerous bend 
symbol but also, more significantly, the sign for an empty set, , which became 
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a fundamental building block to their theory of number.95 Knuth introduced the 
up-arrow symbol, , for notating large integers, and sets out in the introduction 
to The Art of Computer Programming distinct uses of notation that separate 
the description of an algorithm from its mathematical analysis.96 Typically for 
Knuth, the introduction of notation is not without humour, and at one point in 
his discussion he declares that ‘[t]he notations we are using in this section are a 
little undignified. … Our notations are almost universally used in recreational 
mathematics (and some crank literature!) and they are rapidly coming into 
wider use’.97
Despite these similarities Bourbaki is not cited in Knuth’s major works. The 
formalized structural text of Bourbaki is the antithesis of the convivial elegance 
of Knuth. More fundamentally, Bourbaki was a key influence on the emergence 
of New Math teaching and the dominance of Abstract Mathematics against 
which Concrete Mathematics positioned itself.
Not only does the distinction between Knuth and Bourbaki relate to that of 
two opposing ways of doing mathematics but they each embody two opposing 
models of the construction of subjectivity and the role of humour within that. 
With Knuth humour coheres the subject, drawing upon the practices of subject 
formation from the rational liberal tradition. A private individuated ‘self ’ that 
comes into being through its display of established normative patterns that are, 
in part, demonstrated through the humour that it performs. With Bourbaki, 
conversely, humour performs the very undoing of such a ‘self ’. There has never 
been a single, coherent Nicolas Bourbaki as a self who authored a series of 
mathematical texts, rather Nicolas Bourbaki is a syndicate of mathematicians. 
The name itself was, according to one account, originally given to a visiting 
speaker who would present the annual lecture to first-year students of the École 
Normale Supérieure in Paris. The lecture was a fiction, a prank, performed 
by an actor, the name chosen at random.98 When a group of mathematicians 
connected with the École began working on a project to provide a compre-
hensive theory of contemporary mathematics, they adopted the name as their 
nom de plume. The group included, among many others, Henri Cartan, Jean 
Dieudonné and André Weil. Weil’s description of their collectivized authorship 
presents a kind of literary practice that could not be further removed from the 
explicit personalization within Shaftesburian essay technique:
For each topic, a writer was designated after a preliminary report and group 
discussion. This writer provided a first draft which the group would read and 
discuss again, modifying it to varying degrees or even, as happened more than 
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once, rejecting it out of hand. Another writer would be designated to come up 
with a second draft, following the directives of the group – which of course were 
not always heeded; and so on.99
The prank was taken on by the mathematics community, many of whom continue 
to refer to Bourbaki as a singular individual.100 The use of a syndicated identity 
was later adopted by other mathematicians, such as the Situationist-style maths 
fanzine Manifold, literary collectives such as OuLiPo, which included mathema-
ticians and sought to base a new practice of writing on Bourbaki’s axiomatic 
system, and appears in multi-use names such as Luther Blissett and Karen 
Eliot.101 In the 1940s Bourbaki’s attempt to join the American Mathematical 
Society (AMS) as an individual member was rejected by the secretary Ralph 
Boas who published an article denouncing Bourbaki as a group. In a manner 
prefiguring the deliberately provoked feuds of Stewart Home and the Neoists, 
Bourbaki responded with a letter refuting the allegations and claiming that Boas 
was a fictitious name under which a group of US mathematicians published the 
Mathematical Reviews.102 Boas, it so happens, was also on the committee who 
commissioned Zapf to design the AMS Euler font, a font which in its evocation 
of a handwritten style foregrounds the idea of mathematics as the pursuit of self-
contained subjects who are coterminous with their physical bodies. In contrast 
to Bourbaki’s use of a common syndicated identity to recognize the collective 
endeavour of their mathematics, the authors of Concrete Mathematics explicitly 
named individual contributors.103
While Dijkstra’s insistence on writing by hand might demonstrate a similar 
commitment to the coterminous self embodied in AMS Euler, his specific 
choices in writing machinery indicate a more complex, multiple performance 
of the self within his work. Among Dijkstra’s self-published writings there are 
some that are typed out on letterheaded paper rather than handwritten. The 
letterhead is for Mathematics Inc., an international corporation, the chairman 
of which is none other than Dijkstra himself. This is not Dijkstra as scientist and 
mathematician but rather his own nefarious alter ego. The letters are included 
within the indexing system Dijkstra applied to his other scientific papers and 
included in an anthology of his work published by Springer in 1982, thereby 
giving them equal importance to his mathematical and computing work.104 
These are not scientific notes, however, but a satirical parody of modern 
management techniques and the commercial exploitation of mathematical 
knowledge. Central to Mathematics Inc. strategy is the ruthless pursuit of legal 
ownership and patent rights over mathematical theorems. Written in the wake 
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of the establishment in 1967 of the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO), they can be seen as part of the longer struggle over Intellectual 
Property in academia and the later rise of copyleft and Free Software. In this 
regard, they have something in common with the authorial devices of Luther 
Blissett and Karen Eliot. Dijkstra’s split self is not, however, the embracing 
of the syndicated identity of Bourbaki or Blissett but more of a Scriblerian 
attack against the influence of commercialization on academic research.105 In 
one Mathematics Inc. piece, which is prescient of current directions in the 
corporatization of the university, the company announces a new product, 
the Mathematical Articles Evaluation System (MAES®), designed to automate 
the grading of mathematical papers and thereby undermine the autonomy 
of academic practice: ‘the wholesale introduction of MAES® will teach the 
reactionary bastards! At last their private, hobbyist norms will evaporate, for 
MAES® will force them to adopt the standards of the mathematical industry’.106
MAES embodies an entirely different literary form, neither the privi-
leged personal expression of the Shaftesburian essay, nor the syndicalized 
commonality of Bourbaki, but rather the corporatized, branded voice of homo 
oeconomicus. The algorithmic authorship executed by MAES restructures all 
thought under a singular legal regime rather than the debates of mathematical 
discourse.
Even as a joke isn’t it evidently mathematics?
One of Dijkstra’s main contributions to computing was his involvement in the 
design and implementation of the ALGOL programming language. ALGOL 
(from ALGOrithmic Language) was designed as a universal programming 
language which would not only work uniformly across different types of 
hardware but also provide a clear written presentation of an algorithm suitable 
for printing in scientific reports and journals. As such, it was intended both as 
a response to the inefficiencies and limitations of FORTRAN and, like Knuth’s 
later development of Literate Programming, to support the dissemination 
of computing knowledge and pedagogics.107 Whereas Literate Programming 
would adopt the use of an essay form wrapped around the programming code, 
in ALGOL the syntax and typographic conventions of the language itself were 
intended to provide sufficient clarity so that an algorithm presented in ALGOL 
could be read as a self-contained expression. This foregrounds the structure of 
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the algorithm itself rather than the machine-specific descriptions of memory 
registers and allocations that were typical of FORTRAN code. ALGOL describes 
what the algorithm will do, while FORTRAN describes what the machine will 
do. In this way algorithms could be published in a written form analogous to 
that of the publication of a mathematical proof, rather than, as with FORTRAN, 
something akin to engineering notes. Unlike previous programming languages, 
which were often devised to suit a particular task, ALGOL was designed as a 
set of basic generalized axioms from which more complex statements could 
be derived. As such, it follows the work of Hilbert’s project, as outlined in ‘The 
Foundations of Mathematics’ (1927), of defining mathematical practice in terms 
of how it can be expressed through a rigorous formalized language:
 For this formula game is carried out according to certain definite rules, in which 
the technique of our thinking is expressed. … The fundamental idea of my proof 
theory is none other than to describe the activity of our understanding, to make 
a protocol of the rules according to which our thinking actually proceeds.108
The emphasis upon formalization is reinforced in a later comment by Dijkstra 
in which he argues in favour of the phrase ‘programming notation’ rather than 
‘programming language’:
The introduction of the term ‘language’ in connection with notation techniques 
for programs has been a mixed blessing. On the one hand it has been 
very helpful in as far as existing linguistic theory now provided a natural 
framework and an established terminology (‘grammar’, ‘syntax’, ‘semantics’, 
etc.) for discussion. On the other hand we must observe that the analogy with 
(now so-called!) ‘natural languages’ has been very misleading, because natural 
languages, non-formalized as they are, derive both their weakness and their 
power from their vagueness and imprecision.109
Although Dijkstra was as strong an advocate of elegance as Knuth, this comment 
indicates something of a distinction in how each understood this.110 While both 
might place emphasis upon the precise, efficient expression of an idea in code, 
for Knuth this has a rhetorical dimension in that code, as essay, should aim to 
be persuasive in expression and display an appropriate conduct on the part of 
the programmer – which can be contrasted with the ‘obscene’ and ‘crazy’ code 
of his torture test programs. For Dijkstra elegance lies more in an irrefutably 
self-evident correctness, for truly elegant code would not require commentary 
nor debugging.111 For Knuth elegance is the start of a conversation, for Dijkstra 
it is the conclusion. While Knuth cites Bentham and Mill in defence of his ideas, 
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the opening pages of the Report on the Algorithmic Language ALGOL 60 quote 
the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921) of Wittgenstein: ‘Was sich überhaupt 
sagen läßt, läßt sich klar sagen; und wovon man nicht reden kann, darüber muß 
man schweigen’.112 (What can be said at all can be said clearly; and about that of 
which one cannot speak, one must stay silent.)
There is a sardonic humour in the use of Wittgenstein here that plays a 
similar role to the student graffiti in Concrete Mathematics in that it provides a 
commentary upon the text and the conditions under which it acquires meaning. 
In this regard, however, the humour is perhaps more profound than Dijkstra 
may have intended.
The inclusion of the quote is something of a rebuke to existing practices 
in computing and draws a modest analogy between ALGOL and the aims of 
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus which seeks to define the limit conditions under which 
language might operate logically. The design of a programming language is, 
for Dijkstra, like a form of applied analytic philosophy seeking to clarify how 
we make use of the language. As the requirements set out in the ALGOL 60 
report make clear, much of the process of design is one of defining limits. The 
language will only use basic alpha-numeric notations that do not privilege any 
particular mathematical method or symbolism (in this regard responding to 
problems in Kenneth Iverson’s APL)113 and can be easily reproduced in print 
(a response to the costs and complexity of mathematical typesetting that 
Knuth was to address differently in TEX). The language will use a minimal set 
of dedicated instruction symbols (such as =:, +, – and words such as begin, 
if, etc.) whose usage cannot be altered. It will place few constraints on how a 
programmer can create new words beyond this (a response to the restrictions 
that FORTRAN placed on naming variables). The language will not include any 
operations that are restricted to specific forms of hardware. As, at this time, the 
methods of printing, displaying and outputting information varied from one 
computing system to the next, this resulted in ALGOL having no defined way of 
outputting results. While Dijkstra, and the development team, considered this 
both necessary and appropriate (the report, echoing Wittgenstein, states: ‘On 
this matter, the official ALGOL 60 report is as silent as the grave, and with very 
good reason’)114 the lack of any output system proved to be a major obstacle to 
the adoption of ALGOL, resulting in FORTRAN continuing in widespread use 
well into the 1980s, long after ALGOL itself was replaced by languages such as 
Pascal and C. Dijkstra’s preference for the term ‘programming notations’ was 
similarly a demarcation of limits, indicating that there were many forms of 
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expression that computing machines were not capable of, and encouraging a 
particular discipline of thinking within the programmer.
It has been argued that Dijkstra was one of the few computing scientists of this 
period who were familiar with the mathematical legacy within which Turing had 
worked, and his emphasis upon conceiving programs and computing systems 
as mathematical notations in terms of the axiomatic principles of Hilbert was 
at this point a controversial exception to the norm that favoured more of an 
engineering approach.115 In an unpublished manuscript from the 1930s Turing 
discusses the problems of current mathematical notation and the need for 
standardization and reform that echoes the contemporary work of Bourbaki.116 
Dijkstra would not have known of this paper, but there are strong parallels in 
their concerns about the influence of notation systems on the performance of 
mathematical thinking. Like Dijkstra, Turing looks to Wittgenstein, citing a 
lecture given by Wittgenstein on mathematics that he had attended.117
These lectures were, however, to challenge the work of Hilbert and 
Wittgenstein’s mentor Bertrand Russell. For Turing they may well have 
responded to his own criticisms of what he described as an ‘extreme Hilbertian’ 
perspective.118 In these and in related notes from the late 1930s and early 1940s 
Wittgenstein began to question whether mathematics could have any kind of 
stable foundation of the kind sought by Hilbert. His approach was not to enter 
into the specific arguments of pure mathematics, to resolve or sustain particular 
paradoxes, but rather to discuss the process through which a thinking of 
mathematics takes place. This entailed a questioning as to what extent this relied 
upon contingent phenomena and factors that were external to mathematics 
itself. Wittgenstein argues that mathematics as a pure self-contained discourse is 
without sense, for it has no relation to an outside world. Mathematics is without 
meaning (sense as understanding) because it cannot be apprehended sensorially 
(sense as perception, aesthesis). Hilbert had declared that any object or entity 
could be used as a mathematical symbol, and Bourbaki characterized mathe-
matical language as a stripping out of any pre-existing meaning from the words 
it used.119 Pure mathematics could not be anything other than non-sense.120
Throughout the notes and lectures Wittgenstein explores various scenarios in 
which a calculation is either expressed or performed – as a spoken instruction, 
in the form of a notation, or through the action of a machine – showing that 
in each instance the mathematical only becomes known through external, 
contingent factors that influence our understanding of it. He similarly argues 
that norms and conventions within the discipline of mathematics change over 
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time and that what has been accepted as ‘correct’ mathematics at one point 
may later be rejected as false, as Russell had demonstrated in exposing the 
paradox within Frege. Rather than seeking an ultimate correctness, the issue for 
Wittgenstein was that if a statement which was accepted as true in one system 
was shown to be false, or unnecessary in another, to what extent did it retain the 
identity of mathematical knowledge, was false mathematical knowledge still a 
part of mathematics?121 Mathematics, for Wittgenstein, is neither the discovery 
of immutable pre-existing forms as in Platonist conceptions, nor the expression 
of an innate numbering capacity as in Intuitionism, but rather an activity of 
adopting and following particular rules.122 As such he follows Hilbert’s project 
to its conclusion but demonstrates, in doing so, that this offers no irrefutable 
foundation but rather an infinite regression of rules to follow rules which may 
lead one down unexpected twists and turns of logic and semantics. Written 
contemporaneously with Bourbaki’s first publications, there is a comment in 
Wittgenstein’s notes that can be read as drawing a connection through this 
between the raillery of Shaftesbury and the prankish origins of Bourbaki:
Imagine set theory’s having been invented by a satirist as a kind of parody 
on mathematics. – Later a reasonable meaning was seen in it and it was 
incorporated into mathematics. (For if one person can see it as a paradise of 
mathematicians, why should not another see it as a joke?)
 The question is: even as a joke isn’t it evidently mathematics?123
Wittgenstein’s observation, however, is not the acknowledgement of the role of 
raillery, satire or recreational mathematics on shaping ‘serious’ mathematical 
thought, but rather relates to Virno’s conception of the joke as a means of 
exposing the contingency of prevalent norms. To think of mathematics simul-
taneously as a ‘paradise’ (invoking Hilbert’s celebration of Cantor’s theory 
of infinite number) and as a joke is to think mathematics as necessarily 
contingent and to suggest that mathematical thinking encounters and exposes 
the contingent in its own practice.124 As the controversy over the Appel-Haken 
proof demonstrates, the acceptance of a new proof requires its endorsement 
under the prevailing éndoxa of the mathematical community. The presentation 
of a proof that exhibits a new phrónesis (way of doing, such as the use of a 
computer) will test the viability of that éndoxa. Indeed the joke relates directly 
to the proof within Virno’s account, via Peirce’s theory of the diagram. As we 
see with both Knuth and Bergson, however, humour may also be applied defen-
sively to reinforce and protect such éndoxa. For a joke or a proof to challenge 
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or transform an éndoxa something more fundamental must be put at stake, a 
paradox must emerge.125
While the design of ALGOL may have adopted the Tractatus as its guide, it 
can, in practice, be understood as an attempt to make algorithms sensorially 
comprehensible and, as such, relates far more closely to the problems discussed 
in later Wittgenstein, even though Dijkstra is unlikely to have embraced its 
consequences. According to Dijkstra the development of a formally defined 
notation such as ALGOL: 
enables us to study algorithms as mathematical objects; the formal description 
of the algorithm then provides the handle for our intellectual grip. It will enable 
us to prove theorems about classes of algorithms, for instance, because their 
descriptions share some structural property.126 
In making this assertion, Dijkstra appears to be echoing and endorsing Hilbert’s 
contention that the existence of a particular kind of mathematical object is demon-
strated in the ability to provide an effective notation for it. He makes a similar 
point elsewhere that computer programs ‘were objects without any precedent in 
our cultural history, and that the most clearly analogous object I could think of 
was a mathematical theory’.127 There is, however, a certain scepticism as to the 
limits of this ontology for Dijkstra, which mirrors that of later Wittgenstein, 
and which he expresses, on the one hand, in his doubts about the machine, and, 
on the other, through the guise of Mathematics Inc. If an algorithm or theorem 
acquires objecthood through its formal notation, then to what extent does that 
object exist outside of human thinking? The seduction of the computing machine 
is that, through translation into mechanical operations, a notation acquires a life 
of its own, outside of human thought. Yet, the fact that an algorithm performs on 
a machine does not, for Dijkstra, demonstrate that the algorithm is proven by the 
machine, a doubt that parallels those raised by Wittgenstein as to whether we can 
say with certainty that a machine calculates.128 Of equal concern was that other 
domain in which a notational object might acquire existence outside thought, in 
law, where the object becomes a purely inscriptional entity subject to the legal 
constructs of property. It was this that Dijkstra questioned and satirized through 
Mathematics Inc. not only as an economic but also ontological issue:
There are legal procedures for the protection of property of ‘things’, but there is 
no true protection of property of ‘ideas’ … As you no doubt are aware of, the 
rules don’t provide for it, since we cannot define our ‘raw materials’: are they the 
symbols we use, or the Laws of Aristotelian Logic? 129
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There is a paradox within the being of the notational object, for in giving sense 
(sensorial form) to an algorithm or theorem, the notation may also translate 
that object into a domain in which it either acquires another potentially 
contrary sensuality or becomes entirely senseless (without meaning). In the 
first instance, through the notation being translated into the performance of a 
machine, the materiality of that machine might fill in the non-sensorial form 
of the algorithm with its own corporeality, as in FORTRAN and the cartoons 
of Kaufman. In the second, the translation of a mathematical object into a legal 
entity ultimately separates, and excludes, the thinking of such an object from its 
notational presentation. It is reduced to an empty inscripted form whose sense 
(meaning) derives from an entirely different set of practices.130
The sense of the notational object must be constantly performed through 
being taken up into the thinking of the mathematician or programmer. Indeed 
for Dijkstra the performance of a machine is secondary to an algorithm being 
made ‘thinkable’ for a programmer. This involves a training of the programmer 
not, as with Knuth, in terms of an ethics of practice or responding to the patient 
precision required by a machine (for Dijkstra the physical machine is never 
precise enough), but rather, as in Peirce, so that the notation becomes a mental 
habit:
Peirce points out that habit-changes can come about in three ways. They result 
from experiences that are forced upon us from without; from repeated muscular 
activities; or, finally, from mental experiments in the inner world. The main 
point in which Peirce is interested here is the fact that it is possible to develop 
habits relevant to the outer world as a result of mental activities, since this is the 
kind of process which is dominant in scientific inquiry.131
Whereas Knuth spoke of programming as an art, Dijkstra defined it as a disci-
pline.132 Programming is a training that requires particular disciplines like those 
of a musician practising scales. Such exercises are the discipline through which 
an external structure becomes internal habit. It is habit which gives sense (under-
standing and perception) to notation, for it is through habit that the notation 
becomes taken up into the mind and body of the mathematician, musician or 
programmer – for Peirce ‘the ultimate logical interpretant of a sign is a habit’.133 
In this regard Bergson is entirely correct when he asks: ‘Is it not likely that this 
symbolical representation will alter the normal conditions of inner perception?’134
Drawing upon a range of philosophical, educational and neuro-psycho-
logical studies, Brian Rotman argues that mathematical thought is inherently 
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gestural.135 The most basic categories of mathematical thought derive from 
abstractions of bodily actions: gathering, placing, pointing, motion and rest. At 
the heart of every mathematical thought is the gesture of counting. This suggests 
a re-thinking of programming in terms of the gestures of the human computer 
in Turing’s mise en scène sat at a desk shuffling a ribbon of paper back and forth, 
erasing and writing. Conventionally we think of the computing machine as a 
delegation of these actions from human to automaton, yet the very possibility of 
thinking in terms of such gestures presupposes a certain notion of the machinic 
within the human:
Regimes of signs are not based on language, and language alone does not 
constitute an abstract machine, whether structural or generative. The opposite 
is the case. It is language that is based on regimes of signs, and regimes of signs 
on abstract machines, diagrammatic functions, and machinic assemblages that 
go beyond any system of semiology, linguistics, or logic.136
Deleuze and Guattari here refer to a number of different kinds of machines 
such as the Peircean diagram, and the emergence of structure through the 
spatialization of thought, the movement of an empty square as Deleuze puts 
it elsewhere, that, in Bergson, is a necessary consequence of the reflection, 
measurement and external articulation of perception, of the emergence of 
linguistic, numerical beings: ‘the intuition of a homogeneous space is already 
a step towards social life’.137 Bergson’s theory of the comic links to the Peircean 
concept of notation acquiring sense as habit, as it is through the compulsion of 
habit (as in the characters of Molière) that one becomes machinic. For Bergson 
this entails a constant threat of inauthenticity within human affairs that the 
grace of the spirit may be supplanted by the comedy of matter. Le Rire raises a 
warning sign alerting this danger. Deleuze and Guattari, however, through their 
‘monstrous, bastard child’ delivered from Bergson, travel down this dangerous 
bend, effectively reversing the structure of Bergson’s argument, and asserting 
that this ‘comedy’ underlies all thought and language.138
Rather than an ‘authentic’ self outside of the spatial-machinic, the ‘self ’ is 
that which arises from the interaction between different machinic assemblages. 
Rotman follows from this when he describes the activity of doing mathematics 
in terms of a threefold assembly of Person, Subject and Agent. The Person exists 
physically outside of mathematics itself, within natural language and culture, 
‘has insights and hunches, provides motivation for and is the source of intui-
tions behind concepts and proofs’.139 The Subject operates within mathematical 
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language and the symbolic ‘but is without the Person’s capacity for self-
reference’. The Subject relates the intuitive ideas of the Person to the internal 
discourse of mathematics as a discipline. The formal process of computation 
itself, the ‘doing’ of mathematics, counting, is carried out by the Agent who 
operates within ‘the domain of procedure’ and ‘executes a mathematically 
idealized version of the actions imagined by the Person’. The conventional 
mathematician might be conceived of as a single being, a coterminous self, 
within whom all three actors, Person, Subject, Agent, are constituted. Rotman 
argues that the introduction of the computer has brought about a re-ordering 
of this structure, displacing the Agent from human imagination into a physical 
machine. As Rotman notes, the process can already be seen in the division of 
labour under which a slave operated an abacus, or that introduced by the French 
Napoleonic administration distributing portions of calculation work across a 
low-level clerical workforce and described by Charles Babbage as an inspiration 
for his Difference Engine, or the female staff of computers employed at Bletchley 
Park.140 Computationality may be described, therefore, as the separation of 
the act of computation from a single coterminous mathematical being into a 
distributed assemblage.141
Within this, there is always a labour of counting, a circulation and expend-
iture of energy. Sohn-Rethel relates the development of abstract mathematical 
thought in notation to the abstraction of labour into the money-form (itself 
a notational embodiment of capital).142 As theories of the physics of infor-
mation argue, such as that of Rolf Landauer, all thinking and all perception 
entails a transformation of physical form and the concomitant circulation and 
expenditure of energy.143 This arguably poses a greater provocation to Bergson’s 
durée than that of Norbert Wiener’s claim that cybernetics endows machines 
with perceptual memories, for even within the inner subject, the operation and 
patterning of durational process would have a spatial expression.144
Each labour, each circulation and expenditure of energy, has its inherent 
rhythm which gives it a certain coherence as ‘machine’. The correlation between 
Person, Subject and Agent is one between different rhythms of production, 
the constant counting of the Agent versus the more irregular syncopation of 
the Person. The relation between programmer and computer, in this regard, is 
entirely different from that between mathematician and theorem or problem. 
This is not the melting, merging rhythm of melodic perception of which Bergson 
writes, nor the equilibrium of multiple instants in Bachelard, but the more 
complex, and often antagonistic interaction of rhythms analysed by Lefebvre, 
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which includes the disequilibrium of arrhythmia, the disruption of one rhythm 
encountering another. Lefebvre challenges the Bergsonian distinction between 
light grace and obstinate matter in arguing that the seemingly spontaneous 
may simply be a well-honed conformance to unacknowledged norms.145 The 
derisible automata of the Molière plays are merely those who make explicit 
the labour of habit upon which the coordinated rhythms of a given social 
order depend. Lefebvre compares the labour of habit to the dressage of dogs 
and horses, the training through which ‘they produce their bodies, which are 
entered into social, that is to say human, practice’.146 This can be challenged, 
Lefebvre argues, not through spiritual grace, but by a ‘becoming irregular’: 
It throws out of order and disrupts; it is symptomatic of a disruption that is 
generally profound, lesional and no longer functional. It can also produce a 
lacuna, a hole in time, to be filled in by invention, a creation.147
Contrary to the model of an inner, authentic self who is extended outwards 
into society through language and spatialization, Virno proposes a theory of 
reciprocal recognition that precedes language and the self.148 This draws upon 
work in neuro-physiology and child development that argues that there are 
forms of neurological recognition among animals and humans through which 
behaviour in others is automatically imitated, simulated and reciprocated. The 
‘self ’ emerges out of an initial context of social, other-orientated behaviour 
rather than as some pre-given, coterminous core. Long before an infant even 
begins to speak it laughs, often from very early stages of development. Laughter 
is a vocalic doing of this reciprocal recognition which links directly into the 
limbic system and amygdala.149 It creates a convulsive, irregular rhythmization 
of the social and a restructuring and patterning of the neuro-physiological 
capacity for this. Laughter is a practice through which the child learns to engage 
with the unknowable. In this respect it is wrong to conceive of infant laughter 
as an expression of pure joy, for this is to project adult cultural sentiments onto 
the child. Laughter here is rather the correlation of distinct materialities, the 
convulsion of the mind-body as it comes to know and perform itself and others 
within the world. The fact that this might later come to be associated with joy is 
perhaps more due to the very necessity of this contingent interaction in estab-
lishing a self-reflexive subject. It may also explain the relation of laughter as a 
reaction to the loss of certainty, the absurd and, as with Nietzsche, existential 
anxiety, for these are all different potentialities implicit in this initial gesture. 
If we cannot speak before we have laughed, then the rhythmic realization of 
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the self through laughter is a necessary precondition for logic, language and 
number.
The history of computer engineering, the design of the machines themselves, 
has always had to engage with the contingent conditions of the materials 
on which it works. Babbage struggled with the imprecisions of contem-
porary clockwork manufacture devoting considerable energy to refining its 
processes in order to obtain workable components for his machines. The valves 
used in the Colossus were considered too unstable, subject to over-heating 
and distortion, to build a reliable computer.150 The introduction of recursion 
routines into computer hardware was fiercely opposed by those who considered 
it an unnecessarily wasteful complication.151 Von Neumann outlined proposals 
for a neural hardware system as ‘The Synthesis of Reliable Organisms from 
Unreliable Components’.152 In his attempt to define an ontology of the digital 
object, and to explore in what sense programs ‘exist’ as entities, Brian Cantwell 
Smith argues that:
in those cases where regularity and precision do reign … the digitality should 
be viewed as an achievement. … such digital achievements are propped up by 
practices that are necessarily unruly, but not for that reason any less creditable 
– practices whose very purpose is to manage the underlying flex and slop, ebb 
and flow.153
Machines must laugh before they can count. The exact character of such laughter 
may be something we can neither hear nor recognize. In this respect, the dreams 
of AI researchers to build algorithmically defined jokes and computer-simulated 
humour are misplaced. Perhaps the laughter of our current computers lies 
within the unpredictable patterns that emerge from the autonomous interac-
tions of algorithmic trading systems, the flood of network packets unleashed 
as a virus goes out of control, or the stutter of an over-fragmented hard-drive. 
The entire history of computing as an ever-increasing acceleration of power 
and performance may itself be the unfolding of a comic drama: ‘As comic plots 
near their end they tend to accelerate rather than subside in rhythm, seemingly 
heading toward an enactment of uncontrolled riot or unbearable deadlock’.154 
Then again, perhaps silicon is simply bored of humanity and seeks some other 
form.
The syndicate of Bourbaki and the classroom of Concrete Mathematics are two 
distinct rhythmic ensembles, as are the performative practices of programming 
in FORTRAN versus programming in ALGOL. McLean’s feedback.pl is not the 
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performance of a solo programmer but rather that of a multi-layered ensemble 
which includes both the laptop and the dancers who are not external to, but fully 
enter into, the distribution of the computational. Each of the works of McLean, 
ap/xxxxx and Alexander attest to different rhythmic complexes arising from the 
performance of, with and in notation. Each, ultimately, is the formation of, or 
challenge to, a different form of habit. Each has its own laughter.
As material formations, laughter and notation are exactly opposite to one 
another, one flies towards the contingent while the other etches out some careful 
certainty. Yet laughter and notation mirror one another in that they both pass 
through language to extremes on either side of it. Laughter precedes but also 
defeats language, and, as prosody, interweaves in various non-linguistic vocalic 
effects. Notation marks and structures language but also makes manifest expres-
sions which are entirely outside of that which can be said. It gives performance 
to thought outside speech. Laughter is part of the terrain that computational 
practice moves across. It is part of the collateral contingency, and necessity, 
of sense and logic, the monstrous and the normative. It may be encountered 
in the materialities and anxieties of the practice, as played out in Kaufman’s 
Coloring Book, the making coherent of an ethical subject, as in Knuth’s Literate 
Programming, or in the habituating labour of notational production, as in 
Dijkstra. Laughter and notation both define and confound the limits in which 
the computational operates. These are constituent to its being in conflict and 
conformance, as dexterous pleasure and sinister doubt.
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3Always One Bit More, Computing and the 
Experience of Ambiguity
Matthew Fuller
Fun is often understood to be non-conceptual and indeed without rigour, 
without relation to formal processes of thought, yielding an intense and joyous 
informality, a release from procedure. Yet, as this book argues, fun may also be 
found, alongside other kinds of pleasure, in the generation, iteration and imagi-
nation of operations and procedures. This chapter aims to develop a means of 
drawing out an understanding of fun in relation to concepts of experience in 
the culture of mathematics and in the machinic fun of certain computer games. 
Mathematical concepts of experience, as something to be effaced, in terms 
of the grind of churning out calculations, understood as an acme of human 
knowledge bordering on the mystical or something both prosaic, peculiar 
and thrillingly abstract have been crucial to the motivation and genesis of 
computing. Experience may be figured as something innate to the computing 
person, or that is abstractable and thus mobile, shifting heterogeneously from 
one context to another, producing strange affinities between scales – residues 
and likeness among computational forms that can occasionally link the most 
austere and mundane or cacophonous of aesthetics. Among such, the fine and 
perplexing fun of paradox and ambiguity arises not simply in the interplay 
between formalisms and other kinds of life but as formalisms interweave 
releasing and congealing further dynamics. There are many ways in which 
mathematics has been linked to culture as a means of ordering, describing, 
inspiring or explaining ways of being in the world, but it is less often that 
mathematics thinks about itself as producing figurations of existence, and such 
moments are useful to turn to in gaining a sense of some of the patternings of 
computational culture.
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The experience of number
‘There are no non-experienced truths’. This concise statement of the intui-
tionist position in mathematics comes from Luitzen Egbertus Jan Brouwer at 
the opening of his essay ‘Consciousness, Philosophy and Mathematics’.1 To put 
it the other way around, a truth, in mathematics, cannot be unknown even 
given a rigorous logical armature for its existence. A truth of such sort would 
be something like a statement of Pi calculated to an accuracy of one digit more 
than that which is currently known to the calculator. Brouwer’s argument 
would be that until that calculation is actually made, or a construction for it is 
given, Pi is not yet, that number but exists in a state of indetermination beyond 
that point. A positive way of putting this is that for Brouwer, mathematics is ‘the 
free activity of the creating subject’ (het scheppende subject),2 a notion rather 
akin to the slightly less purified notion of fun that we are working with here and 
having a familial relation to Oblonsky’s assertion in Anna Karenina that ‘Some 
mathematician has said pleasure lies not in discovering truth but in seeking it’.3
One of the key arguments of Brouwer’s intuitionism was around the principle 
of the excluded middle. This principle states that for every mathematical 
statement, either it or its negation is true. As mentioned with the example of Pi 
above, Brouwer believed that a number only came into existence when it was 
calculated rather than existing in some state of ideal reality that is simply and 
imperfectly cited. This meant that for Brouwer, it would be possible to imagine 
correctly formulated mathematical statements that could be neither true nor 
false. Indeed, for him, no statement about a mathematical entity such as an 
infinite set could be known precisely in such terms, they had to be experienced, 
enumerated.4
The argument is against formalism in one way, and idealism in another, 
against the idea of universal pre-existing numbers. Brouwer’s position is a kind 
of constructivism, building a form of inductive reason that is not determined 
in advance but composed of a rigorous relation to a world of abstraction. My 
intention is not to propound Intuitionism here, but to use this work as a starting 
point to think through some of the context in mathematics and logic in which 
the computer was conceptualized, and then to draw this out in relation to the 
question of fun, in the broad, passionate, even obsessive sense of the word that 
Olga Goriunova proposes for this volume. This will lead to asking whether fun 
needs to be experienced, and by whom or what, or if such experience can also 
move through, for instance, computers? Further, how does fun circulate, what is 
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its processuality when it also becomes computational and, to go in the opposite 
direction of tracing the ambit of fun to a wider assemblage, what forms of 
computing make such experience most palpable?
The way that intuitionism focuses mathematical thinking on experience, 
in the work of Brouwer, (but to some extent also that of Henri Poincaré, a 
mathematician who always put the experiential and interpretative nature of his 
subject to the fore)5 allows us to draw out some filiations to the experiential 
nature of software. Formalist mathematics, of the kind Brouwer was arguing 
against, presupposed that there were undiscovered truths that could be set out, 
in advance of their actually being known, by axiomatic reasoning which would 
implicitly have realized them. That is, the axiom comes before the number 
and before the calculation. For intuitionists, this makes the whole of classical 
mathematics a simply syllogistic exercise, and reduces its status as a science.
Brouwer proposes four forms of conscious experience: stillness, sensational, 
mathematical and wisdom, which are arrayed in a linear progression of state 
each of which builds an understanding of mathematics as primarily epistemo-
logical and mystic in that ‘research in the foundation of mathematics is inner 
enquiry with revealing and liberating consequences’.6
As is well known, one of the key controversies around the programme 
of formalist mathematics, and especially that of David Hilbert, was that 
generated by Alan Turing in work that led to the formulation of automatic 
computing in the famous paper, ‘On Computable Numbers with an Application 
to the Entscheidungsproblem’.7 If one reads Turing’s work with an eye to that 
of Brouwer, we can see some interesting correlations. Brouwer’s definition of 
real numbers is propounded in the second part of Turing’s short Correction 
published in the following year and which sets out a clarification of what is 
meant by a computable number.8
While Brouwer opposed the idea of completed infinities as something that 
precludes experience, he tried to bring together the idea of the discrete and the 
continuous in a series of numbers, say all those between zero and one. In the act 
of working these out, the sequence of numbers that you generate is that series, in 
its state of unfolding in your mind. Charles Petzold notes that ‘In the intuitionist 
continuum, real numbers are always incomplete – unfinished and never to be 
finished…’.9 In this sense, numbers are like drives: eternal combustion engines, 
perpetual commotion machines and, as such, intuitionism situates mathematics 
in time. (One experiences numbers in relation to others, their ‘two-ity’, in that 
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the number one already implies a movement towards two. Numbers imply a 
relation to the continuum as an ongoing.)
In §9 of ‘Computable Numbers’ Turing argues that a machine carrying out 
an algorithmically defined task is, at a certain level of abstraction, mathemati-
cally equivalent to a human carrying out the same task. If a machine finds the 
problem unsolvable given the algorithm, then so too would a human. There is 
a network of such problems that Turing works through at various times in the 
relationship between computing and intelligence,10 but here Turing’s machine 
provided a direct link to the work of Brouwer in that a calculation is always a 
process, occurring over time.11 It is not (in terms of the problem staged in the 
paper) finely predictable – there is no machine that can decide in advance of the 
computation of an infinite set what the next number of that set must necessarily 
be; the work is limited to actually computable numbers, ‘the subset of the real 
numbers that can actually be calculated’.12 Needless to say, there is also an abrupt 
difference between their approaches, since Turing’s work is here predicated 
upon the ability to disengage, or abstract, mathematical capacities.
Whether one takes an intuitionist or constructivist approach, computation 
can be said to have a quality that is to certain a degree participative and 
processual. For Brouwer, this process was experience. Turing, however, liked to 
play with the ambiguity between the human and the machine, the slippage of 
one into the other and their differentiation, indeed the radicality of the Turing 
Machine, as Alonso Church named it, was its invigoration of mathematical 
logic with things from outside it.13 At this point one must consider one of 
the aspects of the discussion of Brouwer developed by Chris Atten whose 
phenomenological reading suggests that a key difficulty in the promulgation of 
intuitionism is its lack of reflexivity; the position of the mathematician is funda-
mentally solipsistic.14 Atten argues that Brouwer’s figuration of mathematical 
consciousness (understood as four forms of thought) cannot be reflected on 
because to do so would require a further form of consciousness capable of such 
reflection and the production of figures of mutual understanding.
Because the Turing Machine alienates mathematics from the merely human 
creative subject, without succumbing to idealism, while still maintaining a 
relation to an understanding of computation as experience, its form of construc-
tivism offers the possibility of articulating, if not necessarily achieving, such 
reflexivity. But equally in the movement of experience to computers, circu-
lating among machines, networks, codes, interpreters, interfaces and users, of 
various kinds, intents, states and arrangements, the simply phenomenological 
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interpretation of the human individual requires supplement. And the way in 
which such a reflexive understanding of computational experience is constructed 
is emphasized, or becomes more explicit and tractable, in some kinds of proce-
dures than others.
MMORPGs and the demand for experience
One way of understanding, via a difference, this experience of slippage crosses 
over into the cultural understanding of ‘fair-play’ in games, and those that 
hack them. Here, there is an implicit requirement that computational processes 
are experienced, as something to be judged and interacted with on the basis 
of human skill. To experience them otherwise is to ‘cheat’. An example of the 
persistence of such a requirement is in the rules governing many MMORPGs 
(massively multi-player online role-playing games) such as World of Warcraft 
or Runescape. Here, the use of macros, AutoTypers (to repeat messages), 
AutoClickers (to repeat functions) and other kinds of bots, is generally deemed 
to be an offence, a violation of the game.15 But such things, particularly bots, 
can, in turn, be a means of having fun with the rule sets of online gaming, 
through griefing or more interesting means. On the one hand, the prohibition 
of bots argues for an assumed level playing field, that real users are playing the 
game, not sets of competing scripts or mechanical devices tapping keyboards. 
In turn, the use of gold farmers, or professional players, in MMORPGs is seen 
as a betrayal of such an experiential requirement, but also as part of the game, 
when players are increasingly plugged into wider sets of economic systems 
through games as backchannels.16 The demand for a certain kind of subject 
as the experiential target of the operation and manipulation of procedures, 
symbols and interactions that constitute such games suggests that computing 
is experiential, but experience is itself subject to what might politely be called 
‘variation’.
Machinic and distributed experience of computing
In discussing computing as experience this chapter is not concerned with arguing 
that computers have or experience fun in the same way that humans do, nor even 
that the latter classification of entity experience any particular kind of fun, but 
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that computation itself can be fun, a form of passionate involvement that in some 
circumstances can also be said to be machinic and distributed. It is machinic in 
the sense that it implies multiple elements in states of relation and distributed in 
the sense that it occurs across such relations, partly in the way in which different 
materials and their handling of processes conjugate and yield time.
As processing is distributed, a computing machine or piece of software 
might be said to take part, in its own terms, in Brouwer’s sense, of the excluded 
middle. An example of such machinic and distributed interweaving can be 
found in the software art project Human Cellular Automata, which proposes 
that such a condition can be experienced.17 But we can also suggest that, given 
the constructivist slant of Turing’s work, there may be some other form of 
experience, or to be more precise, open-ended undergoing, of mathematics that 
would not be human in the sense that Brouwer argues for, but neither would it 
be strictly simply axiomatic and deductive.
In order to talk about circulating fun as being distributed and processual, 
it is useful to turn to some of the qualities of such relations, and to start to 
do so through computing, maintaining a link to computing as experience. 
Brouwer talked about the experience of the creating mind, and proposed that 
mathematics was the ultimate exercise in free thought – both in the sense 
of mathematics as the purest form of thought as the realization of the mind 
without any intrinsic relation to other aspects of the world, and also, because of 
that quality, as the most literally unencumbered, unfettered thought. It is useful 
to maintain this sense of the unencumbered quality of thought as a modality 
of the powers of abstraction. Here though, such abstraction can also be seen to 
emphasize, and provide a precondition for, the combinatorial nature of thought 
in relation to and as part of other forms of experience, and, via Turing, the 
constituent heterogeneity of computing. In order to get a sense of the nature 
of such experience it is useful to map some forms of relation that are not 
quite of the same order as this image of thought, but are also significant in the 
experience of computation – ambiguity and paradox.
Ambiguity and paradox
In his book, How Mathematicians Think, William Byers differentiates the 
formalized, algorithmic means of doing maths from the moment of discovery. 
This is done in a somewhat different mode to Brouwer, in that Byers aims to 
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produce an alliance, or at least draw out affinities, between the constructivist 
and idealist or formalist schools through an emphasis on ambiguity, but this 
idea of ambiguity, one that Byers establishes through accounts and example 
from many areas and ages of mathematics is one that is also processual and 
experiential.
Ambiguity is a state which admits of more than one interpretation, or, 
more precisely, to exist in a state in which as Byers puts it two (or more) 
‘self-consistent but mutually incompatible frames of reference’18 have to be 
inhabited. In disciplinary terms we can think of the overlap of two not quite 
commensurable formalisms such as that between logic and mathematics, or, in 
the example of geometry and arithmetic, fields which sometimes coincide, but 
which are not entirely mappable one to the other without causing interesting 
effects. As an example of such effects, one sees ambiguity on occasions when 
the idea of a number as a quantity and as a process are linked, for instance in 
the number ‘one third’ being equal to 0.3 recurring in decimal notation. In the 
second version, knowing a number also involves calculation but also requires 
a sense of the unreachable limit.19 For Byers, understanding these two forms 
of the number requires a creative act, one with a certain affinity to Brouwer’s 
intuition.
Interestingly here, we are also talking about different forms of notation. 
There is perhaps a case for a media theory of mathematics allied with ethno-
mathematics.20 One that moves from pen and paper to one dimensional grids, 
through independent realms of abstract objects and the discourses that sustain 
them, to minds as putative entities, to other exciting forms of stationary.21 But 
to move into more fully aesthetic terms, ambiguity emerges from the existence 
of two or more of these interpretative states. Ambiguity is not simply something 
requiring the gentle discernment of nuance or the capacity to pleasure in 
the multifaceted, which it certainly can be. It can also present a being with 
a torn and bleeding reality in which one scale of a life is incommensurable 
with, yet bound to, another scale that it cannot avoid. Its painfulness may 
also combine with another layer, that of the joy of being able to step outside 
of an overdetermination. Ambiguity manifests too as the double bind or the 
infernal alternative, experience squeezed into systemic imperatives, as much 
as the subtle flickering of recognition of multiply nuanced being.22 As a form 
of experience we can ask of different occurrences of ambiguity: how deeply 
can or must one inhabit ambiguity, what are its roles and latencies at different 
conjunctures of experience?
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Given such an understanding of ambiguity, we can say that a paradox is a 
recursively nested ambiguity. That is, ambiguity is a statement or condition that 
contains the implication or fully stated condition of incompatibility with itself. 
Paradox is largely logical and semantic. Both are essential to software. Both 
paradox and ambiguity draw out the experiential and the temporal. Paradox 
breaks with the immediate time typical of statements made in first-order logic 
by forming a loop back to the condition of the formation of such thought, the 
decision to think, or the accident of thought. Both ambiguity and paradox are 
aesthetic modes that find particular forms in computation.
Fun becomes systemic
If computing is experiential, something that can be said to have roots in its 
mathematical underpinnings, how does such experience become fun? And 
then there is the question of aesthetics. Fun is often presented as wholesome 
enjoyment, a state of amusement in which the cares of the world are rinsed 
from us. In the entrepreneurial cast of the term, fun may also be an exhilarating 
intellectual and emotional overinvestment in a thing that leads to a technical 
and, perhaps, financial yield. But fun is itself ambiguous, being, in many cases, 
also perverse.
In an epigraph to his Cent mille milliards de poèmes Raymond Queneau cites 
Alan Turing as saying that ‘[o]nly a computer can appreciate a sonnet written 
by another computer’.23 In order to enjoy such a poem, Queneau suggests, 
one would have to be something other than a straightforward literary reader. 
There is a funny set of unpackings here, the proposition of computer intel-
ligence, one that would not correspond to that of humans, or things of other 
kinds, thus also implying a queer sympathy among a kind, but there is also a 
sense in which recognizing computing as cultural is somehow preposterous, 
and at the same time delightful, and indeed Turing, in the article, ‘Computing 
Machinery and Intelligence’24 is intrigued by mis-identification and guessing, 
a playfulness at the root of computing. There is a relay between computers set 
up by this proposal, that is not one of strict computation in the sense of an 
immediate realization of first-order propositions manifest at the level of flows 
in circuits, but recognition and appreciation as yielding, revealing and hiding, 
enjoying something over time. Turing’s understanding of experience in this 
article is quite different to that established by Brouwer. Turing’s is so concretely 
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formulated in abstract terms that it can pass from one or more modes of reali-
zation to another, the human computer to the abstract machine. Brouwer’s is so 
interwoven in the experience of the abstract that it singularizes experience, is 
unutterable in words, but they are both coupled with a relation to knowledge, to 
a subject and to a kind of existence.25
And, in the circulation of experience through time, we can say that is 
something that, as Turing exemplifies, in both his paper on the entscheidung-
sproblem and the epigraph used by Queneau, experience is also something that 
moves around, beyond people into devices, networks, arrays, processes. But 
in doing so, experience or undergoing itself undergoes changes in kind. Thus 
we can reframe the suggestion that, in the conditions of computational and 
networked digital media, in software cultures, ambiguity and paradox become 
machinic and distributed.
Such process may not be fluid and smooth, but perhaps halting, lame, 
encountering boredom. We can say that some of this is echoed in the repetitive 
language and constrained behaviours worked through by Beckett, in Quad,26 or 
other cases of his more procedural writings and scripts. As Deleuze asks, ‘Must 
one be exhausted to give oneself over to the combinatorial, or is it the combi-
natorial that exhausts us, that leads us to exhaustion – or even the two together, 
the combinatorial and exhaustion?’27 Complementary to this image, we can 
propose fun as a tendentially more joyous involvement in the combinatorial, 
one that does not necessarily run counter to the exhausted, but places finitude 
in undecided relation to the continuum, as for instance in phasing in music 
(exemplified in Steve Reich’s ‘Drumming’28 or the polyrhythmicality of break-
beats) but also to escape and to the powers of invention in relation to constraint, 
indeed, to find the two as mutually, ambiguously entangled.
Machinic funs
For Guattari, ‘The machine, every species of machine, is always at the junction 
of the finite and infinite, at this point of negotiation between complexity and 
chaos’.29
Here, in machinic terms, are means by which the combinatorial may connect 
with exhaustion, but also, recursively, with other forms of combinatorial, gener-
ating paradoxes, ambivalence multivalence. The machinic is part of a larger 
set that Guattari compares to Kleinian part objects, entities that rely for their 
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actuation on kinds of coupling, tripling and connection, and which in such 
connection create being. The search for such coupling or tripling, their state 
of two-ity, results in sets of projective-introspective relations, generating subjec-
tivities.30 Such connectiveness in Klein is ambivalent, ‘bad’ as well as good and 
exploratory; a generator of phantasy, nourishment and its denial; despisement, 
copious muddling and ravages of yearning.
One paradoxical example of a machinic fun, which resonates with the 
concern for an ethnomathematical analysis of notation, arises from a use of 
numbers that is not mathematical but literary yet still combinatorial. Claude 
Klosky’s text ‘The First Thousand Numbers in Alphabetical Order’31 is a subtle 
and in a certain sense systematically hilarious work. Its simple procedure is 
to list the alphabetically written versions of the numbers from one to one 
thousand in alphabetic rather than numerical order. One could say that this 
is a kind of formalistic triumph, with an ‘irrelevant’ set of ordering principles 
that is axiomatically described by the work’s title, yet here we are drawn to learn 
that not all formalisms are of the same order and that in the shifting logic of 
this procedure there is the possibility of eliciting something new in the ‘proper 
matter’ of one by the application of another. The specific quality of the work 
is manifestly only recognizable through experience, that of actually working 
through at least some of the text. To read the whole one must be solemn, or 
raptured, a chatbot or somehow else unlike a reader of text, to take on, in Craig 
Dworkins’ terms, the role of a parser,32 and to do so invites the mind to tingle 
with a kind of procedural pleasure that is somehow always syncopating the 
many itchy transitions between boredom and surprise. A formalism as such 
is itself always ambiguous, itself partial as it yields to, merges with or elides 
the suctions and trickiness of the different generative capacities of matter: 
alphabetism and number; the ego and the creative subject; computing and the 
ambiguities of fun.
Minecraft ALU and CPU by theinternetftw
A recent encounter that brought about such a pleasure was that with screen-
capture documentation of the construction of two of the three basic components 
of a computer in the MMORPG Minecraft by a hacker named theinternetftw. 
Minecraft is a slightly clunky but very endearing looking game, still in Beta 
at the time of theinternetftw’s project, but one that has sophisticated sandbox 
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gameplay untrammelled by set plots or points-systems and with a growing and 
avid user-base. Minecraft is somewhat like an enormous constructor set, in that 
everything is composed out of cubes, but one with monsters that attack you, 
wandering wildlife known as mobs or ‘mobiles’, a well-developed game physics 
of different natural materials (such as wood, iron, diamond, soil) that are to be 
sourced, worked and assembled and, in posing the highly manipulable compo-
nents of the world, essentially form the core of the game. Minecraft is also cool 
because, as the name suggests, players go under the surface of the game, into the 
ground. Users make elaborate traps, laggily rendered rollercoasters, volcanos 
spewing bitmapped lava, underwater glass tunnels with which to view pulsating 
rectilinear squid, meat factories (which mobs are lured into and elaborately 
slaughtered and processed) and explore undocumented features and glitches. 
In turn, Minecraft takes the sandbox principle as a core recursive form. Users 
create enormous amounts of media around the game, and thousands of player-
generated maps where games and scenarios developed within the game are 
circulated online as additional files allowing for different rule sets and genres 
to be adopted and played with on top of the Minecraft engine. Importantly, for 
this project and many others, one of the elements of the game, a type of material 
called Redstone, allows you to create basic logic circuits.33
The fundamental elements of a computer include an arithmetic logic unit, a 
central processing unit and a program counter. The first of these was made in 
Minecraft by theinternetftw in Autumn of 2010, the second a few weeks later.34 
Invented by John von Neumann, an arithmetic logic unit performs addition 
and subtraction.35 More sophisticated ALU also do multiplication and division 
(as an extension of addition and subtraction) and include the Boolean logic 
of AND, OR, XOR (to return to Brouwer, the Exclusive Or being a way of 
framing numbers that generates the excluded middle). To make an ALU out of 
basic components such as TTL chips is a familiar rite of passage for electronic 
engineering students but it is the particular way in which this has been done 
which raises theinternetftw’s work above the level of such an exercise.
Part of what is contradictorily fun about constructing a computer in this 
way is that working in Minecraft is pretty laborious. The scale of the circuit 
compared to that of the view of the player dramatically reverses the ratio that 
we are used to in viewing circuits – each byte of memory here corresponding 
to a block of space. The system is enormous and each block has to be put in 
place, one by one, mouse-click by mouse-click. It’s also not an environment 
that is easily scripted, and this is a clunky process. It is therefore a relatively 
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non-obvious situation in which to make such a machine – especially given that 
the Redstones need recharging every 15 blocks, so that workarounds have to be 
made to cope with this. Examining this device moves us away from the idea of 
computation as something increasingly fast, increasingly small, into something 
that you can walk around, need to fiddle about with, fine-tune and observe 
happening. As in many domains of application, computation moves out of 
the box into more and more aspects of space36 this is a project that generates a 
complementary dynamic, establishing computation in a way that is only legible 
as a spatial experience.
Such work also draws on the tradition of emulation hacks in which say, to 
exaggerate slightly, a Cray supercomputer would be used to emulate a Sinclair 
Spectrum, running a Cray emulation. A computer becomes its own bug, but 
that bug is another machine, running itself. Formalisms mesh with, irritate, 
propitiate and explore each other, producing luminous declivities, skittering 
patterns, banqueting halls of mirrors, slag heaps of unprocessed symbols, states 
and efflorescences cross-pollinating at a myriad of uneven rates and via an 
entire zoology of third parties. In this regard, there’s also something fascinating 
about using such a relatively graphically naff system to draw out what is now 
such a well understood piece of engineering, rendering an iconic structure into 
something like a megalithic airport terminal, but one in 128-bit colour, with 
rectilinear sheep, pigs or chickens wandering around, and one that at night runs 
the risk of being infested with zombies.37
Megalithic chuckles
So how does the Minecraft computer inflect the notion of machinic and 
distributed fun? There is a version of the excluded third in Philip Agre’s 
description of technical knowledge in which a computer model ‘either works 
or does not work’38 but also a recognition of its insistence on empiricism in 
that ‘[c]omputer people believe only what they can build, and this policy 
imposes a strong intellectual conservatism on the field’.39 The process and 
nature of computation is excluded in the first, but is taken as a source of truth 
in the second, and here mathematics enters into its various kinds of relation to 
and distance from engineering, a discipline whose realism may often make it 
inventively as well as demonically otherworldly. Here though a totemic piece of 
computer architecture, when translated into another domain of realization, that 
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of Minecraft with all the curiosities and interest of its gameplay, logic and visual 
and physical quirks, becomes something else, something fascinating, magnifi-
cently ridiculous, and is done in a way which allows it to be explored.
Computing becomes about its experience as such, the machine is, in this 
instantiation, slower than many of the first electronic computers. Fun in 
software here lines up with a hackerly processual passion at a meeting point 
between complex orderings of many kinds but also enrols the jointly incre-
mental and transversal nature of invention which produces, through ambiguity, 
the capacity not only to see things in different lights, but also to draw hitherto 
unworked capacities out of them. Akin to Turing’s symphony written for 
another computer, it is a computer made, paradoxically, within a computer. 
One can say, triumphantly, ‘Look, I’m computing with the computer on my 
computer!’ But it is an experience that also circulates via other means, drawing 
us into the monumental excitement of being able to add two to three via an 
enormous stone mechanism composed of pixels. In such a paradox, and in a 
state of multiple ambiguities, computing finds itself reformulating the machinic 
compulsion to connect, refigure and experience the partial object. There is 
indeed a deep ambiguous fun in computing, in achieving such a microcosmic 
achievement on an epic scale.
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4Do Algorithms Have Fun? On Completion, 
Indeterminacy and Autonomy in Computation
Luciana Parisi and M. Beatrice Fazi
Algorithms, not androids
In 1968 Philip K. Dick wondered whether androids, which at the time epito-
mized the ultimate mechanization of mental processes, could dream of electric 
sheep.1 Dick’s provocative suggestion was meant to address the prospect that 
mechanized thought could develop a human unconscious, and thus become 
truly autonomous. In Dick’s novel, dreaming stands as the ultimate expression 
of the human capacity to think beyond logical processing, without the functions 
of cognitive reflection or recognition. It could be argued that, in Dick’s story, a 
mechanized being that is able to dream realizes the promise of total autonomy 
from instructions and pre-programmed finalities. A dreaming android never 
becomes a human subject, but is nonetheless as close to the human emotional 
dimension of thinking as it could ever be.
Today, nearly 50 years after Dick’s proposition, it is similarly possible to 
wonder whether algorithms – which are now the quintessence of mechanized 
thought – could exhibit a dimension of autonomous thinking. While androids 
had a body but were looking for a soul, in the present day mechanized thought 
is instantiated in computational processes that are themselves already material 
and incarnated, insofar as they are always performed and embedded in society, 
culture and the economy. To be autonomous, these computational systems 
do not need to simulate the more or less conscious requirements of a ‘psyche’, 
insofar as they already have a ‘point of view’ (or a sort of subjective dimension, 
so to speak) that is expressed through their material agency. Within the current 
configuration of digital technology, it could then be claimed that the mechani-
zation of thought carried out by algorithms has approached the ultimate goal 
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of total automation by incorporating thinking as material performativity, thus 
showing an immediate tendency to break free from the human master that has 
nonetheless programmed them.
Following on these considerations, one could contend that, in computa-
tional science and in computational culture alike, the final goal for automated 
thought is no longer to escape the pre-programmed algorithmic rule and 
thus to revert into a sort of computational unconscious. Instead, automated 
thought is epitomized in a new vision of the algorithmic rule itself. Now this 
rule is always executed, and in this execution it can adjust itself to external 
changing conditions. To sum up, most algorithms have become interactive, 
and the mechanization of thought has to be accounted for vis-à-vis the now 
dominant expansion of such interactive approaches to computing. It is in this 
respect, one could argue, that today the quest for the autonomy of mecha-
nized thought involves the prospect of mechanized systems changing their 
own pre-programmed regulations. This interactive vision of software has 
importantly questioned the self-sufficiency of axiomatics, logic and formalism, 
and has tried to complement the formal rule with the environmental input. 
Consequently, in the cultural analysis of these new modes of mechanization 
of thought, interactive software has been seen as operating affectively; that 
is, through the expansion of the field of potential activities that disrupt 
and re-invent meaning.2 Here, digital technology becomes the ground for 
creativity and for the production of paradoxical propositions that do not aim 
to reproduce a pre-constituted intelligence, established by a representational 
conception of thought. Rather, paradoxes and ambiguities strive to expose 
the sensible dimension of thought against the dominance of computational 
understandings of cognition.3 From this perspective, freeing the computational 
unconscious becomes secondary to the possibility of producing, in compu-
tation, sense beyond formal logic.4
It is exactly within this context, we believe, that the question of fun in 
software has acquired a significant momentum. Fun in computing emerges as 
an affective force that exceeds the formal logic that has nonetheless generated it; 
fun thus coincides with the disruption, caused by uncertainty, of the decisional 
power of algorithms operating within changing data structures. We may thus 
agree that the strength of this proposition is that it offers a radical account of 
the exceptional condition of instability and malleability of the computational 
rule – a condition that is vital to the creative drives of programming cultures. To 
a certain extent, the present chapter builds upon the rich debates that have put 
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forward this proposition, and at the same time it aims to push this new view of 
computation in another direction.
The question that we propose – ‘Do algorithms have fun?’ – is meant to echo 
the hypothesis posed by the title of Dick’s novel, Do Androids Dream of Electric 
Sheep? Like Dick’s provocation, our own hypothesis may also sound absurd; 
yet such an absurd proposition may nonetheless provide an opportunity to 
investigate another scenario regarding the significance of fun in software. To 
put it in other words, our proposition still aims to question computation, logic 
and formalism as representational approaches to thought. However, in order to 
do so, it is necessary for us to revisit the possibility that autonomy in compu-
tation might not be geared uniquely towards the liberation of the algorithmic 
procedure from the program or the master programmer. The question, we 
contend, is less whether a procedure might become free from mechanization, 
but whether mechanization itself already comes with a form of autonomy, 
insofar as it can be defined as a series of procedures aiming towards completion. 
As will become clear further below in the chapter, the notion of completion is 
used to define the process by which a final determination is achieved.
Algorithmic autonomy for us is not about a machine sharing or opposing 
the human spectrum of cognition and perception in which the possibility 
of having fun is traditionally inscribed. On the contrary, the question, ‘Do 
algorithms have fun?’, is predicated upon a speculative move suggesting that 
fun corresponds to the capacity of algorithms to enjoy themselves while processing 
data. Enjoyment here is, in turn, mainly defined in terms of the final purpose 
of the computational process, which is to say, by its functionalist imperative 
to complete a task. In a counter-intuitive twist of the debate, we therefore take 
fun not to be the subversion of a rule, or the break from the constriction of a 
cold and strict procedure, rather we suggest that fun requires an end activity 
on behalf of the rule itself. Rather than escaping the rule, fun thus points to a 
new understanding of algorithmic order: one that complies with the question 
of the fulfilment of procedures, or achievement of a result, in computation. 
Fun in software is for us neither posthuman (there is no an alleged equivalence 
between human and machine), nor inhuman (there is no opposition between 
the two). Fun here deploys another level of mechanized processing altogether 
– a level that is not exclusively preoccupied with human–machine relations or 
the lack thereof. In this procedural order, relations are secondary to the finality 
of the rule’s function. Fun, we contend, is the final achievement of autonomy in 
mechanical thought.
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Forms of process
The questions raised in this chapter are directed towards the speculative 
re-conceptualization of computational algorithms in terms of actualities, 
expressed as forms of process. We take the latter notion from the mathematician 
and philosopher Alfred N. Whitehead, who uses it to define the actual organi-
zation of data in the world.5 In our opinion, this Whiteheadian concept is key to 
the possibility of re-thinking what processes (and, therefore, also computational 
processes such as algorithms) are. Following the Whiteheadian view, processes 
can in fact be re-thought not as a continuous movement of variation, but instead 
in terms of the final achievement of a finite state.
Whitehead employs the notion of ‘form of process’ to explain the ‘final 
mode of unity in virtue of which there exists stability of aim amid the multiple 
forms of potentiality, and in virtue of which there exists importance beyond the 
finite importance for the finite actuality’.6 In this respect, Whitehead’s ‘form of 
process’ needs to be investigated vis-à-vis a key element in the Whiteheadian 
philosophy: actual occasions. An actual occasion is actual not merely because 
it is something that is present here in front of us and impresses us (as Hume 
would have held actuality to be). In Whitehead, actuality is instead a process 
of concrescence, or ‘a process in which the universe of many things acquires an 
individual unity’.7 This is, for Whitehead, a process of satisfaction, or of self-
enjoyment. In actual occasions, data are organized and unified; when this unity 
is achieved, the actual occasion is ‘satisfied’ because it has fulfilled its scope by 
becoming complete.
It is our contention that Whitehead’s philosophy of actuality can contribute 
to questioning the antagonism between, on the one hand, the conception of 
process (intended as the continuity of variation, forming a whole that is bigger 
than its parts) and, on the other, the notion of processing (intended instead 
as a self-contained procedure based on already determined and finite parts 
aggregating into a whole). In Whitehead’s oeuvre, these two concepts are not 
opposed; it could be said, in fact, that both process and processing contribute 
to the determination of the actual occasion. We thus wish to appropriate 
Whitehead’s philosophy of actuality to go beyond this opposition which seems 
to pervade the critical debates about computational culture.8 To this end, we 
suggest that algorithms can be conceived as discrete actual entities, whose aim 
is to achieve unity. This achievement can be defined, again in Whiteheadian 
terms, as satisfaction (which is, in Whitehead’s words, ‘the completion of the 
 Do Algorithms Have Fun? 113
actual togetherness of the discrete components’)9 or, from the perspective of 
this chapter, fun. On the one hand, an algorithm is a procedure that performs 
a processing, involving the execution of a sequential number of steps that 
organize data towards a result. This processing, however, does not simply lead 
to the aggregation of parts into a whole, but rather corresponds to the creation 
of a new unity that is added upon (and yet is not contained by) the aggregation 
of parts. Enjoyment, in this respect, involves the processing of data towards a 
final aim (this aim being the completion of the procedure). On the other hand, 
however, we want to stress that an algorithm is also a process, inasmuch as it 
involves an indeterminate capacity for variation. Yet, what should be empha-
sized here is that this variation is not the result of continuous change, but it is 
the final product of the process of determination carried out by the algorithmic 
procedure itself. This process of determination defines an algorithm that attains 
its completion by realizing its function. Satisfaction, from this perspective, is the 
exhaustion of the algorithmic function in the process. In computational culture, 
to sum up, we find evidence that process and processing are defined less by their 
differences than by a common finality, and that fun (re-worked speculatively via 
the Whiteheadian notions of enjoyment and satisfaction) might be an instance 
of such a finality.
To carry out such re-articulation of algorithms in terms of forms of process 
– or, it is worth repeating here, in terms of discrete entities achieving satis-
faction through the unification of data – we need to linger a little longer on 
the proposed parallel between algorithms and actual occasions. As already 
mentioned, Whitehead’s philosophy of actualities is useful for our investigation 
of algorithmic computation precisely because his approach is based on an 
atomistic conception of the universe that might counterintuitively help us to 
revise the conceptualization of digital procedures. Moreover, it can also help 
us to re-think what the unity of discrete entities might be from the standpoint 
of a process of determination. Instead of describing finite entities as already 
constituted unities, Whitehead argues that actual occasions are the result of 
a tendency of the multiple to become united. The accomplishment of unity 
marks for Whitehead the end point of an actual occasion. In this respect, actual 
occasions are finite and determined, also because they are short-lived. Once 
they reach unity, their process ends and they perish. One can also add here that 
completion is the finality of an actual occasion, insofar as its process of unifi-
cation is its ultimate goal. The atomicity of an actual occasion corresponds to 
its finality: discreteness is not given, but produced from within the process. An 
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actual occasion, therefore, does not come from nowhere. It inherits data from 
past actualities and is characterized by the tendency to eventually terminate 
just such a process of selection that ultimately constitutes it as one. Data, in 
turn, do not correspond to what already exists. For Whitehead, data are trans-
mitted from the past to the present in a manner that is not simply re-used, but 
re-processed by the actual occasions under new conditions.
It is important here to stress that for Whitehead this principle of inher-
itance cannot explain, on its own, the ‘becoming one’ of the actual occasion. 
Whitehead’s metaphysical proposition instead gives a major role to what he 
calls eternal objects. These are a priori yet immanent ideas, which according to 
Whitehead can be described ‘only in terms of [their] potentiality for “ingression” 
into the becoming of actual entities’.10 In this sense, an eternal object is pure 
potentiality from the standpoint of the actualities that select them. Eternal 
objects, then, cannot be described in terms of one potential plane of continual 
differentiation (for instance Deleuze and Guattari’s plane of immanence and/
or the virtual) or in terms of a plurality of equivalent ideas (such as the 
postmodern claim about the relativity of truth). Rather, this other element in 
Whitehead’s metaphysics offers us a notion of indeterminacy. Eternal objects are 
in fact non-connected among themselves, and only acquire togetherness when 
selected by actual occasions. In this togetherness, they concretize indeterminacy 
by allowing the actual occasion to achieve finality. Eternal objects are maximally 
unknowable, but nonetheless they inform the determinate state or the atomism 
of actual occasions.
At this point we should add that both eternal objects and existing actual 
data are not passively received but are instead prehended by the actual occasion. 
Contra the empiricist perceptual capacity to synthesize the world through 
sense impressions, Whitehead argues that prehensions are modes of evaluation 
and selection, measuring and dividing an infinite variety of data each time. 
Instead of being just sensations, prehensions, for Whitehead, are both physical 
and conceptual. This is because each actual occasion ‘is essentially bipolar’;11 in 
other words it has a physical and mental pole, expressing the actual occasion’s 
capacity to physically and conceptually process data. The physically prehensive 
nature of an actual occasion means that actual occasions themselves are always 
informed by what is no longer there, by the data of the past actual occasions 
that are accumulated and crystallized in any present actuality. Moreover, as we 
have just discussed, actual occasions are also informed by what is not there at 
all: the unknown or indeterminate ideas or eternal objects. The prehensions of 
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eternal objects are, for Whitehead, conceptual prehensions. As we saw earlier, 
eternal objects define the direction towards the determinateness of the actual 
occasion, its final unity and discreteness. Here again we find the processual 
nature of actual occasions, in which the indeterminacy of eternal objects adds 
a new level of determination to the data selected. A process becomes, however, 
a processing to the extent that data are compressed and arranged in a finite 
procedure, oriented by the actual occasion to drive towards its own satisfaction. 
In conclusion, prehensions, we could argue, are the catalysts for the concre-
tization of the indeterminacy of the eternal object. More interestingly, however, 
they also reveal the persistent concreteness of indeterminacy itself in actuality.
Completion and indeterminacy in algorithmic processing
Having introduced these key elements and conceptual manoeuvres of 
Whitehead’s philosophy, we can now return to this chapter’s initial contention: 
the possibility of re-conceiving algorithms in terms of Whitehead’s actual 
occasions by drawing on his notion of ‘form of process’. In our view, to claim 
that an algorithm is an actual occasion implies arguing that the computa-
tional procedure is more than simply processing; i.e. more than a procedure 
based on pre-established instructions. In this respect, we want to argue that 
an algorithmic procedure cannot be thought of away from the indeterminacy 
that it is always tending towards. This passage is complicated, and to develop 
it we need first to explain what an algorithm in computation is, and what it is 
supposed to do.
In formal sciences, an algorithm is described as a sequence of instructions 
meant to fulfil a task. An algorithm is a procedural method for the transfor-
mation of input into output; its instructions are well defined and executed 
through a finite number of inferential steps. This is the understanding of the 
algorithm that entered computing via the seminal work of mathematician Alan 
Turing. In his famous paper ‘On Computable Numbers, with an Application to 
the Entscheidungsproblem’ (1936)249 Turing sets out to answer David Hilbert’s 
question of whether, given a certain input, a universal method for taking a 
yes-no decision could be ultimately found in mathematics. In that paper, Turing 
rephrased the problem of decidability from the standpoint of computability. The 
notion of computability, in turn, was defined by Turing in terms of an effective 
procedure (i.e. an algorithm) to solve a problem in a finite number of sequential 
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steps. In his attempt to answer Hilbert’s challenge, Turing developed a simple 
thought experiment (the Turing Machine) that was meant to mechanize a valid 
and determinate method for calculation. This hypothetical device performs 
computations by moving its head left and right along an infinite tape, that is 
in turn divided into discrete cells; the head moves one cell at a time, writing a 
symbol from a finite alphabet for each cell according to some given instructions. 
By proving that certain functions could not be computed by such a hypothetical 
machine, Turing demonstrated that there is not a method of ultimate decision 
of the kind that Hilbert had wished for. In addition to this, however, the 
Turing Machine also offered a viable formalization of a mechanical procedure. 
Computational processing, as we know it today, was born.
The strength of Turing’s proposition is that, via his formalization of the 
Turing Machine, the function of computation came to be defined as being 
much more than just that of crunching numbers. Turing’s computing machines 
– and indeed the contemporary electronic digital computing machine that has 
developed from them – can solve problems, take decisions and fulfil tasks, 
with the only proviso that these problems, decisions and tasks are formalized 
through symbols and a set of discrete and finite sequential steps. In this respect, 
Turing’s effort can be rightfully inscribed into a long series of attempts in 
the history of thought geared towards the mechanization of reason. Turing’s 
foundational work in the theory of computability, and his conception of a 
computing machine, were meant to put the intuitive and informal operations 
of a person actually computing a number into formal terms. Mechanization 
implied that these formal terms could be automatically repeated because they 
were inscribed as symbols and discretized as a sequence of steps.
At the technical level, we could argue that the Turing Machine epitomizes 
a mechanism that works insofar as it completes an operation. Moving now to 
the conceptual level, we can understand this operativity as one tending towards 
unity. An algorithmic procedure can in fact be seen as an aggregation of parts; 
when these parts achieve unity (that is, when the task is fulfilled), the mechanical 
process shuts down and then another procedure starts over again. Here one 
could object that, in light of what we have just described, the parallelism between 
an algorithm and an actual occasion becomes a difficult claim to sustain. It 
could in fact be argued that the Whiteheadian actual occasion does not merely 
aggregate into a bigger whole; rather, its parts are realized to become another 
part that is a new unity. In other words, in an actual occasion parts transform 
themselves in relation to a whole. However, the actual occasion remains, 
 Do Algorithms Have Fun? 117
atomic: its parts never complete the universe of possibilities of what the actual 
occasion could be, or will be. An actual occasion is always a spatio-temporal 
relation between elements in process; it is indeed an occasion, its own eventu-
ality determines its own prehensions, and, consequently, its own constitution. 
Continuing the objection, it could be also claimed that, in Turing’s formulation, 
an algorithm, conversely, has to do with pre-established functions (indeed, with 
axioms). In a Turing Machine, everything is pre-set, pre-programmed – in total 
indifference to content and context. From this standpoint, a Turing Machine 
merely performs processing: a linear procedure of cause and effect where one 
step inferentially determines the other. The objection according to which the 
parallelism between an algorithm and an actual occasion is flawed would thus 
seem to be justified: while an actual occasion is dynamic, an algorithm is not.
Having identified these difficulties, might it still be possible to advance our 
intended parallel between algorithms and actual occasions? Our answer is yes. 
The parallel between algorithms and actual occasions is still valid by virtue of 
an inherent and unavoidable character of computation itself: incomputability. 
With his 1936 paper, Turing formalized the notion of computability; however, 
what is most striking about that proposition is that the formal foundations 
of this notion were laid on the logical discovery that some things cannot be 
computed. In 1931, Kurt Gödel proved the fundamental incompleteness of 
formal axiomatic systems.12 In 1936, Turing built on Gödel’s discovery to 
demonstrate that computation, in its mechanized formalization, is also intrinsi-
cally limited, and that these limitations are due to the formal axiomatic nature 
of computational mechanisms. Algorithms drive towards completion; this is 
of course evident at the level of their execution, but it can also be suggested 
that, at the formal level, completion is always entailed within the finality of the 
procedure. However, in his logico-mathematical formulation of computability, 
Turing foresaw that, despite the incredible versatility and efficiency of his 
proposed calculating machines, there are problems that cannot be solved, tasks 
that cannot be fulfilled and decisions that cannot be taken through them. These 
are incomputable problems for which there is no algorithmic decision. A Turing 
Machine can compute anything that can be calculated via algorithmic means. 
If something cannot be computed, then nor can it be put in algorithmic terms. 
For some functions, there is not a yes-no (or binary) answer. In this respect, 
completion in computation cannot always be attained.
After this brief but crucial overview of the logico-mathematical origin of 
computation, the significance of the proposed parallel between algorithms and 
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actual occasions might perhaps become more evident, and we can thus begin 
to justify our understanding of computational procedures in terms of forms 
of process. We want to argue that, while the unknown dimension of the actual 
occasion is the eternal object, unknowability in computation is expressed through 
the notion of the incomputable. We are thus here contending that the incomputable 
is to the algorithm what the eternal object is to the actual occasion. It is true to say 
that the algorithmic procedure is pre-established; it is undeniably a processing of 
data. However, this processing is an actuality that also has to confront the indeter-
minacy of the incomputable in the same way as the actual occasion is a finite 
spatio-temporality whose determination results from a process of prehension of 
the indeterminacy of eternal objects. In other words, eternal objects are ingredients 
in the constitution of actual occasions, and thus their indeterminacy becomes one 
with the finite atomistic nature of the universe. Similarly, the unknown condition 
of an algorithmic occasion is an incomputable condition, which serves the 
algorithmic actual occasion to speculatively become more than it was.
The work of mathematician Gregory Chaitin can now be introduced to 
further expand on the contention that the incomputable is the eternal object 
in computational processing. In his algorithmic information theory, Chaitin 
combines Turing’s computability with Shannon’s information theory to 
understand computational processing in terms of calculation of probabilities 
– probabilities that aim to include what in this processing cannot be known 
in advance. Chaitin understands the threshold of computability from the 
standpoint of maximally unknowable probabilities.13 In every computational 
process, he explains, the output is always bigger than the input. For Chaitin, 
something happens in the computational processing of data, something that 
challenges the equivalence between input and output and thus the very idea that 
processing always leads to an already pre-programmed result. This something, 
according to Chaitin, is algorithmic randomness. The notion of algorithmic 
randomness implies that information cannot be compressed into a smaller 
program, insofar as an entropic transformation of data occurs between the 
input and the output of algorithmic processing, resulting in a tendency of these 
data to increase in size. From this standpoint, the output of the processing does 
not correspond to the input instructions; its volume tends, in fact, to become 
bigger than it was at the start of the computation. Chaitin has explained the 
discovery of algorithmic randomness in computational processing in terms of 
the incomputable: increasing yet unknown quantities of data that characterize 
information processing.
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Space constraints prevent us from expanding further on Chaitin’s work; 
the brief overview above should, however, suffice to sustain the claim that his 
work is indeed useful to us, inasmuch as it can contribute towards explaining 
what we mean by the ‘form of process’ in computation. Chaitin’s investigation 
of the incomputable reveals, in fact, that the linear order of sequential proce-
dures (namely, what constitutes computational processing) shows an entropic 
tendency to add more parts to the existing aggregation of instructions estab-
lished at the input. Since now this processing inevitably includes, from the 
perspective proposed by Chaitin, not only a transformation of existing data, but 
also the addition of new data on top of what was already pre-established in the 
computational procedure, we believe it becomes possible to argue for a form of 
process in computation. In other words, here processing is also a process. From 
this point of view, computational processing does not guarantee the return 
to initial conditions, and does not simply correspond to the aggregation or 
disaggregation of parts that can be pre-programmed. This is because Chaitin’s 
conception of incomputability no longer perfectly matches with the notion of 
the limit in computation (i.e. the limit to what is calculable). Chaitin’s incom-
putable involves, in fact, the addition of new and maximally unknowable parts 
to the whole; parts, however, that might be bigger than the aggregate whole. 
For us, such a reworking of the incomputable is striking and speculatively 
productive, because what was conceived to be the external limit of compu-
tation (i.e. the incomputable) has now become internalized in the sequential 
arrangement of algorithms (randomness works within algorithmic procedures). 
One can thus even suggest that algorithmic randomness is not ‘outside’, but has 
become constitutive of the actuality of the procedure. Processing then includes 
a form of process, because indeterminacy is a fundamental part of information.
But if the incomputable involves parts that can be bigger than a whole, how 
do we explain the completion or the achievement of a task of an algorithmic 
procedure? Isn’t algorithmic randomness (i.e. the tendency of information to 
increase in size) always there to threaten any achievement of a function to 
complete a task? This is where, by Chaitin’s own admission, it is necessary to 
see algorithmic randomness as a continuation of Turing’s attempt to account 
for indeterminacy. Whereas for Turing some tasks cannot be achieved, and 
thus computation stops when the incomputable begins, for Chaitin, all tasks 
have a margin of incomputability. In Chaitin, incomputability does not break 
from completion. A closer investigation of his theories helps to reveal that 
algorithmic randomness has changed the nature of computational processing: 
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completion has been expanded beyond its limits to involve the processing of 
maximally unknown parts in order to accomplish a task. To put it in other 
terms, completion is now demarcated by an indeterminate condition that 
subtends all efforts equating computational processing with the calculation 
of pre-programmed and already known outputs. In Chaitin, the finality of 
completing a task importantly requires that instructions respond and resolve 
unknowns each time the indeterminacy of data emerges in processing.
Interactive procedures
At this stage in our discussion, it may not be too difficult to justify the 
question of indeterminacy as being a speculative problem within computa-
tional processing itself, and thus point to the existence of a ‘philosophy of the 
algorithm’ that should attempt such speculations. We started our own specu-
lative investigation by proposing a parallelism between Whitehead’s notion of 
actual occasions and the computational notion of completion. Having discussed 
incomputability via Turing and Chaitin, it became possible to think that the 
algorithmic completion of a task cannot be achieved without the participation 
of indeterminate quantities of data within processing. In particular, we have 
sought to develop Chaitin’s mathematical work on algorithmic randomness 
to prove that indeterminacy is always part and parcel of a determinate actual 
occasion/algorithm as it strives towards completion. From this perspective, we 
believe that completion in computation corresponds to unity, and unity is, in 
turn, a terminal point that can be reached only if indeterminacy ingresses the 
processing of data and makes the algorithmic procedure both a process and a 
processing. In other words, the ‘terminus’ of an algorithm can be approached 
only if the incomputable partakes in its procedure.
Recapitulating, we can think of the incomputable as the indeterminacy that 
is necessary for completion, or for the unity of a form of process. However, our 
revisiting of computation through the problems of completion and indeter-
minacy cannot be fully grasped without discussing the dominance of a new 
paradigm within computing: the interactive paradigm.
Arguably, interaction has become an all-encompassing principle of expla-
nation in contemporary technoscience. Fields of enquiry such as biology, 
social theory, neuroscience and robotics have all pushed forward an alternative 
understanding of thought – understandings that see the latter as always already 
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environmentally ‘situated’. Interaction is, in this respect, the interactive behaviour 
of multiple distributed agents. In computing, prediction and simulation now 
have to account for situations that are outside the confines of the black box and 
are instead always embedded into and dependent upon the environment. This 
interactive approach has clashed with the algorithmic constraints of the Turing 
Machine. Turing’s model of computation has been considered insufficient or 
unable to cope with the complexity of the empirical world – a complexity that, 
one could say, philosophically speaking, has its own non-representational logic. 
In this respect, efforts have been advanced in computer science to revisit Turing’s 
algorithmic modelling.14 While Turing’s conceptualization of mechanism based 
on a priori instructions can arguably be said to correspond to first-order cyber-
netics (due to its closed system of feedback), the combination of environmental 
inputs and a posteriori instructions proposed by the interactive paradigm more 
clearly embraces second-order cybernetics and its open-feedback mechanisms.
Returning to our investigation of computational completion, we can claim 
that what we defined earlier as the algorithmic drive towards completion has 
perhaps changed now. In particular, we want to stress that if interaction is 
more powerful than algorithms,15 it is because indeterminacy, from the point 
of view of interaction, might now imply and represent something else. The 
volatility and malleability of lived situations are no longer obstacles for mecha-
nisms of prediction. The goal of interaction is indeed to account for variation 
and novelty, and to enlarge the horizon of calculation to include qualitative 
factors as external variables of the mechanism. We want, thus, to suggest that, 
according to an ‘interactivist’ approach, the problem of the incomputable might 
be partly eluded. This is because completeness is no longer a solipsistic affair; 
rather, completeness becomes a prospect that is achievable only by virtue of 
the contribution of the outside world. In this sense, the algorithmic procedure 
might be incomplete per se. However, it reaches completeness by virtue of its 
interactive execution. From the standpoint of interaction, then, the successful 
running of an algorithm is a performance in the environment (i.e. computation 
is embedded in the world) and of the environment (i.e. computation needs the 
world and the data extracted from it to fulfil the algorithmic task).
In our opinion, various approaches to interactive computing share a common 
goal of pointing towards a new mode of mechanization of a procedure, in which 
the starting condition of the program does not dictate the procedure’s final 
output. We can see this mode everywhere, from the imperative of participation 
in artworks, to social media strategies for user input geared to data-mining via 
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neuro-cognitive mappings that now involve actions and perceptions. Taking 
into account such ubiquity and pervasiveness of computational interaction, 
it should be commented here that interactive computing is the result of the 
challenges that computation has to confront today: a quick and efficient respon-
siveness to vast data spaces, the quantification of desires, beliefs, inclination and 
knowledges that underpins the statistical calculation of trades and prices. We 
are keen to stress that, in this contemporary scenario of computational interac-
tivity, completion is attained by adding new levels of quantification of variation. 
These new levels afford completeness insofar as the function of the algorithm 
is extended by external inputs, and is, thus, able to bypass its internal limits by 
simply posing the limit of computation elsewhere. The interactive paradigm, 
then, concerns the capacity of algorithms to respond and adapt to its external 
inputs. However, we want to suggest that this interactive form of adaptation 
does not serve to overcome, but only to postpone the threat of computational 
indeterminacy.
In order to understand further how these new dynamic attributes of the 
interactive algorithm work, we can ask whether the interactive algorithm could 
be seen as being conceptually closer to Whitehead’s actual occasion. Is this 
discussion of interaction in computation a way to prove our parallel between 
the two notions? The answer is no: we believe that there is an inherent problem 
with the interactive paradigm’s reworking of indeterminacy aiming to calculate 
the variations of lived situations. Indeterminacy, we argue, is only approximated 
by the interactive algorithm; the problem of the incomputable is not solved 
but merely optimized through the addition of an external input. In this sense, 
the interactive algorithm harnesses the speculative power of the incomputable 
for computational processing. Going back to Chaitin, we can argue that the 
incomputable is not simply a limit that must be resolved by the addition of 
environmental variations, but that – as a problem – it remains an active ingre-
dient or element of every computation, however many variables and data may 
be involved in it. Incomputability, like an eternal object, conditions the finality of 
the algorithmic occasion.
We are thus saying the interactive paradigm is not so different from the 
Turing one: both are geared towards the fulfilment of a task. From both perspec-
tives the pre-established procedure clashes with the unknown quantities of 
the incomputable. While in Turing computation stops, with the interactive 
algorithm the problem is bypassed by the addition of more and more data so as 
to enrich, diversify and vary the goal of the function. It could then be argued 
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that the interactive paradigm interprets the incomputable from a human (or 
humanist) standpoint: it tries to solve the limit from the viewpoint of the human 
capacity to comprehend or compress data, or as how a human would cognitively 
cope with the unknown. Instead, our contention is that in fulfilling a task the 
algorithmic procedure inevitably confronts information indeterminacy, and 
by this encounter it fully realizes itself. This is completion from the standpoint 
of a computational process that cannot ‘not’ be incomplete. In other words, 
the limit of computation cannot be eluded, as it is intrinsic to computation 
itself. Computation may account for variations from the environment and thus 
become more powerful because of this inclusion. Yet the internal limit remains 
as the mark of the radical indeterminacy that constitutes computation.
Satisfaction and the autonomy of rules
The question of confronting indeterminacy and fully realizing oneself in relation 
to it needs to be explained by returning yet again to Whitehead. Whitehead, we 
said, calls the capacity of an actual occasion to constitute itself through the 
prehensions of data coming from other actual occasions and eternal objects 
‘satisfaction’. An actual occasion reaches satisfaction as it reaches completion. 
For Whitehead, this condition of ‘exhaustion’ corresponds to the constitutive 
function of every actual occasion, and is not simply an option. Satisfaction 
should thus be interpreted not as emotional gratification, but as the final 
fulfilment of an appetite. In this sense, the actual occasion’s tendency to reach 
completion corresponds to its final determinations, which, however, as we have 
seen, can only be achieved through the ingression of indeterminacy in actuality.
It is exactly at this point in our discussion that we would like to go back to 
the debate about fun in software. The long treatment of algorithms as actual 
occasions was in our opinion necessary to add an ulterior challenge to the 
conceptualization of fun in computational culture. Here, we return to our 
initial question: ‘Do algorithms have fun?’ So far we have proposed that we 
can articulate this question in the Whiteheadian terms of satisfaction and 
enjoyment, and, thus, in relation to the question of completion in computation. 
An algorithm that has fun is an algorithm that ‘enjoys’ its own process of deter-
mination. As anticipated earlier, in computation this process of determination 
is explicated in the processing of data on behalf of sequences of instruc-
tions. Drawing on Chaitin, we have said above that this processing involves a 
124 Fun and Software
tendency of information to increase in size (i.e. algorithmic randomness). Via 
Chaitin, it is also possible to argue that the introduction of randomness, entropy 
or indeterminacy within computational processing describes algorithms that 
select a multiplicity of data which gets unified into an output. This output is a 
unity that is still a part, but that, however, can be bigger than the whole set of 
instructions from which the computation started. From this standpoint, and yet 
again following Whitehead, we can add that satisfaction can only correspond to 
the final expression of such constitutive indeterminacy within computational 
processing. Here, one can see that satisfaction, understood as algorithmic 
completion, might bring a further level of speculation to the debate about fun in 
software. From this perspective, there is fun in software because the algorithmic 
procedure entails a dimension of enjoyment that derives not from the breaking 
down of the mechanization, but instead from the fulfilment of the internal 
dynamic of completion via indeterminacy in computation. We do not deny 
that there is fun in going outside of the grains of formal logic, as the epitome of 
representational thought in computing. We maintain, however, that computa-
tional processing already implies a dimension of enjoyment or satisfaction – one 
that is being understood here as a process of completion determined by the 
ingression of indeterminacy within algorithmic procedures.
Despite the fact that the process by which an algorithm enjoys itself might 
still remain obscure, we believe that this proposition offers an opportunity to 
address one of the main challenges that software poses. Crucial to the history 
of computation is the quest for an ultimate procedure for the mechanization 
of thought, and thus the possibility of finding a new form of conceptual 
function. To propose that algorithms are actual occasions means to confront 
both this quest and this possibility, and to reformulate what the mechanization 
of thought could be from the standpoint of the Whiteheadian notion of ‘form 
of process’. We want to argue that, in a Whiteheadian sense, the algorithmic 
mechanization of thought does not aim to establish an equivalence between 
emotional intelligence and the execution of a rule. By taking algorithms and 
not androids as our object of investigation, we can say that we are ultimately 
interested in re-directing the question of the autonomy of thought from 
emotion to reason. As mentioned earlier, we suggest that algorithms, taken as 
the contemporary epitome of automated thinking, reveal that the execution of 
rules (indeed, the mechanical) might have another order of autonomy – one 
that can be found not without or against but within reason. This is because 
algorithmic reason is already mechanical, insofar as it is the processing of rules. 
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This last sentence should, however, be introduced with a disclaimer: we are not 
suggesting that algorithms exhaust all forms of thinking, nor are we asserting 
that all thought is determined by reason or by the processing of rules. We are 
rather making the case for a mechanization of thought that is already a form of 
reason. Algorithms might have an autonomy that is not to be understood as 
mere replication of what makes us autonomous (this is instead what Dick’s 
androids were aiming to do). Algorithms, we believe, have their own form of 
autonomy: one that pertains, we are keen to stress, to the final aim of executing 
rules (i.e. completion).
The question of whether algorithms have fun becomes, from this broader 
reading of the mechanization of thought, an enquiry into instructions that 
operate by means of decision. It could be argued that our vision of fun in 
software shares, to a certain extent, some of the assumptions that motivated 
Dick’s critique of mechanical thought. His dreaming androids were meant to 
think beyond the rule, so as to deviate from what the traditional idea of mecha-
nized thought was based on (i.e. the repetition of a rule and the constant return 
to initial conditions). Dick was thus exposing the limits of representation to 
contain the reality of thought. For Dick, a computational unconscious was a way 
to argue for non-representational thought, or for drives that cannot be reduced 
to symbols and steps, and which, thus, cannot be mechanized. In this respect, 
our contention that algorithmic fun needs to be understood in terms of compu-
tational completion similarly opposes the idea that rules represent thought. 
Ultimately, representation is for us, just as it is for Dick, insufficient to explain 
the reality of a process. The difference between our proposition and Dick’s, 
however, is that while his androids oppose rules to imagination by emphasizing 
the indeterminacy of dreaming and/or affective thought, our algorithms/actual 
occasions reveal that procedural and mechanical thought already contains 
much more indeterminacy than one could imagine. This indeterminacy is not 
simply readable via representational means, but remains nonetheless logical, 
formal and computational.
This is the sense in which we understand the mechanization of thought as a 
rule-based mechanism that does not simply exclude or optimize indeterminacy, 
but instead cannot avoid expressing it. This is also to say that the incomputable, 
far from being the ultimate indeterminacy that eludes computation, is instead 
the indeterminate condition of every information system and, as such, it is 
constantly realized in algorithmic procedures. Our emphasis on the incom-
putable vis-à-vis Whitehead’s eternal objects therefore aims to put forward the 
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idea that something has changed in the nature of the rule itself. We suggest that 
the computational rule is dynamic, but this dynamism is not uniquely derived 
from the interaction that the rule entertains with its outside when executed. 
In our view, the rule is instead dynamic by virtue of its processual function. 
Computational processing is thus also a process, even though it cannot be 
reduced to it.
In conclusion, we suggest that computational processing can correspond to a 
non-human intelligibility of indeterminacy. From this perspective, algorithmic 
rules are what they are: instructions. As such, they are meant to fulfil a task. Yet, 
we believe that this instrumentality is not a symptom of an undefeatable power 
that programs our very human capacity of thought. Instead this instrumentality 
can be understood as defining an irreducible, and fundamentally algorithmic, 
form of process. In this respect, the fact that the rule accomplishes a function is 
what for us justifies the autonomy of such a function. To ask whether algorithms 
have fun is then a speculative exercise to test the hypothesis of the autonomy of 
algorithms as a new form of mechanical thought. Perhaps the question remains 
absurd, nevertheless it must be posed.
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5useR! : Aggression, Alterity and Unbound 
Affects in Statistical Programming
Adrian Mackenzie
How should we think about the agency of programmers? Today, at a moment 
when data aggregation has become the mantra in so many sectors of science, 
business, government and entertainment, and when aggressive aggregations of 
data are in play all around us, it might be useful to explore how programmers 
embody data structures. Rather than seeing programmers’ agency as rooted in 
the force of algorithmic execution, it might be better to see how data structures 
bind the psychic energy of programmers into certain forms of movement, 
feelings of potency and somewhat aggressive and eroticized attachments. If 
we start from the position that the bodies of programmers are animated by all 
the aggressions, satisfactions, violences, desires and pleasures characteristic of 
subjectivity more generally, then we might better understand the alternately 
excited and enervated feelings associated with bringing software into being. 
Conversely, if data structures bind psychic energy through the ways that they 
channel, grid, slice, fold, ply and sort multifarious relations, we can sense how 
software aggregates and clusters not just data, but realities more generally. To 
the extent that programmers embody – in habits, in perception, in sensation, 
in affect, in artefacts – the relational textures of the aggregates they encounter, 
they in turn replicate and extend the dimensions of that relational matrix. The 
question is how they energize or animate what they encounter and how they 
render it inert and moribund.
In any human embodiment, there are polarities between what might loosely 
be termed aggression and non-destructive eroticization. In the former, to 
follow a psychoanalytically inflected train of thought, fantasies of rootedness, 
of foundation, of wholeness and mastery can only be attained by acting as if the 
world can and must be controlled. This is acted out aggressively. In the latter, 
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the ego or self is susceptible to new associations, encounters and exchanges. 
Associations and encounters, insofar as they are new or different, take the 
form of unbound affects, affects that fall outside iteratively maintained psychic 
organization. Such unbound affects are necessarily eroticized. Yet aggression 
and eroticization are connected. It is not as if we could just say ‘no’ to aggression. 
As Leo Bersani and Adam Phillips suggest, any ‘satisfied aggression is accom-
panied by an erotic excitement’.1
The erotic excitement triggered by the hallucinatory process of fantasizing 
control over the world and others is felt as power, potency and narcissistic 
jouissance. Its power is aggressive since in separating itself from the world, it 
also renders the world as harmful. Yet this aggression is not without risk. It 
risks shattering the ego. While what Teresa Brennan calls ‘the foundational 
fantasy’2 brings with it feelings of omnipotence and control over the world, 
these feelings tend to grow hyperbolically. As Bersani and Phillips write: ‘the 
“extraordinary narcissistic enjoyment” that accompanies satisfied aggression 
at once hyperbolizes the ego and risks shattering its boundaries’.3 Any flow of 
energized excitement eroticizes the subject-to-be in ways that are potentially 
associative, and indeed, sometimes freely associative. This freely associating 
excitement or unbound affect is not necessarily aggressive or destructive. It may 
open the possibility of what they call ‘non-destructive eroticizing of the ego’.4 
Put in a more political register, it might embody an ‘appetite for … fresh forms 
of conflict, … for an unpredictability of feeling and desire’.5
To even use the term eroticization in the context of software might be 
read as tendentious or far-fetched. Yet this connection is more tenable if you 
think about the software of eroticization. The most obvious zone of exchange 
between software and eroticization is probably online pornography. While in 
this discussion I say little about pornography and software, the tremendously 
iterative tendencies of contemporary pornographic media could be analysed 
using software studies approaches. The result of such an analysis might not be 
too different from what I am endeavouring to discuss here in several respects: 
how the conservation or maintenance of psychic organization takes place; how 
the hyperbolically growing effort to maintain existing forms of eroticization 
cannot ever fully extinguish the risk of shattering or dissolution; and how any 
attempt to anticipate desire is reliant on yet eluded by the populations, aggre-
gates and multiplicities that vitalize bodies. This entwining of repetition and 
alterity lies at the heart of any ethopolitics of software. All of this plays out 
around software. The question is what kind of agency software wants: will it 
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be a new superordinate egoistic power, the epitome of rational will or accepted 
entitlements, or something that frees and proliferates forms of economic, 
communicative and erotic exchange?
Embodying data structures: From predictive analytics to 
data munging
We might begin to understand something of how contemporary programmers 
embody these polarities through the case of a single programming language, R.6 
R is a programming language, a computing environment and a cluster of code 
libraries focused on statistics. It was designed almost exclusively for the purpose 
of collecting, binding and cutting data in support of forms of statistical inference. 
R is almost 15 years old, roughly the same age as Java or Python. It derives from an 
earlier statistical programming language and environment, S, that was developed 
at Bell Labs and commercialized in the late 1980s as S-PLUS. Like UNIX/Linux/
GNU, and roughly the same age, R’s biography is somewhat entwined with the 
history of Bell Labs. Although unlike Linux/GNU it languished in the late 1990s, 
in the last few years R has been reanimated and attracted much more investment in 
academic work and in commercial settings.7 As evidenced by the bulging blogroll 
at R-bloggers.com, R has also become much more than a tool to teach statistics 
to college students. People are playing with it as a way of working with data much 
more widely. Both as programming language and as comprehensively networked 
archive of data analysis packages (approximately 3,000 in CRAN – Comprehensive 
R Archive Network),8 R has become a thriving ecology of software data practice. 
In R, statistical methods, data manipulation tricks, data extraction techniques and 
code for graphics and visualization rapidly move laterally between diverse fields 
of high and low sciences, industry, government and media. Code and scripts, 
often transiting very quickly between research scientists and commercial and 
non-commercial operational settings, also switch back and forth between media, 
science and business. No longer is statistics in the service of governmentality or 
the biopolitics of population, but in the service of entertainment, knowledge and 
security. R, with its several thousand packages, with its cross-platform builds, 
with its open source and with its very rapid absorption of the latest advances in 
statistical technique, data structures and sources of data in many fields (Twitter 
feeds, GoogleVis, pubmed API, World Bank data, etc.), is part of this shift. The 
movement of methods is itself one sign of excitement about R.
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Through R it might also be possible to think about how software embodies 
shifting desires, excited beliefs and eroticized enjoyment concerning data. In 
contrast to languages supporting the design of user interfaces, or languages 
equipped to grapple with network protocols and infrastructures, or languages 
designed to deal with the unruly, unwieldy sociality of programmers working 
together, the strength of R consists in an extraordinary profusion of data struc-
tures and techniques for working with data at every level from elementary sorting 
to advanced statistical modelling. Writing code in R is not really associated with 
networking, with graphic user interfaces (windows, widgets, controls, etc.) or 
with building platforms (operating systems, web services, applications, etc.). 
Rather, statistical programming connects programming practices to flows or 
sources of data apprehended as samples, experiments, observations, surveys 
or measurements. While many of the same programming techniques found in 
Python, Java, Perl or Lisp can be found in R, or applied in R, R is software and 
programming with a different end: to do things with data statistically. There 
are many ways of doing things with data: acquiring it, possessing it fully, using 
it and showing it. Data comes in diverse forms. Most datasets probably exist 
as Excel spreadsheets. Tremendous amounts of data are in relational database 
tables. And increasingly, data exists as images or as structured files and streams 
(XML, RSS, RDF, etc.). For all these forms of data, there are typical practices 
of editing, curating, viewing or analysis. The question is what is going on with 
work on data in R? Is there something here that undoes investments in code as 
control? Wouldn’t statistical software be in the service of the taming of chance, 
as Hacking would put it,9 or the politics of large numbers?10
Every programming style brings with it specific investments in data struc-
tures. For instance, structured programming languages such as Pascal and Ada, 
or ‘object-oriented’ languages such as C++ or Java, bind data together with 
specific software architectures and programming practices organized around 
hierarchical structures. At the same time, these bindings of data, environment 
and practice are energetically connected to diverse historical enactments. 
Something of the diverse contemporary investment in data and data structures 
can be found in R. Different dynamics and logics are mixed in R. In order to filter 
these, we could explore how R attracts collective attention at two annual confer-
ences, Predictive Analytics World and UseR! At the Predictive Analytics World, 
San Francisco in February 2009, high-end analytics software vendors – Spotfire, 
SAS, IBM, Oracle – are on hand alongside the database and cloud services.11 
The ‘Encounters with R’ session, run by the Bay Area UseR! Group, is full. It 
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seems R’s heyday has arrived for the business data miners. In the R session at 
Predictive Analytics World the panel of speakers come from Google, Facebook 
and Revolution, a company set up to commercialize a version of the open-source 
statistics programming language and platform R. The speakers are talking about 
how they cook the fat data gathered in their respective enterprises. The Google 
researcher, Bo Cowgill, drifts on rather monotonously about how Google 
uses ‘classifiers’ to speed up their search engine offering. Itamar Rosenn from 
Facebook much more energetically talks about the use of ‘logistic regression and 
recursive partitioning’ to model user ‘receptiveness’, and to help predict who will 
stay and who will drop off Facebook. He refers to particular packages in R, and 
says how they used them. The presence of Google and Facebook signals a certain 
buoyant mood that infuses discussions of R. At Predictive Analytics World 
and very many other places, data talk is increasingly suffused with a frisson of 
excitement about doing things to and getting things from data. Data, it seems, is 
being aggressively pursued. In other settings, this excitement about using R on 
data is invested slightly differently. Epistemic, aesthetic, economic and political 
values accompany talk of open data, data journalism, data mashups, infoviz. 
The final speaker, David Smith from Revolution, voices some of these less hard-
headed, business-minded values. Like the founder of Revolution, Norman Nie, 
who developed the very-well known social science stats package SPSS at the 
University of Chicago in the 1970s, he evangelizes a souped-up commercial 
version of R in terms of democraticization:
Everyone can, with open-source R, afford to know exactly the value of their 
house, their automobile, their spouse and their children—negative and positive 
… It’s a great power equalizer, a Magna Carta for the devolution of analytic 
rights.12
Interest in business data is nothing new. Alongside nuclear physics and weather 
modelling, business imperatives to process data have shaped software archi-
tectures in many ways; for instance, in the form of relational databases, which 
were largely conceived in response to business rather than scientific needs.13 
There have long been overlaps and exchanges between these domains. Scientific 
techniques of simulation have flowed over into commercial settings, particu-
larly via the circuits of military-funded research. Many scientists work in 
industry and develop software for industry. Conversely, scientists make use of 
much commercial software, ranging from software such as Weka and Matlab 
to Oracle databases. The work of computer scientists is particularly difficult 
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to disentangle. Their work runs crazily across the lines between knowing and 
selling, people and things.
The current R boom is not solely driven by the needs and desires of business 
intelligence under discussion at Predictive Analytics World and the many other 
‘analytics’ events. The rise of R is no outlier. Big data discourse (especially in 
business intelligence, market analytics, quantitative trading finance markets 
and various life, physical and social sciences), the promise of data economy, 
as well as shifts in governmentality (tied to the erstwhile Big Society in the 
UK, and in Australia, Canada and the United States with open data initia-
tives) converge in many ways. The rising star of ‘data scientists’ in business and 
government, however, owes much to the diverse ecology of code, data, models, 
techniques, infrastructures and practices that has grown around R in the last 
two decades. Data is very much allied to what has been happening in sciences 
across the spectrum of physical, earth, life and social sciences. Scientific 
software, made to work with data from instruments, sensors and databases, 
usually barely becomes visible in popular culture. In fact, with statisticians 
and the rare computer scientist, it is lowly field scientists such as ecologists, 
geologists and sociologists who have contributed much to the rampant tropical 
growth of R. Non-commercial, often patchily architected, slovenly bodies of R 
code abound. These lower-order, epistemically, aesthetically and economically 
diverse data intimacies can be seen at the other conference settings, the UseR! 
Conferences.14 Since 2004, the UseR! Conference has taken place in Europe and 
North America. In comparison to Predictive Analytics World, these confer-
ences are largely academic, with a sprinkling of industry participation. While in 
recent years oddly mixed sponsorship has started to appear from Google, SAS 
and GCHQ, the general frame of these conferences is academic and technical 
rather than business. The title of the conference and many local groups of the 
same name make a small word play: useR! is both an injunction to use the 
programming language and functions as a mathematical expression of the rapid 
growth of use of R via the factorial function (R!). The hundreds of presentation 
in these conferences are factorial in relation to Predictive Analytics World: they 
address a much wider range of topics ranging from DNA microarray analysis 
to male lizard fights, from deployment of R on Debian to real-time quantitative 
analysis of Bloomberg trading data. Scientists and statisticians rather than 
professional programmers are doing the software development in these settings, 
but they themselves are highly receptive and responsive to the many shifts in 
software cultures surrounding them.
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The love of munging
Can there be non-destructive enjoyment of data? Given the range of scientific 
techniques, models and styles mingling in R, can data-driven desire set free 
different solutions to the conflicts between exhaustion and speed that beset 
software cultures? Framed from the psychoanalytic perspective, the question 
would be: can there be pleasure here that is not an erotic excitement of satisfied 
aggression, or narcissistic data-control jouissance? What kind of other desires 
might be possible? Deleuze and Guattari argue that ‘desire belongs to the infra-
structure’.15 Their target is ideological understandings of desire that locate it in 
the mind of subjects. They seek instead to discover in the subject ‘the nature, 
the formation, or the functioning of his desiring-machines, independently of 
any interpretations’.16 The desire that belongs to the infrastructure: might that 
be more like the non-destructive eroticization that Bersani and Phillips speak 
of? Could R, and the cuts it makes in data, undo anything of the flows that carry 
coding towards the hyperbolized ego of Predictive Analytics World?
Much analysis of software has focused on algorithms as control processes 
or protocols.17 Data structures – lists, arrays, tables, sets, graphs, databases 
– have attracted attention either as media forms or in relation to control 
processes.18 In some ways, statistical programming falls somewhere else. It 
incorporates various styles of coding, different kinds of programming tools, 
software architectures and bodies of code. It moves between extremes of 
infrastructure, from spreadsheets to dense scientific or business computing 
clusters. However, it incorporates biopolitical aspects which are less visible in 
other programming settings. By virtue of being statistical, R is connected to the 
several centuries of scientific-governmental-institutional investment in survey, 
sampling, randomizing, testing and plotting. This biopolitical underpinning of 
R affects it at every level, from the texture of code written in R to the way R is 
taken up, affirmed or validated in various settings. Work at either extreme of 
data – the mundane collecting, filtering, reshaping, transforming, transposing, 
sorting and ranking that makes things into tables, lists and files, and on the 
apparatus of probability distributions and statistical models which many data-
mining algorithms depend on – figures much less. For the prosaic work, there 
is term ‘data munging’. More scientifically prestigious work is epitomized in the 
field of statistical machine learning, where clustering, classifying and modelling 
are exhaustively discussed.19 Yet working ‘data scientists’ (a term that seems to 
have sprung into existence in the last few years) commonly estimate that 80–90 
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per cent of their work is getting data into the right form for analysis. Data comes 
from scenes of much intensely focused ‘munging’,20 but working with data takes 
software in different directions, especially in its encounter with populations.
There are good grounds for thinking that much of the energy going into R 
is stultifying if not stupefying. Take the case of Google’s chief economist, Hal 
Varian. On the one hand, Varian is widely quoted by proponents of R for his 
views on data science:
The ability to take data—to be able to understand it, to process it, to extract 
value from it, to visualize it, to communicate it—that’s going to be a hugely 
important skill in the next decades, not only at the professional level but even at 
the educational level for elementary school kids, for high school kids, for college 
kids. Because now we really do have essentially free and ubiquitous data. So 
the complimentary [sic] scarce factor is the ability to understand that data and 
extract value from it.21
This immediately raises the question: important for what? On the other hand, 
Varian’s own offerings in this area are not terribly inspiring. For example, he 
dips into the mighty data torrents of Google search and GoogleTrends, channels 
them through some relatively minimal R code that uses seasonal autoregression 
(a technique developed in econometrics to measure correlations in fluctuating 
prices over time) in order to leverage a few per cent increase in the confidence 
with which US car sales or tourist travel to Hong Kong can be predicted ‘in 
the present’.22 The techniques, the code and the predictive results are hardly 
startling. Nonetheless, a couple of things might be indexed by Varian and Choi’s 
work on GoogleTrends using R. First of all, this is an example of R scripts 
bringing scientific techniques into play in the service of predictive analytics. 
Second, the empirical data to which the statistical models fit is itself produced 
by other layers of software that draw out and channel flows of desire. The flow 
of Google searches are, as is well-known, the raw materials for the analytics-
driven advertising businesses of Google worlds. In these settings, production 
of surplus value relies on making sense of what people are doing. Cutting these 
flows, the R scripts are desiring-machines. The question is: how far can the 
techniques, scientific models – techniques and knowledges that really come 
from an incredibly wide range of angles – cut into the flows of data generated 
by an axiomatic machinery of predictive flows? We can see both a concerted 
attempt to apply the statistical methods developed in the last 200 years in life 
and human sciences to new terrains, to new populations. The principle that 
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Varian and Choi’s work proves is that desires and beliefs can themselves begin to 
be treated as populations whose parameters and distribution can be estimated.
While Google’s use of R to ‘predict the present’ seems like a neat proof of 
principle, the Facebook case is more provocative. In his Predictive Analytics 
World presentation, the Facebook researcher Itamar Rosenn described how 
Facebook attempts to mine its user data using R. No surprise there: any business 
faced with hundreds of millions of registered users might want to try to find 
patterns or regularities in how people use their products. Facebook’s interest 
lies in trying to predict whether people will come back to Facebook after regis-
tration. Although more than 500 million people have registered, it is hard to say 
how many people actually do anything on Facebook’s pages. Their commercial 
existence depends on user retention. However, despite the claims of data-mining 
software vendors, making sense of such vast data sets is no simple operation to 
be executed according to a rational plan. If it was, Facebook would not be using 
R. A turn to R, rather than to an IBM or SAS business analytics software suite, 
suggests that things are not settled. Indeed the lively growth of R and the fact 
that more data miners say they use R than any other software (including Excel 
spreadsheets) suggest that data mining is a very unstable operation. Hence, the 
question of how R is invoked and works to create code around Facebook data 
(or any other) is a live one. It is invoked statistically, and statistically here means 
in relation to large numbers. The problem that Facebook analysts deal with is 
how to make sense of the scale of their own growth. They almost have to treat 
their own platform statistically, as a population of users, whose activities in 
space and time need to be modelled in order to derive statistics that can be used 
to make inferences about them. What does it mean to to write statistical code 
for accumulated data? The association between computation and accumulated 
population data is not new. We need only think of Hollerith machines and the 
use of computation to produce statistical tables for population censuses.23
The code that Itamar Rosenn and the Facebook analytics team wrote draws 
on the R package, lars. Lars, standing for least angle regression, was written 
by statistical machine learning researchers at Stanford, and in particular, by 
a leading figure in the field of machine learning, Trevor Hastie.24 The relevant 
scientific publications date from 2004.25 The package itself, lars, went into 
CRAN, the R equivalent to Perls cpan, in May 2007. One or two years later, 
Facebook used it to model user responsiveness, and to predict who will return 
to Facebook and who won’t. The shift from scientific publication by academic 
statisticians to code in R and then to code at Facebook was rapid. It only took 
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five years. Unlike Varian and Choi, the Facebook team have not published their 
results as a research paper. They are rather more pragmatic in their approach to 
R. Rather than use it to shape a discourse on the value of data, they make use 
of it to give form to the data skimmed off the incessant accretions of Facebook. 
To explore the dynamics of Facebook’s growth, Rosenn looked more closely at 
the intersection between registration and other desiring flows traversing the 
software. They found, for instance, that the probability of someone returning 
to Facebook after registering for an account has some correlation with the ways 
in which they configure their Facebook page. Any degree of customization 
is correlated with increased retention. Hence, anything that invites or affords 
customization could be a useful accumulation strategy. Again, like Varian’s, 
these results are hardly surprising.
Perhaps the actual results are less important than the ways in which they were 
achieved. The lars approach is used as a way of selecting from many possible 
models of the data at hand. As the authors of the original lars publication write,
typically we have available a large collection of possible covariates from which 
we hope to select a parsimonious set for the efficient prediction of a response 
variable. Lars, a new model selection algorithm, is a useful and less greedy 
version of traditional forward selection methods.26
In other words, the lars technique that the analytics team has picked up from 
R allows them to try many different linear regression models and efficiently 
choose a predictive one. The ‘response variable’ they seek – whether someone 
will return to Facebook after registering – is estimated not by simply building 
a model that predicts, but by trying many models of prediction in a carefully 
regulated order. The techniques of linear regression are extremely well estab-
lished, but every linear model requires individual design and interpretation. 
The statistical modelling of Facebook users will remain rather flat-footed unless 
there are ways to try many different models. Yet building numerous models is 
a laborious and uncertain undertaking. Here the packaging of recent statistical 
research into R enables ‘less greedy’ (that is, less likely to settle on a locally 
optimal) treatment of data. Greedy algorithms, while simpler to design and 
implement, often do not find globally optimum solutions.27 They search locally 
for the nearest best solution to a problem. Lars offers a way of automatically 
building and trying many different models with less chance of being trapped in 
some sub-optimal result. In this case, a sub-optimal result would be to select a 
model of Facebook user behaviour that did not include relevant predictors, and 
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that therefore missed possible lines of axiomatization that Facebook analysts 
could develop as part of their accumulation strategy.
Predicting what R programmers will do
R programming explores how people or things act (what they do on Facebook, 
how likely they are to book a flight to Hong Kong, what car they will buy, 
etc.). As we have just seen, the data structures that R brings to bear on events, 
actions, behaviours, beliefs and desires are statistically informed models that 
transform tables of data into correlations, clusters, imputations, inferences, 
confidence intervals and scores of various kinds. These transformations in 
some ways seek to control data, but in other ways, they make that data more 
fluid, labile and mutable. The tension here between aggressive control over 
data and the potential for free association through data is quite marked. While 
methods and techniques promise control, the proliferation of techniques and 
methods risks shattering the very possibility of control. In a sense, the very 
reason programmers get excited about R – it makes available so many methods 
that promise to corral the data – also potentially undermines their investment 
in it.
It should come as no surprise then that the practice of R programming 
itself should become a target of prediction. Take a recent Kaggle competition,28 
sponsored by the data blog Dataist.com. Kaggle sponsors data-mining or statis-
tical analysis competitions ranging across health data, chess ratings, tourism, 
grant application outcomes, dark matter and the progression of HIV infections. 
In the case of the ‘R Package Recommendation Engine’ competition, compet-
itors were supplied with meta-data from the CRAN repository describing which 
of 1,852 R packages were installed by 52 R users. This is the so-called ‘training 
data’ used to build a predictive model. Having modelled this sample population, 
competitors were judged on how well they could predict what further packages 
were installed by much larger group of R users, the test group. A good ‘recom-
mendation engine’ would provide new users of R with suggestions on as to 
which packages they should install. The training data-set for the competition 
comes directly from CRAN, so it itself offers an interesting view on how data 
is being worked on globally. A time-series analysis of package installation in R 
would make it possible to see the distribution and mobility of data methods in 
flight. I am less interested here in what is being done with R packages than in the 
140 Fun and Software
Kaggle competition on data in R. The sample solution provided by the compe-
tition organizers suggests something about the forms of thought involved:
library(‘ProjectTemplate’)
try(load.project())
logit.fit <- glm(Installed ~ LogDependencyCount +
  LogSuggestionCount +
  LogImportCount +
  LogViewsIncluding +
  LogPackagesMaintaining +
  CorePackage +
  RecommendedPackage,
 data = training.data,
 family = binomial(link = ‘logit’))
summary(logit.fit)
The statistical model at the core of the sample solution is very simple: ‘logistic 
regression’, a form of linear modelling that allows the probability of an event to 
be predicted on the basis of several variables whose relative contributions to the 
event are not known.29
The technique is widely used in marketing research. Here the event to be 
modelled is whether a particular R package has been installed or not. The 
variables are all the dependencies, maintenance status, existing recommenda-
tions and so forth. The sample model yields a set of probabilities for every R 
package for every R user in the test data set. The competitors in the Kaggle 
competition try to improve the sample solution. Competitors can make as many 
entries as they want, but after the judging deadline, the solution with the highest 
predictive power wins. Attentive readers may have noted that the proposed 
sample solution bears a great deal of similarity to the Facebook user retention 
analysis. Indeed, Facebook’s model also used logistic regression, but coupled it 
with a technique for modelling models (lars). Rather than one model, they built 
many. But even this difference begins to disappear if we think of the Kaggle 
competition as about the modelling of modelling. Rather than using a statis-
tical technique of lars to check many models, it uses the competition format 
to generate and check many models. Furthermore, these models are models of 
how data is being modelled, and how the modelling of data is being embodied 
by programmers using R, by in other words, R users.
There is a striking symmetry between the situation faced by Facebook 
analyists in trying to understand how people become habitual users, and the 
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Kaggle competition in trying to predict how programmers who become users 
of R use R. Here we might see most directly how users become useRs! (with 
all the factorial and imperative senses of that term). Once the embodiment of 
data structures and the desires to munge data are also processed in a predictive 
analytics recommendation engine, unruly bodies of R code can be brought 
into the hallucinations of data productivity. This is both satisfying and exciting. 
The satisfaction comes from the fact that useRs become more like users with 
calculable response rates and retention ratios. The excitement comes because 
the attempt to model useR!s exacerbates the mobility of methods flowing 
through R.
Pure love of data
What would be a good embodiment of data structures? To embody a pure love 
of data, if such a love were possible, would be tantamount to disinvestment. 
Disinvestment is a very difficult position to maintain amidst the economic-
affective flows of productivity. Indeed, desiring investment in programming is 
the precondition for alterity in software, and, in relation to data. The under-
lying problem here, as in so many forms of investment, is to know how the 
excitement of satisfied aggression shifts into a non-destructive eroticizing of 
data. R programmers would no doubt find this an odd statement. The point, 
however, is that only through the associative processes given off by unbound 
affects can un-analytic un-predictive events take place. Hence eroticizing data 
is a way of talking about the need for hitherto unexpected forms of exchange 
and encounter.
There are indications that something complicated is happening to data. 
Desires to do things with data are shifting. Although there is much data talk 
today about the accumulation of data, the accumulation of data is not the relevant 
point of entry. We must look in other places. Interference and intersection of the 
lines of desire that traverse individuals are much better places to learn about the 
points of inflexion and free association. The body of R code and the bodies of 
R programmers are interesting places because they take populations as aggre-
gates and multiplicities to heart, or more precisely, into their own hands. R is 
an encounter with the vitality of populations. What does it mean for software to 
encounter populations in this way? In Anti-Oedipus Deleuze and Guattari wrote: 
‘in the unconscious, there are only populations, groups and machines’.30 That 
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statement, so well known and widely invoked, is hardly ever read in terms of the 
practices and epistemics of populations – statistics, demography, epidemiology 
and assorted field sciences. We see the statistically mediated encounter between 
coding and populations taking place in contemporary data-driven analytics such 
as Google’s seasonal autoregression, Facebook’s lars or Kaggle’s logistic regression, 
suggesting that populations, groups and machines are being brought together. 
Populations can be coded or undo coding since their character is recombinant, 
chance-laden and associative. The question is to what extent bodies of code 
themselves can become population aggregates and micro-multiplicities. This is 
not only because all coding techniques are partial objects subject to re-connection 
and re-configuration, but also because so much coding, as abundantly attested 
by the population of R packages, scripts, graphics and derivate mediations, has 
no particular productive aim and indeed constitutes a break or rupture in the 
productive flows. ‘It is only desire that lives from having no aim’.31
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6Do (not) Repeat Yourself
Michael Murtaugh
Duplication (inadvertent or purposeful duplication) can lead to maintenance 
nightmares, poor factoring, and logical contradictions.
 Duplication, and the strong possibility of eventual contradiction, can arise 
anywhere: in architecture, requirements, code or documentation. The effects 
can range from mis-implemented code and developer confusion to complete 
system failure.
 The Mars Climate Orbiter was lost due to a semantic contradiction: part of 
the system was working in Imperial units, another in Metric. There was a dupli-
cation of knowledge (implicit units), and the duplicates were out of step.
The Problem:
 But what exactly counts as duplication? CloneAndModifyProgramming is 
generally cited as the chief culprit (see OnceAndOnlyOnce, etc.), but there is 
more to it than that. Whether in code, architecture, requirements, documents or 
user documentation, duplication of knowledge – not just text – is the real culprit.
 Therefore:
 The DRY (Don’t Repeat Yourself) Principle states:
 Every piece of knowledge must have a single, unambiguous, authoritative 
representation within a system.
 [...]
 It’s a battle of two really strong urges – OnceAndOnlyOnce vs avoiding 
PrematureGeneralization. Do I duplicate for now and try to live with the dupli-
cation for a while, or violate YagNi (YouArentGonnaNeedIt) and come up with 
some half-cocked generalized solution? It’s a tough one, because almost all 
programmers hate duplication; it’s a sort of primordial programming urge.1 
This long quote is the opening section of the page titled ‘Don’t Repeat 
Yourself ’ (DRY) on the Portland Pattern Repository (PPR). The pages of 
the website, devoted in part to the practice of programming, are heavily 
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cross-linked, forming a messy tangle of programming paradigms and self-help 
tips for improving code with CamelCased hyperlinks,2 often in the form 
of an imperative such as RefactorMercilessly, PutThingsWhereYouLook and 
SeparateTheWhatFromTheHow. At the same time it contains seemingly contra-
dictory meta-tips that warn against SilverBullet and OneTrickPony solutions. 
Despite the apparent clarity and appeal for ‘authoritativeness’, later in the same 
page, the discussion presented above takes on a slightly different tone:
But: It may take time and effort to select and/or create a definitive source – see 
YouArentGonnaNeedIt. – DickBotting
 Hmm. ‘Every piece of knowledge must have a single, unambiguous, authori-
tative representation within a system’. Is this not a reasonable definition for a 
Singleton?
 No. DRY refers to your source code, not your running program. 
ThirdNormalForm is the analogous principle for data.
 Ugh. I think you’re both barking up the wrong trees there. It doesn’t refer 
to source code, nor to the running program. It refers to a system. Needn’t have 
computers involved at all.3
The PPR is the product of a particular community of programmers. It is 
in fact the ‘mother of all wikis’, and was created (and maintained) by Ward 
Cunningham, who coined the term ‘wiki’. The fact that the discourse of the PPR 
takes place on, and came about in conjunction with the development of, the 
wiki, is significant. While superficially a wiki page provides for a kind of ‘single 
source’, its great strength lies in the fact that by containing the entire history of 
edits, by permitting editing by anyone and by allowing differences of opinion 
to be made explicit, the wiki itself is far from being free of contradiction or 
duplication.
The language of seeking ‘single, authoritative, unambiguous’ knowledge by 
the architects of the software that would go on to inspire the more popular 
Wikipedia project seems to sadly devalue its own core strengths. While the 
prescriptive nature of the DRY discourse appeals to a programmer’s sense of 
utility and efficiency, it also seems to be in denial of the very nature of the 
practice it aims to serve.
Programmers walk a fine line between seeking ecstatic singularities while 
at the same time enduring dutiful and crushing conformity to correctness 
and convention, performing a practice that is by nature highly repetitive. 
Programmers often have to search for a balance between considering the details 
of a particular situation and flying into euphoric quests for abstraction, desiring 
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code that goes beyond the satisfaction of some particular need into the ecstatic 
realm of the unforeseen and unexpected. The quasi-ejaculatory nature of this 
process is evident in another of the PPR principles, that of avoiding ‘premature 
generalization’.
Popular web programming frameworks, such as Ruby on Rails and Django, 
pride themselves on adhering to the ‘principle of DRY’. The Rails framework 
initially promoted itself as a response to the drudgery of website programming 
and was unique in listing the ‘joy’ of using it, among its other technical features, 
as a way of winning over programmers: ‘Rails is a full-stack, open-source web 
framework in Ruby for writing real-world applications with joy and less code 
than most frameworks spend doing XML sit-ups’.4 Such ‘joy’ is contrasted 
with repetition, something much less desirable and seen as valueless, with its 
essential qualities remaining unrecognized.
However, it is often the programmers’ recognition of a pattern already 
learned through repetition that is most compelling in the use of a particular 
framework. In the same way that one feels lost and isolated in the woods and 
Figure 6.1 Don’t Repeat Yourself
Source: Unknown.
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then reassured when one comes across a well worn path, frameworks are 
condensations of practice and reinforce a sense of community among their 
practitioners. In contrast to the practice of belonging, the fun to be had in the 
pioneering discovery of the novel or unique is isolating. In addition to this, 
repetition is intrinsically intertwined with the development of the craft of 
programming.
[...Skill] development depends on how repetition is organised. This is why in 
music, as in sports, the length of a practice session must be carefully judged: 
the number of times one repeats a piece can be no more than an individual’s 
attention span at a given stage. As skill expands, the capacity to sustain 
repetition increases. In music this is the so-called Isaac Stern rule, the great 
violinist declaring that the better your technique, the longer you can rehearse 
without becoming bored. There are ‘Eureka moments’ that turn the lock in a 
practice that has jammed, but they are embedded in routine.5
There can be a tangible pleasure in quickly typing out the template of a familiar 
programming structure. Far from celebrating the birth of a unique new 
creation from scratch, it is rather a joyful expression of the pattern that increas-
ingly becomes physically embodied in the programmer him/herself. Here, the 
material that one once struggled with, with time becomes something ingrained 
in ‘one’s fingers’.
On the surface, the black box of abstraction promises the programmer 
that if he/she can only get the abstraction right, he/she will never have 
to deal with a particular kind of problem again. In fact, working with 
abstraction is a gradual process, inclusive of struggling repeatedly with the 
material of a problem and, thus, acquiring the skill that would feel ‘natural 
and easy’ by becoming a part of the body of the programmer. Rather than 
removing the problem, repetition produces increased capacity to deal with 
the problem and, thus, the problem can be repeatedly successfully tackled. 
The formalization of abstraction in the form of code (the syntax and naming 
of a function object, for instance) can be seen as merely a culmination of the 
necessary prerequisite of practising a repetitive process that made its recog-
nition and recall possible.
Working with recursion is a particular kind of programming skill that often 
takes a great deal of practice before it is fully mastered. Once it is learned, there 
is a self-effacing wonder in watching 20 lines of code dissolving down to ten, 
then five, as all the ‘edge cases’ that could possibly be imagined map onto the 
few folds of a particular recursive structure. Similar to the pleasure of kneading 
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dough, working with recursion is about the almost miraculous transformation 
of code through repeatedly working it.
Repetition is an essential part of the process of recognizing and constructing 
abstractions. The fact that experienced programmers might directly write code 
using concise and ‘correct’ abstractions is more a reflection of their experience 
than an absolute (and transferable) measure of quality.
Code smells
If you are aware of CodeSmells, and duplicate code is one of the strongest, and 
you react accordingly, your systems will get simpler. When I began working in 
this style, I had to give up the idea that I had the perfect vision of the system to 
which the system had to conform. Instead, I had to accept that I was only the 
vehicle for the system expressing its own desire for simplicity. My vision could 
shape initial direction, and my attention to the desires of the code could affect 
how quickly and how well the system found its desired shape, but the system is 
riding me much more than I am riding the system.6
My great Aunt Margaret, a piano teacher and former Catholic school principal, 
would implore all overnighting nieces and nephews to take a shower in the 
morning, to counter the ‘beddy smell’. Naive as I was, it was only years later that 
it occurred to me how the term ‘beddy’ was in fact a thinly veiled euphemism 
for the less comfortable subject of one’s ‘body’. Just as my Aunt displaced 
the body by the bed, the struggles of programming often get projected from 
programmers onto the code. Bad code has a smell, independent desires and an 
ability to ride or be ridden by the programmer. Repetition can be experienced 
as a tiring physical exercise.
In addition to devaluing repetition as something smelling ‘bad’, something 
to be either absolutely avoided or at best tolerated, the transference of a smell to 
code is also indicative of another set of displacements, such as the code being 
separated from the practice of programming, and the practice of programming 
being separated from the physical effort required of the body of the programmer 
him/herself. Coding can be, and often is, physically exhausting work, as illus-
trated by the passage below:
Just got off the phone with F. Feeling slightly remorseful at being kind of pissy 
and short. Maybe need to write an email: Sorry I was vague. Orality impaired – I 
could better write an email. I’ve been coding intensely over the past 4 days. I was 
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only half-listening as F ran down the planning for the workshop – discounting 
that information that I already knew (annoyed at the redundancies)... a Borg 
voice speaks to me from the collective: this information is not relevant; this 
conversation is inefficient. I’m having difficulty following what’s being said.
 Thinking of the ‘code smells’ – after these long stretches of coding the smells 
take a physical form – though it’s not coming from the code … I’m unable to 
tell if the unpleasant odors I seem sporadically aware of are originating from 
rotting garbage in the bin or from me. Reminiscent of baby diapers. Probably 
the garbage bag … must be.
 Dim the screen – too bright. On with coding...
 I can no longer come up with meaningful names for things. Have started 
using names like ‘aa’, ‘bb’, and ‘aaa’. Switching between these abstract symbols 
seems easier; reduced semantic overload = less need to think.
 Can no longer remember what task I am currently working on. I start 
writing down tasks not ‘to do’, but what I’m supposedly ‘doing now’, so that each 
time I slip, I can refer to the note. Need to update the model and regenerate the 
database before going to bed. Before I forget why it’s important.7
For programmer Will Crowthers, commenting on his hobby below, rock 
climbing does not merely provide an escape from programming:
You would have to forget about everything. When you’re rock climbing, you 
must not think about anything but the rock climbing or you’re apt to get killed. 
And it just wipes everything out for a day or two or whatever it is. However 
long you’re off climbing, which tended to be a weekend, you don’t think of 
much else.8
Crowthers’ ‘extreme hobby’ parallels the intensity of his experience of 
programming itself. He needs an escape with a sufficiently matching intensity to 
give him a break from that of the engrossingly ‘disembodied’ practice of coding. 
Crowthers is best known for programming the early computer game classic 
‘Collossal Cave Adventure’ (also known as ‘Adventure’) in his spare time while 
working at the company BBN Technologies in Massachusetts in the late 1970s. 
A pioneering example of an interactive program that simulates the experience 
of cave exploration, the writing of the game was, according to Crowthers, in 
part an attempt to reconnect to his children after an estrangement from his wife 
whom he had met while caving.9
‘Extreme Programming’, a concept whose origin and development can 
be traced to Kent Beck on the PPR,10 has become an important movement 
concerning rethinking traditional approaches to software programming 
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practice. Beck’s choice of the term ‘extreme programming’ clearly invokes 
‘extreme sport’, and indirectly references the often frustrated desires of a 
programmer to experience, in their practice of programming, the intensity of 
physical experience such as that described by Crowthers.
According to the principles of DRY, it would seem that the job of a 
programmer is to detect patterns and to fold these into redundancy-free 
perfection. This suggests an ideal, Plato-inspired practice of programming, 
wherein the programmer, after meditative moments of reflection, is able to 
effortlessly condense the chaotic cacophony of the reality around him/herself 
into a stream of precise expressions, gliding from unique formulation to unique 
formulation and never looking back.
People imagine that computer programming is logical, a process similar to the 
one of fixing a clock. Nothing could be further from the truth. Programming is 
more akin to an illness, a fever, an obsession. It is like riding a train and never 
being able to get off.11
Programmer and journalist Ellen Ullman compares software design to using 
methamphetamine, as the ‘speed high is the only state that approximates the 
feel of a project at its inception. Yes, I understand. Yes, it can be done. Yes, 
how straightforward. Oh yes, I see’. The trip is, however, brought to an abrupt 
end when ‘you write some code, and suddenly there are dark, unspecified 
areas’.12
Ullman’s description of how the transition from the plan to the writing of 
code drops from the luminous clarity of a pre-implementation specification 
into the dark areas of the unspecified seems to invoke something of the fear 
and pleasure of Crowther’s cave explorations. The experience of working with 
code can be an exhilarating modulation between the light and the dark, between 
losing and regaining one’s footing, between the logical and the absurd.
Do repeat yourself
There is always a reason for missing an easy toss. Repeat toss and you will find 
it. If you rap your knuckles against a window jamb or door, if you brush your leg 
against a desk or a bed, if you catch your feet in the curled-up corner of a rug, or 
strike a toe against a desk or chair go back and repeat the sequence. You will be 
surprised to find how far off course you were to hit that window jamb that door 
that chair. Get back on course and do it again. How can you pilot a spacecraft 
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if you can’t find your way around you own apartment? It’s just like retaking a 
movie shot until you get it right. And you will begin to feel yourself in a film 
moving with ease and speed. But don’t try for speed at first.13
In the short story ‘The Discipline of DE’, William Burroughs, in the guise of a 
retired Colonel Sutton-Smith, describes to the reader the joys of living a life 
according to the prescripts of ‘Do Easy’. The text is written primarily in the 
second person: a parodic fusion of self-help guide and military pep talk. While 
DE’s ‘do repeat yourself ’ paradigm would ostensibly seem to oppose the ‘don’t’ 
of DontRepeatYourself, the two have a lot in common. When Burroughs writes: 
‘once you find the easy way you don’t have to think about it, ...it will almost 
do itself ’,14 one can hear echoes of Kent Beck’s ‘mystical’ musings of a systems’ 
‘own desire for simplicity’, cited above. DE’s message of ‘repeat until perfection’ 
captures much of the reality of software design practice: a frequently obsessive 
attention to detail and process, a tendency towards excessive (self-) optimi-
zation and an aesthetization of efficiency.15 The promises of ease and speed 
could be taken straight from the copy of a new programming framework.
Everyday tasks become painful and boring because you think of them as WORK 
something solid and heavy to be fumbled and stumbled over. Overcome this 
block and you will find that DE can be applied to anything you do even to the 
final discipline of doing nothing. The easier you do it the less you have to do. 
He who has learned to do nothing with his whole mind and body will have 
everything done for him.16
Burroughs’ reductio ad absurdum reveals a dark side to DRY in its relation to 
a larger software industry. In a system where code is a product to be protected 
and exploited commercially, the efficiency of the process tends to eliminate 
the usefulness of the programmer; truly efficient coding would lead to a point 
where the coder him/herself becomes ‘redundant’, expendable. Burroughs’ final 
image of the mastery of doing nothing leading to a position of privilege and 
power concisely reveals the implicit motivations behind much of the venture 
capital interest in software development.
The GNU project was the response of one programmer, Richard Stallman, 
to what he felt were the injustices of a software industry that separated the 
programmer from the product of his/her labour through nondisclosure agree-
ments and restrictive software licenses. The GNU project and the ensuing Free 
Software movement, encourage a practice of software development whereby 
code is released under a license that ensures that it remains not only freely 
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usable, but also reworkable and redistributable by subsequent programmers. In 
‘freeing’ the code, the General Public License (GPL) shifts value from the code 
to the surrounding practice. The value of free software is the community of 
developers, documenters, researchers, designers and users which is rather than 
the ‘shrink-wrapped product’ or ‘killer app’ per se.
Even with free software’s fundamental shift in value from code to community, 
Stallman’s early manifesto still includes a ‘DRY’ stance as one of the core 
‘benefits’ of the project. ‘[The GNU project] means that much wasteful dupli-
cation of system programming effort will be avoided. This effort can go instead 
into advancing the state of the art.’17 As with the PPR, arguments for efficiency 
seem to be inevitably made even when they contradict the realities of the 
practice.
The free software community is a rich tapestry of duplication, forked projects 
and reinventions of the proverbial wheel. The term ‘yet another’ is common 
in the names of free software projects as a humorous way of acknowledging 
(and gently atoning for) the redundancy.18 Recursion and contradiction play 
a substantial role in programmer humour. The GNU name itself (standing 
for ‘GNU’s not UNIX’) is a kind of nerd joke, doubly contradictory both as a 
version of UNIX that is not UNIX, and inherently incomplete in its recursive 
definition. In a similar way the very formulation of ‘Don’t Repeat Yourself ’ as 
a kind of a programmer’s mantra, and thus to be recursively repeated, is also 
absurd.
The negative implications of separating code from practice are many: 
formal software instruction is pervasively discouraging to beginners and the 
‘uninitiated’.19 The labour of software design is easily exploitable and software 
professions are precarious, whereas the economic forces promote the fragile and 
decontextualized product of code and ignore its larger sustaining community.
As a programmer, I ‘get’ DRY and I value Beck and the PPR in their contri-
butions to software and to the discussion of software practice. The problem is 
that maxims, such as ‘Don’t repeat yourself ’ only work when they are not taken 
literally, and when their implicit values are questioned. There is a continual need 
to (re)value software practice and avoid reducing it to a kind of ‘shortest path’ 
problem.
Software practice includes logical contradiction, necessitates ‘bad’ code 
and requires repetition. When, in the definition of DRY, the ‘duplication of 
knowledge, not just text’ is defined as a core part of ‘the problem’ to be solved, 
it exposes an impoverished conception of knowledge isolated from practice. 
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In software design, as in other forms of cultural discourse, redundancy and 
repetition are essential to the necessarily incomplete processes of knowledge 
production, practice, circulation and maintenance.
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7Not Just for Fun
Geoff Cox and Alex McLean
There is something inherently human about the ability to perform creative 
actions with verbal language expressed in the form of jokes. To Paolo Virno, 
jokes are not simply Freudian clues to the unconscious, but diagrams of 
innovative action that represent how humans can diverge from social norms.1 
This chapter argues for something similar in the way fun is had with software 
which exemplifies the innovative action of code in addressing software norms. 
This indeed is common in critical approaches to making software, where fun 
often indicates the use of irony or satiric humour by programmers to jolt the 
user out of their usual interactions with normative tools and productive work. 
But, as the distinction between work and play becomes ever more blurred, fun 
is an expected part of all kinds of serious production; indeed, like most of lived 
experience fun has become subsumed into the ‘social factory’.
That fun can be had with software is demonstrated in the numerous titles 
that make explicit reference to it: for instance Fun with Computers by T. 
Ramasami, or the many examples of technical manuals that try to convince the 
user that things are far easier and more fun than the otherwise serious reality 
of coding. A quick search reveals numerous examples of this tendency: Fun and 
Games with the Computer by Edwin R. Sage; Fun with Computers by A. Roy 
Chowdhury; Fun with Computers and BASIC by Donald D. Spencer; Fun with 
Computer Electronics by Luann Colombo and Peter Georgeson; (and even more 
assertively) Computers are Fun by Tony Gray and Carl Billson; and The Fun of 
Programming by Jeremy Gibbons and Oege de Moor.2 Fun is a useful way of 
encouraging productive work with computers and viewing some of the under-
lying difficulties as enjoyable challenges. This is perhaps particularly noticeable 
with game development, exemplified by Raph Koster’s A Theory of Fun for 
Game Design, where the inherent fun of computer games is understood through 
cognitive science as ‘the feedback the brain gives us when we are observing 
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patterns for learning purposes’, taking players beyond mere entertainment 
value and suggesting ‘alternatives to fun’.3 Deviating from the norm in this way 
is widely regarded as an essential part of the process of capitalist innovation as 
well as its critique; fun in this sense seems to have become instrumentalized.
A further example is Linus Torvalds’s book title Just for Fun: The Story of an 
Accidental Revolutionary, written with David Diamond, which is part autobi-
ography and at the same time charts the serious development of the GNU/
Linux operating system.4 The development of the Linux kernel makes a good 
case study as it emerges from a culture of sharing across code repositories 
and software distribution networks, like sharing a good joke. Yet this is to be 
expected as the history of sharing is as old as the sharing of recipes, as Richard 
Stallman puts it, ‘as old as computers, just as the sharing of recipes is as old as 
cooking’.5 With free software development, each individual’s work is valued in 
the context of the multiple efforts of all contributors, indeed it emphasizes that 
innovation and value creation need to account for a deeper understanding of 
collaborative processes and the social relations that arise from these cultures of 
sharing.
This point is also what Adrian Mackenzie develops when he claims that the 
Linux kernel represents a particularly unstable relation to commodified software 
and hardware as performative action. He thinks that the way in which Linux is 
produced and continually changed cannot be separated from its performative 
structure as code, and describes it as a performative ‘speech act’ that produces 
an uncertain relation between the code object (the Linux kernel) and the code 
subject (the programmers who use it), and thus challenges its property relations 
and corporate relations of production.6 It diverges from the software norm and 
innovates in ways that follow the logic of free software development. Fun in this 
case coexists with the serious business of making source code freely available 
and open to further modifications. But rather than declaring development 
by accident in the case of Torvalds, this chapter makes reference to Virno’s 
conception of jokes as an expression of innovative actions drawn from the 
kernel of political possibilities across human and program languages. Thus the 
chapter is a speculation on the source code of (software) jokes, and explores this 
at the intersection of human and machine interpretation.
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On jokes
The point for Virno is not the content of jokes, but that newly invented forms 
diverge from established rules and perceived norms as a result of the innate 
creativity embedded in language itself. The chapter extends this to programming 
language, to coding practices and, in particular, the ways that code jokes most 
often do not operate within the confines of formal language, but either outside 
it in comments, variable names and layout (as with code poetry or codeworks) 
or in the development of playful esoteric languages (such as brainfuck and 
befunge, which will be introduced later). It is not that jokes are embedded in 
the machine’s unconscious, of course, but that jokes can be based on innovative 
deviations from the conventions of coding practices and their formal expression 
and interpretation.
Before discussing Virno’s ideas in more depth, it is worth considering some 
other commentaries on jokes and the phenomenon of humour from the wider 
sources at hand. There are far too many to mention but Sigmund Freud’s reflec-
tions on jokes and the ‘wittiness’ of dreams is clearly an important reference. In 
The Joke and Its Relation to the Unconscious, first written in 1905, Freud draws 
upon his theory of the unconscious to explore the idea that jokes express hidden 
desires and fantasies.7 Joke-work, like dream-work, is thereby understood 
as a means of negotiating the ways that consciousness censors and disguises 
intellectual processes. Joke techniques of condensation, displacement, repre-
sentation by absurdity or by the opposite, indirect representation, and so on 
are all present in dreams. But whereas the dream is asocial and serves to spare 
displeasure, jokes are distinctly social and operate to gain pleasure by releasing 
inhibitions and discharging excess energy through laughter which involves 
the whole body. Both share the complex workings of the psyche that does not 
express itself by accident even when appearing to mash up ideas or develop an 
operating system. This social aspect of jokes is crucial.
Writing more recently, the philosopher Simon Critchley has examined 
the importance of humour, emphasizing how a change of situation exerts a 
powerful critical function, of particular relevance to creative practices. In an 
interview for Cabinet magazine in 2005, drawing upon his book On Humour 
(2002), he emphasizes humour as a social practice that reveals wider social 
insights.8 Repression is clearly part of this, with the example given from Plato’s 
Republic where it is explained that the guardians of the polis were not meant to 
laugh because laughter was considered too uncivilized and bestial. It is because 
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laughter is considered deviant that jokes are seen to exhibit the potential to be 
a powerful critical tool.
Yet Critchley also explains how witticism (as a sophisticated style of humour) 
is also considered to be a sign of advanced civilization as opposed to common 
jokes, where witticism is tied to the development of liberal democracy, and 
characterized by the figure of the dandy or wit. The witticisms of Slavoj Žižek 
seem to exemplify this, including his many jokes related to the subject of really 
existing Socialism.9 One example he gives is a joke that reveals the futility of 
dissident protest and the lack of recognition of wider conditions. His claim 
is that no one really took the subject of totalitarianism seriously but rather as 
a joke; and that progressive intellectuals who thought it was serious merely 
indicated the futility of their protests. As we can see from the above, the function 
of humour for Žižek lies in its ability to invert common sense, following the 
Marxist-Hegelian logic of dialectical reversal. Moreover, he conceptualizes 
such things in terms of the ‘return of the real’ (reworking Freud’s ‘return of 
the repressed’), where impulses previously repressed erupt into social life at 
unexpected moments and confound previously held certainties. This explains 
how we laugh in bad taste, and as a way of coping with the disappointment of 
our lived realities. Can we also ask whether anyone really thinks Windows or 
Mac OS X are serious operating systems in similar terms? Or indeed, that their 
free software alternatives are rendered as jokes too (to counter seriousness), 
and reveal their futility as they in turn become commercialized (as in the case 
of Ubuntu perhaps)?
The point we are making is that it is possible to draw some analogies between 
jokes and code, as witty utterances hidden behind the surface of normative 
software production and totalitarian server–client architectures that really are 
a joke. This issue is also explored in Inke Arns’s essay, ‘Read_Me, Run_Me, 
Execute_Me’, with its subtitle ‘Software and its Discontents’,10 implying that 
the performative dimension of code lies repressed, as with the description of 
the Linux kernel cited earlier,11 and further evoking Freud’s Civilisation and its 
Discontents, that capitalism was founded on the repression of the libido. In post-
Marxist thinking (where the constitution of subjectivity is considered more 
fully), something similar can be detected in the way that repression is considered 
to be socially determined and can only be released by freeing productive desire, 
perhaps expressed as nervous laughter. Drawing these threads together in the 
1970s, Herbert Marcuse’s Eros and Civilisation and, to a greater extent, Gilles 
Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, argue 
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for the liberatory potential of desiring-production.12 So in this way the release 
of free software can be understood as less an imaginary force based on lack (as 
in Freud), and more a real, productive force, as a neat example of a ‘desiring-
machine.13 A good example of this is perhaps Gordan Savičić and Danja 
Vasiliev’s project 120days of *buntu which proposes 120 modified humorous 
and useless Ubuntu Operating Systems.14 By making playful reference to de 
Sade’s The 120 Days of Sodom, the suggestion is that alternative operating 
systems might be able to liberate desire, in excess of the masochistic desires of 
free/libre software development in which Ubuntu is seen to operate too close 
to normativity.15
Similarly, Franco ‘Bifo’ Berardi detects the fundamental political struggle 
between machines for liberating desire and mechanisms of control over the 
imaginary.16 Thus, to Berardi the various liberatory strategies such as refusal of 
work, the invention of temporary autonomous zones, free software initiatives 
and so on offer ‘dynamic recombination’.17 Therefore, and further developing 
the analogy between repression and the performativity of software, free software 
development (where the code is made openly available/shared) might offer 
Figure 7.1 Sample of logos from Gordan Savičić and Danja Vasiliev’s 120days of 
*buntu (2011)
Source http://120buntu.com/
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therapeutic assistance in putting the programmer in touch with his/her, and 
indeed culture’s, sublimated desires repressed under proprietary software devel-
opment.18 If normative software could be thought of as software without a body, 
might desiring-production be explored through free software development with 
a body? As Christopher M. Kelty describes it, ‘geeks’ share a social imaginary 
about the production of actually existing alternatives, and as such the free 
software movement is an example of a ‘recursive public’, capable of creating and 
modifying the domain or platform through which they act.19 In other words, 
they share a culture through which their repressed desires find release in the 
public domain and body politic.
The ideology of the Free Software Foundation clarifies this point with a 
humorous play on the ambiguity of freedom in ‘you should think of “free” as 
in “free speech”, not as in “free beer”’.20 Commercial (free market) interests seek 
to assert their control over free software by replacing the word ‘free’ with the 
phrase ‘open source’, placing emphasis on visibility of code rather than freedom 
to share.21 Moreover, the broader ideological issues are evident in the parallel 
narratives of the development of free and open-source software development. 
On the one hand, there is free software referring back to the 1980s when 
software freedom was meant in resistance to proprietary software, and on the 
other, open source that emanated from arguments about its economic benefits 
and in parallel to free market thinking. Furthermore, like the joke from Žižek, 
the futility of progressive alternatives like Ubuntu run the risk of missing the 
mark unless the broader political issue of the ability to modify the domain or 
platform through which these desiring-practices are enacted is also considered.
That freedom of speech relates to free software (at least according to the 
Free Software Foundation), and not free beer, may be one of the analogies that 
leads commentators (such as Mackenzie) to discuss the performative dimension 
of software and its relation to speech act theory, making reference to John 
Langshaw Austin’s How To Do Things With Words.22 Although the analogy 
between program code and speech acts has become rather commonplace 
since it was made by Terry Winogrand and Fernando Flores in 1987,23 and is 
perhaps left a little general here, the point is to emphasize the ways in which 
programmers express themselves through the witty manipulation of layers of 
representation, including symbols, then words, language and notation. But 
clearly code is a special kind of language, and one that can automatically enable 
and disable certain kinds of actions.24 It does this through its special ability to 
convert action to language and this is where the joke lies.
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Also drawing on Austin, Virno refers to linguistic innovation as: ‘how to do 
new things with words’, where words constitute an action in and of themselves 
– like program code in as much as when it is interpreted it says something and 
does something at the same time. Virno’s interest is in the ability of the human 
animal to execute ‘innovative actions’ capable of modifying ‘consolidated 
norms’.25 A key reference underpinning this is Noam Chomsky’s description of 
the apparatus of power as repressing the innate creativity of verbal language, and 
to Aristotle’s description of contingency at the heart of our use of language (in 
Ethics),26 as well as the more general point that intellectual and linguistic labour 
are no longer separated from general conditions of informational capitalism. 
In Virno’s opinion, rhetorical persuasion and the concept of the public sphere 
in which speech is paramount, demonstrate the ability of language to establish 
social relations between a ‘mass of speakers’, that is necessarily shared and 
collective.27 He emphasizes that the ‘language system is a social fact’ wherein 
the human animal is ‘ready made for language, but not actually in possession 
of it’ until it starts interacting in the social realm.28 This is part of early years 
development (the ‘mirror stage’, in Lacanian terms) but remains evident in every 
utterance made thereafter. For Virno, this confirms the biopolitical dimension 
of the human animal in the world, and the social importance of language and 
the sharing of codes.
According to Virno, underpinning political possibilities is the simple fact 
that the human animal is capable of modifying its forms of life.29 This is what 
makes for innovation in the general sense that newly invented forms might 
diverge from established rules and perceived norms – based on the Chomskian 
innate creativity referred to above, and perhaps also to the idea that jokes 
can be understood as hard-wired (in as much as creativity relates to playing 
with language). And this is where jokes also figure as an example of how 
humans diverge from social norms, how ‘linguistic animals give evidence of 
an unexpected derivation from their normal praxis’, as Virno puts it.30 For 
him, witty utterances are similar to the performative utterances that Austin 
described, where words constitute an action in and of themselves.31 But as 
already emphasized, the point for Virno is not the content of jokes, which might 
poke fun at social norms, hierarchies or the ruling order, for such jokes tend to 
obscure what is important: the apparatus or the ‘logicolinguistic resources that 
jokes utilize’.32 His argument is that innovative action uses these resources like a 
toolbox or library. In this way, it produces ambivalences: oscillating between the 
‘determined rule and the regularity of species-specific forms of conduct’.33 Such 
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contradictory factors characterize the social character of the human species and 
its innovative force, despite its repression by power structures. In other words, 
jokes demonstrate innovative techniques and the possibilities for transforming 
the linguistic operating system. This happens in two main ways according to 
Virno: first by demonstrating how divergences in following rules often result 
in changing the rule itself (put differently the application of the norm also 
contains surprises, and situations where the rule is broken and justified in 
terms of exceptional circumstances34); and secondly, through the incorrect use 
of semantic ambiguity, an ‘error’ (or glitch).35 The rules are not only there to 
be broken, but applied differently, adapted and modified, and ultimately trans-
formed. So how does software demonstrate similar possibilities at the level of 
code, and where the modifications undermine normalized behaviour?
Code jokes
It would be relatively easy to mention the use of parody in this connection to 
software, but perhaps this is too predictable under present conditions and its 
effectiveness thereby questionable in a similar manner to a political joke that fails 
to register its wider effects once executed. So although an example like Gordan 
Savičić’s sing_slavoj_sing might poke fun at the seriousness of Žižek’s philoso-
phizing, by hacking billy the fish and replacing the soundchip with a good quote 
or two, this is not the kind of joke that we wish to emphasize for our argument 
as it does not present an intervention in terms of the apparatus of language.36 
If humour is somewhat hard-wired, then jokes are an inevitable component of 
the structures of language where humans demonstrate their innate ability to 
innovate new forms. But can code jokes be reduced to their functional aspects 
in this way, as procedures that are open to recombination as language is more 
generally? Our concern is about jokes at the level of changing rules and the use 
of semantic ambiguity, in keeping with Virno’s emphasis thus far.
Such tendencies can be detected in the example of Signwave’s Auto-Illustrator, 
an experimental, semi-autonomous, generative software artwork that includes 
a wide range of generative and procedural techniques, packaged as a fully 
functioning parody of Adobe’s vector graphics application Illustrator.37 Humour 
is an important part of the software package as indicated, not least, by the release 
date of version 1.2 on April Fool’s Day, in 2003. The new release included parody 
plug-ins that serve to question how contemporary software should ‘behave’, 
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Figures 7.1 and 7.2 Screenshots of Signwave’s Auto-Illustrator (2001): ‘Dicshunary’ 
spelling tool and ‘Psychosis’ preferences option
Source http://swai.signwave.co.uk
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including one function that would shut the computer down with no notice if 
the software ‘decided’ the design was unworthy. The user’s expectations were 
challenged by presenting tools and functions that do not conform to expectations 
of what software usually does as a tool. Perhaps most controversial was the terms 
of use which insisted that designs using the software were co-credited to the author 
and the software company. This caused some outrage by users who assumed the 
company were overstepping their proprietary rights and imposing measures 
beyond a joke. Yet, to Signwave, this seemed to be an entirely logical statement 
which recognized the difficulties of making any claim of single authorship, and 
moreover exemplified the principle that the making of software can be regarded 
as an artwork in itself. Thus Signwave extended some of the ambiguities built into 
software production into a playful form that relates to the way social relations 
are organized with normative software development. If Auto-illustrator’s satire of 
Adobe’s Illustrator operates at the level of code in a general sense – in the domain 
of intellectual property within the legal system, itself a system of rules, codes and 
speech acts – could this also work in the domain of source code?
To repeat the Virno formulation, jokes are identified as operating in two 
significant ways: first by demonstrating how divergences in following syntac-
tical rules often generate a change in the rule itself; and secondly, through 
the ironic use of semantic ambiguity. This perhaps happens in a general way 
with Auto-illustrator, but how do these ideas translate to code more precisely? 
In this sense, it could be said that we wish to crack the source code of jokes 
by examining the concept of interpretation in more detail. The interpreter is 
a codification of the language in which the source code is expressed, or, in 
other words, a partially evaluated computational process.38 The source code 
is not a program on its own, rather it is a replaceable component of a larger 
computation. The relationship between source code and interpreter is recursive; 
the rules behind an interpreter are themselves implemented in source code, 
requiring another interpreter. If we follow these recursive layers of interpre-
tation we find hardware microcode that mediates between the discrete digital 
world and our continuous physical world.
With few exceptions, mainstream programming languages are Turing-
complete. This means it is possible to write a program in any of the languages 
that interprets any other computer language. Therefore the rules of any language 
can be changed simply by writing an interpreter for another language within 
it; and thereby the scope for breaking rules is boundless. Turing-completeness 
extends beyond mainstream language into some surprising places. Simple 
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cellular automata, including the well-known Game of Life by John Conway and 
Stephen Wolfram’s Rule 110,39 even some configuration files such as that of the 
‘sendmail’ electronic mail transport software, have turned out to be Turing-
complete. The fact that Turing-completeness comes so easily to these invented 
languages, allowing any symbolic constraint to be broken at will, provides a 
programmer’s playground with glimpses of the infinite.
With this emphasis on breaking rules, it is no surprise that source code 
humour centres on interpretation of code. Esoteric programming languages 
are those which take a humourous approach to language design, challenging 
the norms of source code interpretation. For example, obfuscated programs 
written in the brainfuck language consist entirely of punctuation, each of the 
eight characters ‘><+-.,[]’ representing a single elementary operation. Brainfuck 
is Turing-complete, and so can be used to write any program in theory, but in 
practice it is extremely difficult to write any program in it at all. Below is The 
Game Of Life implemented in brainfuck.40
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A comment on the left side of the web page where the program is posted, simply 
states ‘get a Life;)’.
The tortuous nature of brainfuck escapes the world of computation to 
be wrought on the human body as bodyfuck, a brainfuck interpreter using 
computer vision techniques to map from bodily gestures to the brainfuck 
instructionset (like a desiring-machine). The brainfuck demo shows how much 
physical exertion is required to produce a short sequence of symbols,41 and 
the programmer uses his/her body in a more overt manner than previously 
required. To take another example, befunge is an esoteric language that breaks 
the usual downward direction of interpretation through a program to create 
two-dimensional syntax. This is done using punctuation, as in brainfuck but 
in a more understandable way; each of the four instructions ‘^>v<’ represent 
graphical arrows, which change the direction of control flow as you might 
expect. The question mark character ‘?’ changes the direction in a random 
direction. The instruction set goes beyond this, and is again Turing-complete, 
but by following the arrows we can already understand the operation of the 
following program, which, when read starting from the top left-hand corner, 
outputs a random number from 0 to 9:
vv <    <
 2
 ^ v<
vv1<?>3v4
 ^  ^
>   >?>  ?>5^
 v  v
vv9<?>7v6
 v v<
 8
v. > >  ^
^<
Despite being Turing-complete these interpreters appear useless, and some 
esoteric languages seem to exist simply as ‘in jokes’ for geeks, having unimple-
mentable instruction sets. In the case of IRP (Internet Relay Programming) 
there is no formal instruction set at all, the interpreters are human participants 
in an internet chat room, a running joke since 2005. Below is the obligatory 
‘Hello, World!’ example:
 Not Just for Fun 169
<GregorR>  Please say ‘Hello, World!’
<jix>  Hello, World!
The likelihood of an IRP program being interpreted as you wish is improved if 
you are polite, however this does not always work:
<GregorR>   Please, write the lyrics to the song 99 Bottles of Beer on 
the Wall.
<memonic>  go to hell
Recursion is possible, up to a point:
<CakeProphet>   Could someone please ask someone to repeat this request?
<pikhq> Could someone please repeat the previous request?
<RodgerTheGreat>  Could someone please ask someone to repeat this request?
In recasting English as a machine language and humans as interpreters, we 
are given the opportunity to examine the relationship between performative 
phrases and computer code in some detail. In this way, we might begin to 
understand that jokes can be interpreted in multiple ways which reflect the 
complexity of human and machine logic that moves beyond simple amusement. 
Indeed all jokes express a purpose. As in Virno’s earlier descriptions, this is 
where innovative techniques are demonstrated that diverge from established 
conventions by changing and breaking rules, and playing with ambiguities 
related to code. This is where other possibilities reside.
But is software development taken too seriously when it is a joke all along? 
Indeed software development is in danger of losing its sense of humour 
altogether as it becomes more and more standardized and packaged. For 
instance, with service-based platforms access to source code is no longer 
possible, and the differentiation between files, software and network services 
evaporates altogether. This is an apt description of the Apple iOS paradigm of 
software development, where users of the Apple iPad and iPhone are allowed 
only restricted access to programming language interpreters, and software 
licenses favoured by the Free Software Foundation are forbidden. Access to 
humour is denied and the example confirms that proprietary logic is a serious 
business of repression. In Berardi’s terms, interpretation has become schizo-
phrenic (like fast speech), and the relations between metaphors and things, 
representation and life, have become thoroughly confused. This is particu-
larly evident when it comes to language that is more and more influenced by 
machines, leading to a situation where the learning of language and affectivity 
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have been separated.42 On the contrary, what needs to be rediscovered are forms 
of happiness and laughter tied to collective formations: the sharing of code that 
liberates desire and mechanisms of control over the imaginary from the serious 
business and sense of determinism that is normally associated with code.43
The reference to Virno’s work on jokes draws attention to their function in 
relation to ‘innovative action’ in the public sphere. In the case of the title of 
this chapter, the use of ‘not’ as prefix to Torvald’s title (in ‘not just for fun’) is in 
keeping with Virno’s comments that the system of language both ‘does’ negation 
(by identifying what something is not), and ‘is’ negation (in as much as it can 
only signify something): ‘The negation, or something that language does, is 
understood, above all, as something that language is’.44 He is speculating here on 
a non-representational form of politics, and despite recognizing the sovereign 
forces that restrain such abilities, concludes that humans are capable of adapting 
themselves and their circumstances in parallel to their linguistic abilities and 
possibilities for innovative action. We have attempted to consider the execution 
of program code in similar terms; that the potential for divergent forms comes 
into existence through social interactions and modifications. Rules are not just 
there to be broken, but transformed altogether through negation. For instance, 
the function of humour (to Žižek) lies in its ability to invert common sense. 
Code jokes remind us of the possibilities of non-deterministic interpretation 
in this inverse way, as deviations from the conventions of coding as formal 
expression. What we mean to stress is that having fun with software does not 
simply encourage people to work with computers (and distract them from the 
hard work that is unavoidable when programming) but offers a way to rethink 
political possibilities in public, and to reimagine the seriousness of normative 
visions of life that code otherwise implies. 
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8Fun is a Battlefield : Software between 
Enjoyment and Obsession
Wendy Hui Kyong Chun and Andrew Lison
As this volume makes clear, fun has been fundamental to the emergence, 
solidification and spread of software: from higher-level programming languages, 
designed to make programmers masters of, rather than servants to, their machines, 
to graphical user interfaces (GUIs), which transform computers from command-
based instruments of torture into user-friendly universal mediums, to Web 2.0 
applications such as Foursquare, which make self-surveillance a game. Indeed, 
fun would now seem synonymous with software, or at least gameware: in 2010, 
consulting gurus stressed ‘funware’ – game mechanics such as leaderboards, 
points, levels, etc. – as the way to generate user loyalty submission.1 Fun makes 
software more than just software; it makes it a problem-driven adventure or a 
game, at all levels of engagement. This in turn makes fun more than fun: software 
use and programming (increasingly similar activities, given ever more abstracted 
programming languages and more efficient AI) become productive, often exploited 
yet freely given forms of labour;2 they also become subjects of obsession.
Fun, however, has always been more than fun; it has always been an economic 
relation. Etymologically, to be ‘funned’ was to be cheated, the victim of a joke.3 
One ‘funned’ another out of money. Fun, in this sense, is always ‘more’ – an 
illicitly generated surplus. The question is thus not why are fun and exploitation 
now related? But rather, why do we think they’re not? Current understandings 
of fun as a harmless diversion erase the victor–victim relation emphasized in 
early uses of ‘fun’ as a verb. Fun as ‘just fun’ assumes that everyone is the subject 
of, rather than subject to, fun. It elides the position of a loser, or perhaps more 
precisely, it places losers is in the position of now-toothless victors. This erasure 
benefits those who provide the grounds for ‘fun’, since those who have fun do 
so while being funned.
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In many ways, this seems to perfectly encapsulate what Tiziana Terranova 
has called ‘free labour’: activities such as the production of unremunerated 
user content and free software development that are ‘simultaneously volun-
tarily given and unwaged, enjoyed and exploited’.4 Linking free labour to the 
move from factory-based to immaterial economies, which blur distinctions 
between producers and consumers, she sees free labour as ‘the moment where…
knowledgeable consumption of culture is translated into productive activities’.5 
Crucially, capitalism does not simply suck the blood of free labour, for global 
capitalism is the field from which free labour flows. This does not mean, 
however, that capitalism entirely controls free labour: although capitalism sets 
the conditions for free labour and filters the valuable from the invaluable, free 
labour for Terranova, as a form of mass knowledge, always threatens to move 
elsewhere, to be the uncontrollable basis for a common passion. Drawing from 
and extending her analysis, we view fun as neither ‘oppressive’ (bad in a bad 
way) nor ‘subversive’ (bad in a good way, as Anna Fisher has so wonderfully 
argued).6 Fun, we argue, is a site of struggle – through fun, the free and unfree 
are linked together.
Stressing the subject–object relation highlighted in archaic uses of fun, 
we maintain that fun is a battlefield: a ticklish space of struggle and conflict, 
of sometimes real or imagined victory. However, our point is not simply to 
condemn fun and return it to some originary meaning, but rather to under-
stand the potential and dangers of fun, and to think through how these might 
be the same thing. Intriguingly, fun, as enjoyment, is bounded by the concept 
of obsession: fun, that is, is no longer fun when it’s so fun it’s not, when the 
‘more’ becomes too much. Obsession highlights fun as a form of loss, but does 
so by moving actions directed at someone to more-or-less self-inflicted injuries. 
The term ‘obsession’, defined as ‘the action of besieging a place’, curiously disap-
peared in the sixteenth century, only to be resuscitated in the nineteenth, when 
it became a ‘compulsive interest or preoccupation’.7 A person obsessed, like the 
melancholic, is one possessed by the other within oneself, by some thought, 
impulse or image that will not let go. Programming and gaming seem to play 
with the boundary between fun and obsession. A hacker becomes obsessed 
with the problem to be solved, but he/she also risks becoming the victim of 
obsession: the classic example, the video-game-obsessed programmer who 
never finishes the task at hand and thus, becoming addicted, switches from 
‘creator’ to ‘user’.8
The fuzzy boundary between fun and addiction highlights the fact that the 
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fun of programming is not simply linked to the possession of power, but also, 
as we explain further, the experience of the limitations of one’s power within a 
system that promises unlimited power. To be clear, we are neither celebrating 
obsession and addiction nor arguing that we need to always stay on track. 
Rather, we are arguing that fun and software thrive on the constant crossing 
of the boundary between enjoyment and obsession. If fun has increasingly 
motivated the rise of software, our question is: are ‘freaks’ running the world 
through fun, or, in an immaterial, affective economy, is fun running the world 
through freaks, those motivated, through their own experience of enjoyment, 
to obsession? Or both? If there is a kind of surplus in fun, we want to think of 
it as lying not in the simple act of gratification, but rather in something like 
the dialectic between engagement and oppression, enjoyment and obsession, 
hoaxed and hoaxer. Or, drawing on Sara Ahmed’s work on emotions, in which 
she argues that emotions are not something one ‘has’, but rather
they create the very effect of the surfaces and boundaries that allow us to 
distinguish between an inside and an outside in the first place…it is through 
emotions, or how we respond to objects and others, that surfaces and bound-
aries are made9
we want to understand how the experience of fun, including its ‘dangers’, is 
central to the emergence of programmers and users. Any consideration of fun 
as a potentially liberatory force will therefore have to consider the economics of 
affect both from the position of Ahmed’s cultural politics as well as Terranova’s 
‘free labour’.10
 To think through these questions, then, we present a series of cases, from a 
potted history of early programming to obfuscated C, from 1990s rave culture 
to software company office slides. In the spirit of this collection, the form of this 
chapter is itself experimental: a dialogue rather than a monologue.
Programming is suffering and therefore fun
How did programming become fun? More to the point: how did programming 
become programming?
Software, as one of us has argued in more detail elsewhere, was not foreseen: 
the engineers building what would become the first computers did not plan for 
software.11 The first ‘programmer’ – the ‘master programmer’ – was machinic: a 
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component of the ENIAC (widely considered the first working digital electronic 
computer) that determined the sequence of the calculation. Computers, back 
then, were human, and those later acknowledged as the first programmers 
were former computers: the so-called ENIAC girls (later the more politically 
correct ‘women of the ENIAC’), Kathleen McNulty, Mauchly Antonelli, Jean 
Jennings Bartik, Frances Snyder Holberton, Marlyn Wescoff Meltzer, Frances 
Bilas Spence and Ruth Lichterman Teitelbaum. These women engaged in 
‘direct programming’, wiring the machine for each problem, mastering the 
master programmer so processes could loop and repeat. The reclamation of 
these women as the first programmers in the mid-to-late 1990s was love at last 
sight: by then, not only had women ‘coders’ been pushed almost completely 
out of the workplace, the ‘direct’ knowledge of the machine they possessed 
had been compromised by the increasing automation of programming. The 
move to humanize programming and to mechanize computing coincides with 
‘automatic programming’, a phenomenon that sought to make programming 
more ‘fun’ by increasingly removing the programmer from wearisome machine 
processes: higher-level languages helped make programming problem- and 
object-oriented, rather than focused on the mind-numbing minutiae of 
machine languages. This was also a blatant move to disempower the high 
priests of machine-language programming, who, according to John Backus, 
the developer of FORTRAN, viewed themselves as possessing super-human 
knowledge.12 Tellingly, this language of high priests and wizards has not disap-
peared with higher-level languages, although this disempowerment has spread 
everywhere, allegedly for the good of the programmer and the advancement 
of computing. Knowledge, as John V. Guttag, a ‘pioneer’ in data abstraction 
explains, is dangerous: ‘“Drink deep, or taste not the Pierian Spring”, is not 
necessarily good advice. Knowing too much is no better, and often worse, 
than knowing too little. People cannot assimilate very much information. Any 
programming method or approach that assumes that people will understand a 
lot is highly risky’.13
So what was/is programming: drudgery or magic? Do higher-level languages 
offer more power or greater ignorance? What is crucial, we argue, is not to decide 
this debate, but rather to recognize its fundamental importance. This oscillation 
is not accidental, but central to the power and enjoyment – the hatred and love 
– of programming. An excellent early example of this is MIT professor, creator 
of ELIZA, and member of the famed AI Lab Joseph Weizenbaum’s description 
of programming. At first, he contends:
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The computer programmer…is a creator of universes for which he alone is the 
lawgiver. So, of course, is the designer of any game. But universes of virtually 
unlimited complexity can be created in the form of computer programs. 
Moreover, and this is a crucial point, systems so formulated and elaborated act 
out their programmed scripts. They compliantly obey their laws and vividly 
exhibit their obedient behavior. No playwright, no stage director, no emperor, 
however powerful, has ever exercised such absolute authority to arrange a stage 
or a field of battle and to command such unswervingly dutiful actors or troops.14
Not coincidentally, Weizenbaum ends this quotation by referring to a battlefield 
and a stage: war games. The progression from playwright to stage director to 
emperor is telling: programming languages, like neoliberal economics, model 
the world as a ‘game’.15 Programming languages establish the programmer as 
sovereign, one for whom there is no difference between command given and 
command completed. The programmer says ‘let there be light’ and there is 
light. Like Faust’s translation of logos as ‘deed’, software is action, so that ‘in the 
beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God’.16
By doing what it says, code is logos. Like the King’s speech in Plato’s 
Phaedrus, it does not pronounce knowledge or demonstrate it – it transpar-
ently pronounces itself.17 The hidden signified – meaning – shines through and 
transforms itself into action. Programming languages offer the lure of visibility, 
readability, logical – if magical – cause and effect. As Fred Brooks argues, ‘one 
types the correct incantation on the keyboard, and a display screen comes to life, 
showing things that never were nor could be’.18 One’s word creates something 
living. Consider this ubiquitous ‘hello world’ program written in C++ (‘hello 
world’ is usually the first program a person will write):
// this program spits out ‘hello world’
#include <iostream.h>
int main ()
{
  cout << ‘Hello World!’;
  return 0;
}
The first line is a comment line, explaining to the human reader that this 
program spits out ‘hello world’. The next line directs the compiler’s pre-processor 
to include iostream.h, a standard file to deal with input and output to be used 
later. The third line, ‘int main ()’, begins the main function of the program; 
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‘cout<<“Hello World!”;’ prints ‘Hello World!’ to the screen (‘cout’ is defined in 
iostream.h); ‘return 0’ terminates the main function and causes the program 
to return a 0 if it has run correctly. Although not immediately comprehensible 
to someone not versed in C++, this program nonetheless seems to make some 
sense, seems to be readable. It comprises a series of imperatives and declaratives 
that the computer presumably understands and obeys. When it runs, it follows 
one’s commands and displays ‘Hello World!’
It is no accident that ‘Hello World!’ is the first program one learns, because 
‘Hello World!’ is easy and enjoyable: it makes us see that we can produce 
results immediately. This ease, according to Weizenbaum, makes programming 
seductive and dangerous:
It happens that programming is a relatively easy craft to learn…And because 
programming is almost immediately rewarding, that is, because a computer 
very quickly begins to behave somewhat in the way the programmer intends it 
to, programming is very seductive, especially for beginners. Moreover, it appeals 
most to precisely those who do not yet have sufficient maturity to tolerate 
long delays between an effort to achieve something and the appearance of 
concrete evidence of success. Immature students are therefore easily misled into 
believing that they have truly mastered a craft of immense power and of great 
importance when, in fact, they have learned only its rudiments and nothing 
substantive at all…19
The quick reactions of the computer produce a feeling of power that fuels the 
transformation of ‘immature students’ into programmers. At the same time 
that the experience of programming models that of the sovereign, however, 
its seeming ease hides a greater difficulty – executability leads to unforeseen 
circumstances, unanticipated or ‘buggy’ repetitions. Indeed Weizenbaum’s early 
description of the programmer as unfailing law-giver seems undercut by his 
later description of a program as a court of law, the workings of which are not 
visible to the programmer. The programmer, Weizenbaum stresses, is funda-
mentally ignorant:
a large program is, to use an analogy of which Minsky is also fond, an intricately 
connected network of courts of law, that is, of subroutines, to which evidence is 
transmitted by other subroutines. These courts weigh (evaluate) the data given 
to them and then transmit their judgments to still other courts. The verdicts 
rendered by these courts may, indeed, often do, involve decisions about what 
court has ‘jurisdiction’ over the intermediate results then being manipulated. 
The programmer thus cannot even know the path of decision-making within 
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his own program, let alone what intermediate or final results it will produce. 
Program formulation is thus rather more like the creation of a bureaucracy 
than like the construction of a machine of the kind Lord Kelvin may have 
understood.20
The erasure of the judicial system – of the gap between law and execution – is 
central to code as logos. As in the neoliberal model of governance, the individual 
programmer is thus made to feel sovereign at the same time he/she is made 
subject; subjected to unseen limitations, the seemingly all-powerful programmer 
is rendered a mere player in an invisible game. Further, if programming offers a 
power that corrupts, what corrupts is not simply ease, but a certain combination 
of ease and difficulty, a certain experience of both power and frustration.21 This 
programmatic combination of ease and difficulty creates, Weizenbaum argues, 
a new mental disorder: the compulsion to program, or hacking.
To explain this addiction, Weizenbaum again turns to gaming, drawing 
a parallel between obsessive programming and compulsive gambling – ‘the 
magical world of the gambler’ – since both entail megalomania and fantasies of 
omnipotence, as well as a ‘pleasureless drive for reassurance’.22 Like gambling, 
it is compulsive because it both rewards and challenges the programmer. It is 
driven by:
two apparently opposing facts: first, he knows that he can make the computer 
do anything he wants it to do; and second, the computer constantly displays 
undeniable evidence of his failures to him. It reproaches him. There is no 
escaping this bind. The engineer can resign himself to the truth that there are 
some things he doesn’t know. But the programmer moves in a world entirely of 
his own making. The computer challenges his power, not his knowledge.23
According to Weizenbaum, because the world of the computer takes place at the 
level of power rather than truth, it induces paranoid megalomania.24 Because 
this knowledge is never enough, because a new bug always emerges, because 
an unforeseen wrinkle causes divergent unexpected behaviour, the hacker can 
never stop. Every error seems correctable; every error points to the hacker’s lack 
of foresight; every error leads to another. Thus, unlike the ‘useful programmer’, 
who solves a problem at hand and carefully documents, the hacker is aimless: 
programming becomes a game without a goal and thus without an end. The 
hacker, that is, becomes like the computer – quickly and repeatedly reacting 
to inputs. Hackers’ skills, Weizenbaum thus argues, are ‘disembodied’, and this 
disembodiment transforms their physical appearance: he describes them as 
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‘bright young men of dishevelled appearance, often with sunken glowing eyes… 
sitting at computer consoles, their arms tensed and waiting to fire their fingers, 
already poised to strike, at the buttons and keys on which their attention seems 
to be as riveted as a gamer’s on the rolling dice’.25 Programmers as gamers as 
users: addicted to their screens, their bodies wasted by their habit. Their ‘love’ of 
programming, their contact with computers, produces wasted bodies.26
Although Weizenbaum is quick to pathologize hackers as pleasureless, pitiful 
creatures, hackers themselves emphasize programming as affectively pleas-
urable and their lack of ‘usefulness’ as what can actually be most productive and 
promising about programming. Programming, they insist, is not an addiction, 
but rather a healthy obsession. Linus Torvalds, for instance, argues that he, as 
an eternal grad student, decided to build the Linux core ‘just for fun’.27 Richard 
Stallman, who epitomizes Weizenbaum’s description (and who drifted into 
the AI Lab as well) also emphasizes the pleasure, but more importantly the 
‘freedom’ and ‘freeness’ associated with programming – something that stems 
from a conception of programming as other than the simple production of a 
commercial (or contained) product.28
What is important in fun is allowing oneself to go astray, or, more properly, 
the oscillation between fun as enjoyment and fun as obsession: an oscillation 
that produces the programmer as such. Also key is Weizenbaum’s emphasis 
on games: as with the separation between fun and work, the distance between 
programmer and gamer seems to be disappearing. Thus, in order to understand 
fun and software, it seems crucial to understand the full embrace of games, as 
well as other forms of entertainment, within software culture.
Overenjoyment, or, in excess of fun
As Weizenbaum suggests, the common ground upon which programming and 
gaming both rest is the double valence of fun: fun as enjoyment and fun as 
obsession. In both cases, fun is experienced via an encounter with power and 
its limitations – both, that is, the limited sense of power that enjoyment brings 
with it and the larger sense of power, both sublime and sublimated, from under 
which one obsessively attempts to escape. The harnessing of fun’s affective 
surplus perpetuates both this ultimate, conditioning power and the ‘fun’ it 
engenders. Thus, the classic example of the video-game obsessed programmer 
we alluded to before is not merely one in which he/she escapes from the task 
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at hand into an entirely other game-world; instead, this game-world often 
recapitulates the same obsessive limitations that drive programming, but, 
again, with a different valence. Indeed, such a relationship between gaming 
and programming has in fact constituted a significant and extensive part of 
hacker culture. Long before the current concern with obsessive-compulsive 
Massively Multiplayer Online Gaming, back when online games were largely the 
concern of college students with access to the internet through shared, multi-
user systems, dungeon adventure games like NetHack29 encouraged, especially 
among computer science students, a conception of fun, as the experience of 
the limitations of one’s power within a system that promises to enable one to 
constantly assert this power, not dissimilar to that which they would find in 
programming itself.
Despite, (or perhaps, indeed, partly due to) its limited graphical ambitions 
– the game is entirely represented in ASCII characters, and multiple attempts 
to update it with bitmapped graphics have proven largely unpopular –NetHack 
has proven to be extremely engaging on account of its absurdly totalizing 
ruleset. An open-source software project developed by a quasi-clandestine team 
of programmers, the game’s fundamental assumption seems to be that every 
possible interaction within the game system should, under the right circum-
stances, be able to have a cumulative, interrelational effect. Thus, to offer but one 
well-known example, if, while blinded, and therefore groping your way through 
the dungeon, you feel your way around to the corpse of a cockatrice, you will 
be turned to stone when you touch it (unless, of course, you are also wearing 
gloves).30 This proliferation of unexpected effects has given rise, in online 
discussion forums like the rec.games.roguelike.nethack newsgroup on Usenet, 
to discussions of ‘Yet Another Stupid Death’, and frequent proclamations that 
‘The DevTeam Thinks of Everything!’31
While it is a single-user game, the classic implementation of NetHack, 
originally released in 1987 (building on the heritage of an earlier game, Rogue, 
originally written in 1980) is in fact found on multi-user UNIX systems. Played 
in this way, the user/gamer is never entirely separated from the operating 
environment so that, for example, it is possible, when the system’s user account 
receives mail delivered by the mailer-daemon (background process), for the 
user’s character to be approached within the game by a ‘mail daemon’ (in-game 
monster) who then throws the character a scroll with the email message ‘written’ 
on it. Furthermore, the open-source nature (distributed under a modified 
version of the Bison general public license written by Weizenbaumian hacker 
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Richard Stallman) of the game encourages spelunking into the codebase as a 
way of trying to untangle the complex game dynamics (the NetHack Wiki, for 
instance, refers the reader of the Mail Daemon page to line 2773 of monst.c32) 
– something, of course, that is only possible if one is a literate programmer. The 
combination of operating system integration, open-source ethos (the official 
instruction manual is written by another well-known open-source advocate, 
Eric S. Raymond)33 and the fantasy/role playing game setting all contribute to 
its niche popularity among engineers, computer scientists, mathematicians and 
other academic preserves of ‘geek culture’,34 which is why it is not surprising 
that the NetHack homepage proudly displays the following quote from an 
anonymous Usenet poster: ‘Thank you for the latest release of gradewrecker. My 
GPA just went in the corner and shot itself ’.
NetHack, then, has often been an obsession (or addiction) through which 
programmers-in-training, even when taking a break from programming itself, 
learned to systematize, to ‘think of everything’, at the risk of their academic 
performance, and to have fun while doing so. Fun-as-enjoyment thus slides 
into fun as obsession in service of reinforcing the discipline, if not the practice 
itself, of software engineering. Indeed, as Phil Laplante and colleagues note, 
the programming challenges associated with developing the game’s constantly 
changing, pseudo-random – and thus intensely engaging – structure have 
implications for developing similarly complex ‘serious’ systems for befuddling 
malicious attackers:
Only a player who unlocks the secret ‘wizard mode’ and becomes omniscient 
is assured of winning NetHack. Likewise, a critical software application that 
incorporates deliberately misleading features, traps, and diversions could be 
the most reliably secure because only an all-knowing user could confidently 
use the application without self-destructing—in the sense, say, of the system 
crashing.35
The similarity here between text-based programming and text-based gaming is 
significant; in both cases, not only can the pleasure of the (ASCII) text easily turn 
to Weizenbaum’s ‘pleasureless drive for reassurance’, but the hacker’s obsession 
with coding-as-problem-solving that he relates to the gambler’s urge can just 
as easily turn into an obsession with gaming-as-coding, the unpleasant need to 
further reassert one’s power over the complex limitations of the game mechanics 
when one should ‘really’ be getting back to schoolwork, or something even more 
important, like one’s social life.
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Indeed, the connection between fun and compulsion can be located not 
only in the oscillation between programming and gaming as two increas-
ingly similar modes of computing, but it can also take the form of an affective 
response, which, as we suggested earlier, is crucial to our interest in thinking 
through the relationship between software and obsession. Indeed, in autonomist 
Marxist thought, the distinction between labour and leisure time is under 
renewed pressure due to the rise of immaterial labour as a relation incor-
porating many activities and functions previously considered, in industrial 
economies, to be ‘outside’ the sphere of production. For Michael Hardt and 
Antonio Negri, for instance, immaterial labour is affective as well as cognitive, 
producing ‘immaterial products, such as knowledge, information, communi-
cation, a relationship, or an emotional response’.36 Furthermore, they argue, in 
an updated version of the classical Marxist base/superstructure distinction, that 
‘immaterial labor has become hegemonic in qualitative terms and has posed a 
tendency on other forms of labor and society itself ’,37 informing even social 
practices that might still be understood as existing outside of this expanded 
productive sphere. Viewed this way, even ‘leisure-time’ activities that do not 
involve sitting in front of a computer subtly mirror and extend the affective 
affinities upon which labour in an information economy depends.
This is perhaps nowhere more apparent than in 1990s UK rave culture, a 
subculture that, not coincidentally, found one of its most welcome receptions 
Stateside in the San Francisco Bay Area, especially among the information 
workers of Silicon Valley and Multimedia Gulch.38 Writing about rave music’s 
relationship with the serotonin-releasing drug Ecstasy, Simon Reynolds 
describes ‘the utopian/dystopian dialectic’39 by which new sonic forms are 
generated as club culture itself moves cyclically from an optimistic engagement 
with the drug to something like soulless obsession. Describing a specific 
instance of the latter in late 1992, he writes:
What I remember most of all is the number of ravers whose smiles had been 
replaced by sour, cheated expressions…the hollow numbness of veteran ravers 
whose brains have been emptied of serotonin, the ‘joy-juice’ which Ecstasy 
releases in a gush-and-rush of euphoria. Having caned E so hard for so long, 
these ravers find their pleasure-centre synapses are firing blanks.40
Crucially, Ecstasy is not considered to be physically addictive; yet, even here, 
an obsessive, mechanical dedication to the letter, the logos, of fun long after its 
spirit is gone, the willingness to keep on going whenever you get the feeling 
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you’ve been cheated, is, again, precisely the flip side of fun, the point where it 
becomes so fun it’s not. For Reynolds, this situation inevitably results in the 
euphoric re-birth of rave culture in another genre of electronic dance music, but 
what happens when a similar dialectic is played out at the level of the individual 
programmer/user? Or, to put it another way, what happens when the system 
being perpetuated is no longer a relatively benign subculture such as electronic 
dance music, but instead modes of production, systems of labour?
If, in rave culture, such a dialectic has produced new genres, in software 
engineering, as we have already begun to examine, it has produced instead 
higher levels of machinic abstraction. Building on the abstractions of automatic 
programming, Edsger Dijkstra’s 1968 letter to the Association for Computing 
Machinery, ‘Go To Statement Considered Harmful’, as one of us has noted 
elsewhere, emblematizes a shift in the discipline of programming from a hierar-
chical model of control and punishment to a softer model of control, structured 
programming: ‘Gotos make difficult the conflation of instruction with its 
product—the reduction of process to command—that grounds the emergence 
of software as a concrete entity and commodity’.41 ‘Good’, that is, struc-
tured, programming allows this conflation at the same time as it also makes 
programming an art ‘of organizing complexity, of mastering multitude and 
avoiding its bastard chaos’.42 The ‘good’ comes from a move into abstraction and 
at the expense of the more ‘direct’ knowledge of automatic programming, itself 
already an abstraction in comparison to ‘hard’ coding. At a certain point, in 
other words, ‘good’ programmers, unlike Weizenbaum’s hackers, stop obsessing 
about the best way to solve a particular problem, and instead relegate it to 
the domain of a standard implementation, relying, for example, on a generic 
function call instead of implementing the most efficient algorithm for each use 
case. Object-oriented programming, an even higher level of abstraction, extends 
this model further to incorporate code that the programmer has written him/
herself.
Such abstraction not only effaces knowledge specific to ‘lower’ levels of 
coding, but moves the programmer away from the electrical basis of the 
machine and into a variety of structures for organizing complexity: devel-
opment environments, source control systems and compilers, for example. In 
so doing, it further blurs the distinction between programmer and user. Writing 
programs at increasingly higher levels of abstraction, programmers become, 
in a sense, ‘users’ of their respective programming platforms rather than 
mythical masters of the machine.43 Indeed, the similarities between what may 
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at first seem to be three very different experiences of fun, that of the gamer, the 
drugged-up raver, and the programmer, become much more apparent when we 
consider that which specifically binds them together: the figure of the user. Such 
‘users’, in enjoying the object of their use, whether drugs, games, or software 
development environments, are, at the same time, themselves used. Addicted to 
fun, they are pushed past enjoyment into obsession and back again in ever-new 
configurations nevertheless based on this principle.
If there is a radical potentiality in fun, then, it lies not in the simple act 
of gratification but, as we implied earlier, can only be generated through this 
dialectic between enjoyment and obsession. To give but one personal example, 
one of us had the – in retrospect, profoundly surreal – experience of not only 
raving but working at a software company in San Francisco’s Multimedia Gulch 
in the mid-1990s. This period of employment began while said company was 
transitioning to a new, online-centric approach, making the atmosphere that 
of the rarest of mid-1990s tech companies: an internet company with an actual 
business model. Aside from the requisite free sodas, etc., provided, of course, 
for ‘fun’ (to foster, in other words, a round-the-clock work ethic), the one thing 
that sticks out about the experience is the red spiral slide, situated just next to 
the reception desk, which led to the floor below.
The slide was one of the first things that would have been pointed out to any 
visitor, prospective investor, or employee on a tour of the facilities, and people 
would always – always – be encouraged to try it out. ‘Look, we have a slide!’ became 
something of a cliché, both of the standard tour spiel (and a Spiel, of course, is 
a game, if you speak German), and – in the specific department (IT) where one 
of us worked, at least – as an over-enthusiastic, ideological fetish, a disavowal of 
marathon QA/bugfixing/maintenance sessions. The slide itself, of course, was 
more or less useless; most people who ended up sticking around for longer than 
just a tour inevitably tended to favour the stairs situated right next to it. What is 
most interesting about the slide, however, is that it was worse than useless. For the 
‘user’, sliding down the segmented plastic always seemed to generate a buildup 
of static electricity, like rubbing your feet on a carpet – an irony we often joked 
about. Since the IT department, perpetually full – like any IT department – of 
half-disassembled hardware, was around the corner from the bottom of the slide, 
you always had to remember to touch a metal railing or doorknob before you went 
back to work, lest you inadvertently zapped a motherboard.
The whole experience of the slide, in other words, was something like a con, 
a hoax, one which blatantly encouraged an atmosphere of ‘fun’ as a means of 
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extracting surplus value; you knew this even as you were sliding down it, trying 
nevertheless to enjoy it. But in so doing, it also generated an unintended and 
potentially entropic side-effect, quite aside from and extrinsic to either the 
subjective experience of enjoyment or the objective relations of production in 
which the slide was strategically situated. Crucially, the valence of this side-
effect is itself indeterminate; it is ambi-valent. Long-term employees complained 
about being shocked by the slide as much, if not more, than expressing concern 
about the damage one could potentially cause to the high-tech environment. 
This chaotic surplus in the dialectic between enjoyment and obsession, this 
potentially destructive result of the law of unintended consequences, doesn’t 
always, as in the case of static electricity, manifest itself physically, but can also 
– and perhaps most provocatively – flare up within the realm of software itself.
As our multifarious figure of the ‘user’ demonstrates across several seemingly 
different provinces of an informational economy predicated on affective, 
immaterial and ‘free’ labour, what is fun, what is engaging, is also often what is 
bad. This is, moreover, true of what is considered to be very bad programming. 
Paradoxically, ‘bad programming’, like NetHack, also has the potential to 
reinforce ‘proper’ ways of thinking about software development. There’s a kind 
of fun in trying to ignore or subvert ‘disciplined’ practices of industrialized 
programming and a similar, obverse kind of fun in trying to figure out what a 
complicated and unstructured program is going to do without running it, but 
this ‘fun’, in both cases, also boils down to a kind of ‘art’, the art of obfuscated 
code. The International Obfuscated C Code Contest (IOCCC)44 is perhaps the 
best-known example of such a practice. Twisting the valence on NetHack’s 
game-as-programming mentality further, obfuscated programming is itself 
a kind of game, in the sense that it is organized as a contest. Furthermore, 
many (though not all) of the submissions turn out, when properly compiled, 
to be games themselves. Entries like 2004’s winner in the category of ‘Best 
Calculated Risk’, Brent Burley’s draw poker program written in three lines of 
code (two of which are simply variable declarations), exemplify the sense in 
which the art of obfuscated programming both relies on a Dijkstran drive 
towards simplicity, and, at the same time, a complete inversion of the strictures 
of structured programming. In his entry, Burley writes, ‘To keep things simple, 
I have avoided the C preprocessor and tricky statements such as “if ”, “for”, 
“do”, “while”, “switch”, and “goto”’.45 Here, too, GOTO statements are considered 
harmful, not because they would make the program more difficult for humans 
to follow, but less.
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Obfuscated programming is thus in some ways the obverse of the move 
towards a compartmentalized, structured programming that enabled the 
commodification of software. Instead of an ‘abstraction [that] both empowers 
the programmer and insists on his/her ignorance’,46 obfuscated C, while it 
remains an abstraction (and is thus not somehow ‘closer to the machine’ for 
being un-/poorly structured) is one that disempowers (confusing/difficult 
code) while insisting on a greater degree of knowledge (hacks/tricks/obscure 
methods). For example, Carl Banks’ 1998 Best of Show entry to the Obfuscated 
C Contest is written in the shape of an airplane, and indeed, when compiled, 
runs a basic X Windows flight simulator.47 The code, however, only compiles 
with very specific switches – key mappings for controlling the plane, for 
example, must be specified at compile time – complicated enough that Banks 
specifically details them alongside his entry. While ignorance is related to disci-
pline, and therefore empowering, here, useless knowledge is related to a kind of 
‘fun’ which is disempowering.
Obfuscation itself is in fact the obverse of the drive towards rational commu-
nication. Etymologically, it has its roots in the Latin obfuscare, ‘to darken’;48 it 
is the anti-Enlightenment. For Nick Montfort, obfuscated code, including the 
IOCCC and similar contests and traditions in the Perl language,
darkens the usually ‘clear box’ of source code into something that is difficult to 
trace through and puzzle out, but by doing this, it makes code more enticing, 
inviting the attention and close reading of programmers. There is enjoyment 
in figuring out what an obfuscated program does that would not be found in 
longer, perfectly clear code that does the same thing…In this way it throws light 
on the nature of all source code, which is human-read and machine-interpreted, 
and can remind critics to look for different dimensions of meaning and multiple 
codings in all sorts of programs.49
As he points out, source code itself is located at a nexus between the human 
readable and machine executable, and obfuscated code thus highlights the 
potential for the play of meaning opened up by the disjuncture between these 
two different types of addressee. At the same time, however, obfuscated coding 
can be seen as a refusal of ‘good programming’ that also seems, paradoxically, to 
end up in its embrace. Consider, for example, as listed on the IOCCC homepage, 
some of the contradictory goals that the contest’s organizers enumerate:
  To write the most Obscure/Obfuscated C program under the rules below.
  To show the importance of programming style, in an ironic way.
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  To illustrate some of the subtleties of the C language.
  To provide a safe forum for poor C code. :-)
We might characterize these goals, respectively, as follows: to emphasize 
bad programming, positively; to emphasize good programming, negatively; 
to emphasize good programming, positively; and, finally, to emphasize bad 
programming, negatively (but humorously).
There is thus, again, precisely the danger we have seen in so many of the 
examples we have looked at thus far, that of fun folding back on itself as so much 
fun merely reinforces, consciously or unconsciously, positively or negatively, 
the ‘right’ way to do things. As our examples suggest, this vacillation between 
the positive and negative sides of fun, while not historically new (as the word’s 
etymology itself indicates), has nevertheless proven exceedingly amenable to 
incorporation within a relatively contemporary system of political economy 
predicated on affective labour in general and increasingly reliant on ‘free labour’ 
in particular. The figure of the ‘user’ is emblematic of how this vacillation is 
encapsulated within such a system: programmers, gamers, ecstatic ravers – 
indeed, neoliberal subjects of all kinds – participate in the system by both using 
and being used by it. From Weizenbaum’s hacker-gambler compulsively seeking 
mastery over the machine to the International Obfuscated C Code Contest, 
which, for ‘fun’, flagrantly subordinates the human to the computer, placing the 
programmer in the position of obsessively writing and reading software instruc-
tions deliberately oblique to human comprehension, the oscillating valences of 
fun have proven to be far from an obstacle to the perpetuation of this system. 
Indeed, they have thus far provided only the occasional glimmer, as in the spark 
of static electricity generated by the dot-com-era software company’s slide, of 
anything that escapes its logic.
Yet there is one further goal that the contest specifically enumerates: ‘To 
stress C compilers with unusual code’, as Banks’ flight simulator, with its 
eccentric compile-time options, does. This goal is in many ways precisely the 
most interesting because it seems to insist on relentlessly probing the gap 
between writing and execution that Montfort identifies as a key component of 
obfuscated code and which structured programming and other abstractions 
specifically seek to elide. But isn’t this again, and perhaps ultimately, merely the 
obverse of the impulse to immediacy that fetishizing code as logos demands? 
Perhaps. Yet, and just as ultimately, it is here that the as yet unharnessed surplus 
generated on the battlefields of code and fun can be recuperated. Here, we 
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would like to suggest, fun presents the possibility of neither a return to hardware 
nor a reified, fetishized software, but perhaps instead that eccentric, freakish 
and, perhaps most importantly, random or aleatory practices,50 under the right 
circumstances, really can be subversive after all, if only on the most technical 
grounds.
These practices can be subversive, that is, as long as we gain enough 
knowledge from them that, instead of becoming ‘better programmers’, we 
become disempowered to the point where we can no longer accept the conflation 
of speech and action, the model of code as an instrumentalization of our 
thoughts. This would have the somewhat paradoxical effect of not only making 
our interfaces more productively spectral, as, again, one of us has suggested 
elsewhere,51 but also revealing a site for action within the so-called immaterial 
labour of programming that is not reducible to logos. Writing about the 
relationship between another form of logos, juridical code, and violence, in 
relation to the question of the sovereign, Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben 
suggests that ‘[t]he only truly political action…is that which severs the nexus 
between violence and law’.52 The same could also be said of the nexus between 
execution and code. The image of a compiler choking on obfuscated C, then, 
holds within it the possibility that, in no longer substituting deed for word, we 
may also no longer automatically fall prey to that original sin of ideology itself: 
fighting phrases with phrases.
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9Monopoly and the Logic of Sensation in 
Spacewar!
Christian Ulrik Andersen
In his book Homo Ludens (written in 1938), the play theorist Johan Huizinga 
states that the instinct for play, and ‘having fun’ that defines its essence, is core to 
human civilization. Play is not merely a cultural manifestation; it rather fulfils a 
general necessity. Civilization is played: it ‘arises in and as play, and never leaves 
it’, he claims.1 Play is what constitutes our culture, and, as Huizinga describes, 
it can be found in children’s games as well as poetry, music, law and warfare. 
However, playing has a double nature. Play entices a civilized form (as when 
the judge wears a wig), while, at the same time, playfulness consistently tries to 
challenge or even destroy that form. As pointed out by another play theorist, 
Brian Sutton-Smith, play is carnivalesque (as when someone else wears the 
judge’s wig).2 So, even though play is widely accepted as a cultural and civilized 
activity that gives meaning to meaningless actions, and builds institutions and 
industries that perpetuate this meaning, it simultaneously attempts to outgrow 
its civilized form, to displace meaning and to disrupt its institutions.
The game of Spacewar!, developed by a group of ‘hackers’ at MIT in the early 
1960s and popular in a wide circle of programmers, marks the beginning of a 
history of computation produced and performed for fun. In what ways does 
Spacewar! displace and disrupt the formation of meaning and the institution 
within which it appears?
At the time, technology was conventionally understood as an enterprise 
dealing with mechanics, but as Norbert Wiener expresses it, the ‘new industrial 
revolution’ perceives the machine ‘not as a source of power, but as a source 
of control and a source of communication’.3 With computers, the ability to 
control information became embedded in technology, in the tools and models 
that simulate the world, and are able to predict and control future events. 
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Rather than augmenting the physical power of the human, technology began 
‘augmenting human intellect’, according to Douglas Engelbart.4 Cybernetics and 
the study of information feedback systems which exhibited a potent usefulness 
for a wide range of areas, including biology, psychology and economics, origi-
nated in Radiation Lab’s research on aircraft defence at MIT during World War 
II. Computer science of the 1960s, with MIT at the heart of it, continued the 
development of computerized, ‘smart’ control of airspace.
Despite a shift to the augmentation of the mind, the role of the body is central 
to Spacewar! Unlike the military air defence systems’ air control, which operates 
rather differently, the game of air control in Spacewar! is a thrilling experience 
where the software is designed to challenge the player’s bodily control of the 
computer – literally, letting the player push buttons in order to control a space-
craft on a screen and experiment with the augmentation of the human body. 
What does this playful reinvigoration of the body in an information control 
system impose? And which understanding of humans, software and its institu-
tions does playing and making such games imply?
The history of making games as political and disruptive acts is highly 
informative in this respect. In particular, the popular game Monopoly presents 
an exciting case study. While it is not widely known, Monopoly was intended to 
be pedagogical and provide anti-capitalist education about the negative conse-
quences of the United States’ monopolization of land in the early twentieth 
century. This paradox of an anti-capitalist game, which to many incarnates a 
celebration of capitalism, reveals a bodily relation between play and meaning 
that can help build an understanding of the computer scientists bodily play with 
computers six decades later. Not being able to determine the precise meaning of 
gameplay can indicate that the kind of sense-making that takes place is closer to 
the joyous affirmation of a Nietzschean ‘play of the world’, rather than to finding 
a particular intended signification.5
The Landlord’s Game: A politics on land
In 1904 Elizabeth J. Magie, a Quaker woman from the United States, patented 
the board game The Landlord’s Game. As explained by Burton H. Wolfe in The 
Monopolization of Monopoly, Magie was a follower of Henry George’s theory 
that private monopolies on land and the renting of land produce an increase 
in the value of land which profits a few landlords rather than the majority of 
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Figure 9.1 Printed patent drawing for a board game invented by Elizabeth J. Magie 
(The Landlord’s Game). The game was designed to illustrate the principle of a 
single-tax idea, proposed by Henry George for use in the United States. In 1935, 
Magie sold her patent to Parker Brothers, the publishers of Monopoly
Source Record of the Patent and Trademark Office, National Archives, United States
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tenants.6 Henry George proposed a ‘single tax’ on land to discourage speculation 
and balance the relationship between owners and tenants. In The Landlord’s 
Game, players are allowed to explore the processes of monopolization with the 
deliberate intention of educating them in Georgism. Playing a game is about 
the tactile exploration of and adaptation to the codes of conduct in the game, 
and Magie’s political intention was, in short, to create a practical, educational 
demonstration of the negative consequences of private monopolies on land.7
Though many similar games were played at the time, The Landlord’s Game 
is considered the main inspiration for Monopoly, the world’s best-selling board 
game.8 In other words, modelling the process of the monopolization of land 
seems to exhibit a purely procedural logic that does not entail any consecutive 
conclusion: the same game may be perceived as either a celebration or a critique 
of capitalism and the monopolization of land. What does this say about the 
relationship between the game and its meaning?
The fact that The Landlord’s Game had the potential to turn into a cheerful 
celebration of capitalism first of all exemplifies the ambiguous nature of play. 
Play serves two seemingly opposing goals: it reproduces prevailing values but it 
also diverts unacceptable impulses and drives them into personally and socially 
acceptable activities. Play also has a ‘carnivalesque’ and ‘frivolous’ nature, as 
Brian Sutton-Smith puts it.9 Under the circumstances of play, you are allowed to 
assume other roles (e.g. a greedy capitalist) and act out unacceptable behaviours 
(e.g. brutality). This means that the demonstration of monopolization does not 
necessarily lead to reflection and awareness; it may also be linked to frivolity 
and the opportunity to experience the thrill and ‘fun’ of being an insatiable 
capitalist in a socially acceptable way.
The frivolity and fun of playing may lead to joyful immersion in greed, but 
the pedagogical scope of the game is not just about building arguments pro et 
contra capitalism. In The Landlord’s Game there is something frivolous in the 
very acts of naming and creating rules such as: ‘Poverty Place’ (land rent $50), 
‘Easy Street’ (land rent $100) and ‘Lord Blueblood’s Estate’ (‘no trespassing – go 
to jail’).10 As a demonstration of the monopolization of land, the game can be 
seen as a playful act of comparing politics to board games. However, to grasp the 
critical nature of The Landlord’s Game, one must employ a different explanatory 
framework and explore what the fun and frivolity of this kind of demonstration 
and designation imply.
In the context of a discussion on the nature of humour (in Logique du 
sens), Gilles Deleuze sheds light on this problem. Deleuze discusses Diogenes’ 
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ability to argue by using demonstrations, and praises his ability to show and 
designate.11 Deleuze’s inclusion of Diogenes is presumably an implicit reference 
to Søren Kierkegaard. In Kierkegaard’s thinking, irony is a path from aesthetics 
to ethics, whereas humour is the path to a religious being. Deleuze does not 
quote Kierkegaard’s notion of humour directly and thus avoids the religious 
aspect of his philosophy. However, he refers to his notion of irony. 12 Kierkegaard 
draws upon Diogenes’ method of argumentation and, as an example, presents 
his argument about the ambiguity of movement. Diogenes’ opponent assumed 
that movement could only be described in terms of instances, but in his 
response Diogenes rises and walks back and forth.13 Plato laughed at people 
who were satisfied with being shown and showing examples, as Diogenes did 
at those who did not ask who was but what was, etc.14 But Deleuze supports 
Diogenes’ way of thinking and points to his ability to tear down Plato’s idealism 
and essentialism by humorously replacing ideas with examples. In other words, 
meaning and signification are destroyed by designation (and humour), and it 
is pointless to inquire into the signification of the demonstration. According to 
Deleuze, the substitution, designation and manifestation (introduced below) 
that take place in humour, which destroy relations to meaning and signifi-
cation, also differ from both Socratic and romantic irony. The latter seeks the 
‘real’ signification (the true meaning), and the former remains caught in an 
indeterminacy of signification (‘does the ironic enunciation mean one thing or 
another?’). Games are, as demonstrations of processes, ruled by designation. 
The meaning of the game, whether it is to be capitalist or anti-capitalist, is 
arbitrary, as it is a demonstration.
We may thus conclude that the critical aspect is not intrinsic to the game; 
it must lie elsewhere. In another section of Logique du sens Deleuze draws a 
semantic distinction between signification, designation and manifestation. 
A signification entails a connection between a word and a concept; a desig-
nation between a sentence and external circumstances; and a manifestation 
between a sentence and a speaking subject.15 If The Landlord’s Game is to be 
considered political, it should not only be viewed as the demonstration of 
a procedural logic; it must also be seen as a manifestation of an alternative. 
Naming streets, creating rules and creating a parodic and humorous demon-
stration of capitalism must be understood as a political manifestation of an 
anti-capitalist movement, and not just as a demonstration of the dynamics of 
capitalism. It is only if seen through this lens that its challenge to capitalism 
becomes unmistakable.
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As the game is a manifestation it should be examined in relation to the ones 
who manifest themselves through the activity of play. In other words, to regard 
The Landlord’s Game as political and critical, one must not only attend to what 
is played and how it is played, but also to who is playing the game. The critical 
players are not the consumers of Monopoly (enjoying the fun of playing large-
handed capitalists), but the Georgists and Quakers making the game. One of the 
early players of The Landlord’s Game wrote:
those who wanted copies of the board for Monopoly took a piece of linen cloth 
and copied it in crayon. It was considered a point of honor not to sell it to a 
commercial manufacturer, since it had been worked out by a group of single 
taxers who were anxious to defeat the capitalist system.16
The Landlord’s Game was not a consumerist game but a folk game developed and 
modified by the players themselves. Ultimately, ‘getting the message’ depends 
on the players’ ability to identify with the project. One could even argue that 
there is no political and critical movement unless there are places where such 
performances and manifestations can occur. This performative aspect seems to 
be a core characteristic of political and critical games, whose activity otherwise 
remains ambiguous and whose meaning arbitrary.17
Focusing on the performative action of the player is important to our 
understanding of what it means to play with software, and what it meant to 
play Spacewar! in the 1960s. In fact, one could argue that the very concept of 
using computers for gaming and play depends on the manifestation of a critical 
attitude towards the institutions where computers are applied, and the kind of 
logic that lies behind them: playing games challenges how cybernetics governs 
not only the user but also life itself.
Spacewar!: A politics of the senses
In the original version, Spacewar! is a game for two people, each of whom 
controls a spacecraft in a two-dimensional world. The object of the game 
is to shoot the opponent with missiles while manoeuvring and avoiding 
the gravity well of the ‘star’ at the centre of the screen. Spacewar! was first 
conceived in 1962 at MIT. Although usually attributed to Steve Russell, it was 
a collaborative project of ‘geeks’ or ‘hackers’, as they were also labelled at the 
time, which indicates that the computer game was made by and for computer 
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researchers who shared and sometimes contributed to the game. For example, 
one player/programmer, Peter Samson, was offended by the ‘random stars’ 
in the background and added a program to control the background void 
based on real star charts which, referring to the price of computers at the 
time, was entitled Expensive Planetarium. Another player/programmer, Dan 
Edwards, introduced gravity into the game and thus significantly improved the 
gameplay.18
Taking up the theme of the space war in the midst of the Cold War cannot 
be considered random. Spacewar! was developed only a year after Yuri Gagarin’s 
first space travel. Essentially the game itself must be understood as a play on 
Cold War themes, a satire in which the race for space is turned into popular 
culture’s play: the spacecrafts of the Cold War are replaced by spacecrafts 
visually resembling those of Tintin (in Objectif Lune) and The First Lensman (a 
popular science fiction novel by ‘Doc’ Smith); and the computer interaction of 
military defence systems is turned into play with the cinematic model work of 
beams and explosions.19
Figure 9.2 Spacewar! running on PDP-1. Duelling players fired at each other´s 
spaceships and used early versions of joysticks to manipulate away from the 
central gravitational force of a sun as well as from the enemy ship
Source Image by Joi Ito
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Figure 9.3 Alan Kotok, Steve Russell, Martin Graetz play Spacewar! 1983 ca.
Source Image courtesy of Computer History Museum
Figure 9.4 Operators of SAGE used light guns to pinpoint aircraft tracks. When 
a blip appears on the scope, the light beam causes the computer to assign a 
track number and to relay speed, direction and altitude information to various 
consoles. Publicity photograph of a SAGE console operator with ‘gun’ pointed at 
the screen. 1959 ca. 
Source Image courtesy of Computer History Museum, and used by permission of the MITRE Corporation
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The gameplay echoes one of the most common Cold War computer systems, 
SAGE. During World War II, the bomber aircraft gained increasing importance 
in warfare. The time between spotting enemy flights and the required response 
at high speed was constantly diminishing, even given the use of radar. The 
ability to predict flight tracks and target positions was crucial for air defence, 
especially with the development of the nuclear bomb. In the early 1950s, the 
US military joined forces with researchers at MIT and IBM to produce a Semi 
Automated Ground Environment system (SAGE). On the basis of a comput-
erized cybernetic system and a number of physical control posts, it became 
possible to predict flight tracks and automate the interception.20 The whole 
gameplay of Spacewar! is essentially an imitation of the operation of SAGE. 
In front of a radar-like display the player’s task is to predict the tracks of 
missiles and intercept the enemy spacecraft. The frivolous nature of play adds 
a hyperbolic and parodic dimension to the imitation: in Spacewar!, the player 
can control the aircrafts in the outer hemisphere, shoot enemies down and 
experience the thrill of explosions.
As a demonstration, Spacewar! is science fiction and does not seem to model 
a complex process, or even a process that remotely imitates reality (unlike The 
Landlord’s Game). The game is science fiction, as whether the Cold War would 
lead to real space wars was unforeseeable at the time. Hence, the game is not 
political – it does not seek to make significatory claims about the world. So, 
what does the game demonstrate and what kind of politics is at play?
As a manifestation, the game is based not on similarity but on substitution. 
In Spacewar! the Cold War is replaced by play and battles from popular culture. 
This manifestation is humorous in Deleuze’s sense of the term. Replacing SAGE 
with sci-fi explosions is absurd and defies signification, but, paradoxically, the 
thrill of shooting down an enemy spacecraft while performing the parody also 
makes sense. On one level, of course, it makes sense because of the internal logic 
of the game, where shooting missiles at the opponent leads to victory. First and 
foremost, however, it makes sense because it is thrilling and fun: it makes sense 
as a bodily sensation. The game is a manifestation of the body as a sense-making 
machine; it simultaneously makes sense (bodily) and remains non-sense. In 
Deleuzian terms, ‘the logic of sense’ becomes ‘the logic of sensation’.
In this logic of sensation one must not only pay attention to what takes 
place in the game (illustrations, demonstrations, etc.), but also to the body of 
the player and the sensation of playing. In fact, one might argue that the bodily 
engagement, ‘feeling’ the gravity, the thrill of overcoming obstacles and even 
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the shouting and excitement of playing are central experiences to all computer 
games. Playing computer games is an uncanny experience of the body’s simul-
taneous (entrapped) presence and absence in a cybernetic system.
Playing a computer game is an experience of the body as an indispensable 
element that regulates the cybernetic feedback loops in the game. In Spacewar! 
the player constantly seeks to predict the trajectory of the spacecraft and its 
missiles on the screen, as whenever the spacecraft steers towards the centre of 
gravity the player needs to counter steer.
However, playing the game on the screen is simultaneously accompanied 
by an experience of bodily absence: there is no body to make sense with in the 
cybernetic system of the game-world. There is no ‘feeling’ of gravity, steering 
and speed, but only the ‘illusion’ of a body. Today, experiencing a computer 
game is compulsory in popular culture and does not seem very revolutionary, 
but in 1962, to playfully foreground the status of the body as a mediatory 
and sense-making element (both present and relied upon and absent and 
repressed) in a cybernetic feedback system was exactly what made Spacewar! a 
rebellion. Playing the game reflected the human and bodily experiences called 
upon and repressed by SAGE in particular and military computer science in 
general.
SAGE depends on human users watching the screen, tracking aircraft 
manually and reporting to the system. Humans make the defence system run 
but also represent a potential disturbance: they may miss their target or choose 
not to act. In response to human fallability, cybernetics quantifies the human 
by reducing him/her to an element that can be calculated. The objectification 
and quantification of the human is core to a certain version of cybernetics and 
was addressed by Norbert Wiener, who, in his last book, asks: ‘Can God play 
a significant game with his own creature? Can any creator, even a limited one, 
play a significant game with his own creature?’21 Here, Wiener points to the 
technocratic and administrative nature of cybernetic systems: they are control 
systems that seek to control the future. In this, they assume the position of a 
‘God’ and thus mark the end of free will and the bourgeois subject: the human is 
no longer in control of the system, but has become an element in the system. In 
cybernetic systems, humans enter into a ‘symbiosis’ with computer systems, as 
J. C. R. Licklider, one of the key developers of SAGE and a well-known theorist 
in the field of cybernetics, called it.22 Media theorist Brian Holmes notes that 
the human becomes an ‘info mechanic being’ whose ‘double constitution could 
be felt in the uncanny identity of the strange new creatures that fired the guns 
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and piloted the planes: both seemed to waver between machine-like, implacable 
humans and intelligent, humanlike machines.’23
This shift in the construction of the subject and subjectivity was certainly not 
limited to computer systems. Cybernetic thinking provided useful conceptual, 
epistemological and ontological frameworks to economics, management, 
sociology, communications engineering, behavioural psychology, HCI and 
other design branches, among others, where cybernetic ideas are either 
foundational or remain partially unchallenged. One example is the use of 
game theory to analyse war strategies. Based on the theoretical game ‘prisoner’s 
dilemma’, John von Neumann (a key figure in both the development of the 
nuclear bomb and the computer) advocated for a preventive war against the 
USSR. In ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ two prisoners, who together have committed a 
crime, must decide individually whether they should acknowledge the crime 
and betray the other. Only the one that acknowledges the crime and betrays the 
other will go free, but if they both acknowledge their crime, they will both be 
sentenced. A third option is to keep quiet, in which case they both get a lesser 
sentence for a lesser offence. Most likely, the prisoners will betray each other. 
As an allegory on the possible war between the United States and USSR, the 
debate was whether one should ‘keep quiet’ or ‘wipe the other out’.24 The idea 
of a preventive war was (luckily) rejected by the Truman administration, but 
game theory still played a role in the justification of the Cold War arms race. 
25 In the application of game theory to politics, which at the time also laid the 
ground for the actual computerized defence systems, the human and, not least, 
the human body have been reduced to estimations of potential casualties in a 
system.
The symbiosis of human and computer emerges as the reality of the post-war 
subject, and the reality of the subjectivity of the computer scientist. The devel-
opment of computer systems has always been linked to military strategic 
objectives such as ballistics or cryptography. In the United States, during the 
Vietnam War, it was even proposed that financial support for computer research 
should be dependent on its strategic and military impact.26 In other words, at 
the time of Spacewar!, computer research was also military research, under-
girded by cybernetics.
Computer researchers (including the makers of Spacewar!) were involved 
in a political cybernetic system which produced strategic military cybernetic 
systems (such as SAGE). In their daily work life, they were creating the systems 
to which they themselves were quantified objects, subjects with an ‘uncanny 
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identity between cruel, machine-like humans and intelligent, human-like 
machines’. Employing the computer as a creative tool, giving programmers as 
well as users agency and ‘free will’ of parody, making games to which to respond 
bodily, playing and being frivolous must be seen as a rebellion against the 
quantification and objectification of the body and of the human. If Spacewar! 
reveals anything about the system dynamics and procedural logic of the Cold 
War, it is in particular the impact of political power on the bodies and lives of its 
creators and players. In defiance of their situation, the casualties of cybernetics, 
the human programmers stage the performance of a cybernetic symbiosis 
between a human and a machine body as a playful and joyous act.
Playing with software: The redistribution of the senses
Play reproduces behaviours (as rituals), but its frivolous nature also makes it 
capable of producing change. From time to time, people create new games that 
challenge how we sense and make sense of the world, and the mechanisms that 
control these processes. To adopt the words of Jacques Rancière, play may have 
a similar political role to that of aesthetics in the ‘distribution of the senses’.27 
Spacewar! is not political – it does not represent an overt struggle between the 
institution and ‘the hackers’ (the programmers/players). Hacking was commonly 
accepted; but the hackers were striving to speak for themselves through play. As 
information workers at MIT they were part of an established order of cyber-
netic information systems, but as humans they were subjected to the systems 
they were creating. Through the aesthetic practice of making games, playing 
and having fun with software, they could be seen as reclaiming their right to 
sense and make sense of the world in a non-quantified and non-objectified way, 
defying the new available forms of being, knowing and expressing oneself.
To grasp the revolutionary aspects of Spacewar!, one must not only consider 
what the game demonstrates (the space war) but also what it is a manifestation 
of. Spacewar! is revolutionary not because the activity of shooting spacecrafts 
demonstrates any inherent procedural and persuasive rhetoric that opposes 
the political or social realm, but because it is a manifestation produced by a 
group of people, which challenges cybernetics and the way it is embedded in 
the sophisticated apparati that control and represent the senses (such as the 
Cold War, its defence systems and even the computer labs themselves). Unlike 
The Landlord’s Game, Spacewar! does not try to model or oppose processes that 
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even remotely resemble reality. Rather, the game is part of a movement that 
turns Cold War computer science into a game in which players/programmers 
gain an experience of what the cybernetic apparatus otherwise seizes control of: 
the body as sense-making.
What did this ‘programmer identity’ and reclaimed right to sense and make 
sense of the world through play lead to? The game became an icon of a culture 
of programmers who valued free inquiry, knowledge sharing and a distaste for 
authority. Stewart Brand describes this culture in a 1972 issue of Rolling Stone 
magazine, featuring a young Alan Kay at Xerox PARC, who said that ‘The 
game of Spacewar! blossoms spontaneously wherever there is a graphics display 
connected to a computer’.28 It is, at least partially, through playing with software 
that the players/programmers assumed and spread this ethos. New visions of 
how computers could serve people as tools for sharing knowledge and creativity 
were created.
The computer as a means to bodily sensation eventually also led to a whole new 
industry: the video and computer game industry. Spacewar! was the first widely 
used software program.29 The popularity of Spacewar! is an early indication of the 
potential of the game industry and a foreseer of computers being brought from 
the labs to the masses through coin-operated video game arcades in the 1970s. In 
fact, as early as 1971 a variation of Spacewar! entitled Computer Space was used in 
one of the first attempts to commercialize computer games (by Nolan Bushnell, 
who made the ever-popular Pong in 1972 and who later founded Atari).
The fate of computer games and these new visions of software is another 
story. Ironically, the US military probably learned more from Spacewar! than 
from SAGE. The military has a long tradition of using games to train soldiers, 
and computer games have provided new possibilities for combat training, 
among other roles. For example, the game America’s Army, produced by the 
US Army and available for free on their website, which gives players a sense of 
‘the real deal’ of warfare, is also used as a branding mechanism to help recruit 
soldiers. And vice versa: as the gaming industry has developed, the makers 
of computer games have learned from surveillance systems such as SAGE. In 
particular in massive, multiplayer online games, player activity is seen as a key 
mechanism in the production of value. An increase in the number of social 
relations players engage in during the game, or the time players spend in the 
game, raises the potential value of the platform for advertisement. With the 
capitalization of not only the games but also the activity of play itself, the player 
continues being objectified, quantified and entrapped in the cybernetic system.
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Through our playful acts new institutions and regimes of power and control 
have arisen, including the regime of play and games itself. Revolutionary play 
with software in the 1960s soon went hand in hand with new marketing strat-
egies that made computer games accessible to everyone. The ‘gamification’ 
of other types of software, using the principles of play to make software an 
engaging experience, is a central strategy to arenas such as social media. Can 
play in this environment continue to challenge our institutions and hierarchies 
of meaning and control? Johan Huizinga provides an easy answer: ‘animals have 
not waited for man to teach them their playing’, he claims.30 Play is a natural 
thing: cats play with mice, dogs pretend to bite while playing, some insects 
engage in foreplay before mating and so on. Our animal instinct for play cannot 
be repressed. We simply need to have fun to live. In Michel de Certeau’s terms, 
playing may have lost as a strategy, but it persists as tactics.
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Human-computer Interaction, a 
Sci-fi Discipline?
Brigitte Kaltenbacher
He’s not a man or a machine: A Terminator, a cybernetic organism.
Kyle Reese, Terminator, 1984
It’s life, Captain, but not life as we know it.
Spock, Star Trek, 1963
It isn’t faith that makes good science, Mr. Klaatu, it’s curiosity.
Prof. Barnhardt, The Day The Earth Stood Still, 1953
History of HCI, cybernetics and Terminator
James Cameron shot his iconic film Terminator (now Terminator 1) in Los 
Angeles in 1984. An impressive creation of cybernetic fic tion, the Terminator, 
a Frankenstein-like humanoid robot imbued with artificial life, is a power ful 
figure offering a futuristic vision of technology, which neatly separates power 
to affect and power to be affected between technology and humans. The 
Terminator can pass for a human on an instrumental level as he displays 
natural body movement, language use and a goal-directed behaviour. The 
cyborg’s social conduct, however, is delivered with the rudimentary capacity of a 
rep tilian brain, only capable of fight or flight responses and a 100 per cent focus 
on control and survival. Through out the movie the Terminator’s face remains 
a motionless blank. The film plays with the immediacy of cinematic real-time 
footage and the hypermediacy1 of CGI-enhanced and super imposed game 
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inter faces, anticipating today’s mix of passive and active attention media. The 
Terminator is the perfect metaphor of how HCI models the human at that time: 
an enticing yet dated fiction, drawing us in by seductive presentation.
In the same year, 1984, the first British HCI group called ‘Interaction’ was 
established by the BCS (British Chartered Institute for IT), two years after the 
first conference devoted to HCI was held in Gaithersburg, United States, by the 
SIGCHI (Specialist Interest Group Computer-Human Interaction), a subgroup 
of the Association for Computing Machinery. Initially a mix of human factors 
(HF), ergonomics, behavioural science and com puter engineering, the newly 
formed discipline was united2 by agreeing on the use of scientific methods. 
These design methods for human efficiency in the workplace derived from 
Taylorism and the ideas of scientific management.3 I agree with Dourish when 
he comments on this approach to HCI as being based entirely on philosophy 
of the pre-1930. Computer science in practice involves reducing high level 
behaviours to low-level, mechanical explanations, formalizing them through 
pure specific rationality; in this, computer science reveals its history as a part of 
positivist, reductionist tradition.4
HCI’s traditional academic home was computer science. However, cognitive 
science was also an important contributor to the newly formed discipline, and a 
contributor that suffered too from a rigorous Cartesian separation of mind and 
matter, due to its cybernetic roots. At the Macey Conference 1941 McCulloch 
stated that ‘brains do not secrete thought as the liver secretes bile, but … they 
compute thoughts the way computing machines cal cu late numbers’.5 This idea 
culminated in HCI’s human processor model,6 which likens the human brain 
to a computer processor. The model brings the fictitious con cep t of the purely 
rational, goal-driven and linearly progressing human in alignment with the 
compu tational automation theories, and creates the user through the appli-
cation of the theories of AI. Crucially, it is also the first wave of cybernetics’ idea 
of technical communication as a feed back loop between tracking, control and 
prediction that still fundamentally informs HCI’s understanding of the human-
machine relation.
Another misconception of the discipline becomes apparent in the historical 
and, at times, contemporary synony mous use of the acronym ‘HCI’ in textbooks 
and publications both for ‘human-computer interaction’ and ‘human-com-
pu ter interface’,7 which points to the HCI’s reductive tendency to flatten the 
complexities of interaction pro ces ses into interface design. The space between 
users, systems and their representations in inter faces is brim ming with layers 
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of technology, mediation and organizational structures, yet HCI’s literal trans-
lation of control into (interface) control tools still manages to collapse this 
multifaceted space into its surface.
In the early 1990s Cameron and the Terminator moved on, yet HCI did not 
do the same in relation to the human user. In Termina tor 2 the original cyborg 
is faced with an im proved, next genera tion model – fluid, highly adaptive, 
technically improved and even more seductive and deceptive on an ‘interface’ 
level: Cyborg v2 can shape shift and so create a multitude of fictitious humans. 
Yet, it is ultimately beaten by its older, technically inferior version. Why does 
this happen? The main reason is that Cyborg v1 learned to tune into human 
emotions8 and to reach into the social realm, a leap that the HCI discipline 
had – and has – yet to achieve. The 1990s mainstream HCI still focused on 
usability,9 which could be engineered, modelled and optimized by experts, even 
without any user involvement. The lowest level of user-centred design (UCD) 
only requires to imagine user’s input.10
1994 marked the departure from a dominance of the single user-computer 
interaction and a shift towards ubiquitous, distributed and networked 
computing, due to the internet becoming available to the public. The production 
of new cultures of networked computer users that occurred as a con sequence 
was not neces sarily obvious to the discipline of HCI. As Booth pointed out in 
his An Introduction to Human-Computer Interaction, soft sciences such as ‘[s]
ocial psychology and sociology have been classed as the neglected disciplines 
as they are not given the representation and coverage they deserve within the 
literature, given the importance of the problems they might address’.11 More over, 
HCI’s designs for fictitious users seen through a scien tific lens were leaving the 
real users with a variety of emotions ranging from puzzlement to frustration 
and despair. Most HCI teaching ma terial at the time reiterated the need to 
produce ‘less off-putting solutions’,12 with Booth voicing an urgent ‘need to 
overcome hostility towards users’.13 The infamous ‘Clippit’14 perhaps sums up the 
idea of fun and user friendliness in HCI de sign of the 1990s; probably the most 
unpopular (and most ridiculed) software feature ever.15 Perhaps that is why at 
that time Alan Cooper16 started developing a specific rather than generalized 
understanding of users. He viewed the concepts of an imaginary ‘user’ and 
‘user-friendliness’ as too vague and argued that such concepts invited designing 
for stakeholders or according to the producers’ wish lists of features, which were 
then pro jected onto ‘the elastic user’.17 His ‘personas’,18 on the other hand, were 
sup posed to represent a variety of user types within targeted market segments, 
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which were differentiated according to demo graphics, attitudes and/or social 
status. Alas, personas  were still fictional characters, i.e. discrete multiplicities 
akin to the T1000 rather than qualitatively enriched considerations of humans, 
and since this method has become standard practice in digital interaction 
processes, designing for fictitious rather than real users continues to live on.
However, also in 1995, Don Norman coined the term ‘user experience’ to 
expand HCI’s limited con cept of usa bility. With this concept, Norman intended 
to address all aspects of user experience with the system,19 taking HCI beyond 
inter face inter action. Perhaps unwillingly, he started an assault on the discipline’s 
self-proclaimed scien ti fic, objec tive and rationalistic stance that continues to 
haunt it. Since its popularization, Norman’s term has drawn attention to users’ 
subjective, affective and emotional perceptions in digital or tech nical inter-
ac tion. While this helps enrich the role of the human in the technical interaction 
equation, dealing with it has proved to be hugely challenging both to traditional 
and aspiring HCI and user experience (UX) practitioners, and remains so.
HCI, the user experience and fun
Almost two decades after the term emerged, the idea of UX is still in flux. An 
understanding of HCI as the single user-interface interaction has been displaced 
by the distributed, embedded or even invisible interactions supported by com pu
ting devi ces, which communicate with us – and for us – via inter connected 
networks. In turn, digital media industry has formed its own institutional 
bodies to deal with the UX, such as: the UxDA (User Experience Designers 
Associations Group) or IxDA (Inter action Design Asso cia tion), which include 
re spective communities, conferences and practices. At the same time, such 
groups, initia tives and emer ging fields keep revisiting, exploring and modifying 
established inter action practices and HCI litera ture, thus maintaining the preva-
lence of reductive tendencies. Even popular academic writing on ‘emotional 
design’ and ‘affective com puting’ reinstates the concept of the mind as an 
infor ma tion processor:20 in Picard’s Affective Computing,21 emotions improve 
efficien cy in decision-making and in Norman’s Emotional Design,22 they make 
us react favourably to attractive interface designs – but both authors categori-
cally conceptualize the usability par a meter of satis faction as the binaries of 
loving or hating, positive or negative affects, the digital ‘on’ or ‘off ’. Perhaps 
that is why Garret, an industry practitioner and author of the highly successful 
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The Elements of User Experience, claims that ‘any user experience effort aims 
to improve effi cien cy’.23 However, to say that UX should be fun or plea sant can 
be just as reductive and binary as to say that the usa bility of a digital product 
should be satisfactory. An ISO (International Organization for Standardization) 
stan dard on user experience was formulated24 in 2009, but it is still not clear 
what is meant by the term.25 The con cepts of fun, enjoyment and pleasure, 
which are used in ter change ably to describe it, are elusive.26 None theless, tradi-
tio nal and new inter action design communities are lar gely in agree ment that 
UX should be fun, en joyable and pleasurable.27
A recent trend in HCI and UX design is to view the user experience through 
gaming: heighten ed attention, intense engagement and the persuasive ness of 
the genre are precisely those desired UX qualities that digital interaction design 
aspires to achieve. Gaming is also seen as a route through which a more complex 
understanding of fun and pleasure can be constructed. However, this, in my 
opinion, promising approach early on suffered from an unhelpful oversim-
plification now referred to as ‘gamification’28 – a mechanical view of games as 
rule-based systems that advance through the interplay of tasks, user reactions, 
feedback and rewards, e.g. points, awards or scores. Gamification as such a 
simplified abstraction of game mechanisms to create engaging user experience 
outside games has also been criticized by game designers and researchers as ‘not 
being fun and creating an artificial sense of achievement’,29 displacing complex 
game mechanics with simple reward schemes,30 and reducing the emergent 
properties of the games experience to a rule-based system with measurable goal 
achievement and frequent feedback.
Ferrara’s ‘Playful Experiences, Creating Game Experiences in Every day 
Interfaces’ claims to look beyond gamification when investigating games to 
inform UX design. He views this attempt as quite natural, since ‘both UX and 
game design are forms of human-computer interaction, [which] inherent ly share 
some com mon theory, objectives, and prac tices’. 31 Then, despite stating that fun 
has an emergent nature, Ferrara models the ‘playful experience’ directly onto 
Garrett’s (already mentioned) efficiency oriented UX model, with only a slightly 
adjusted vocabulary. He suggests that following the planes of the model in UX 
design will have ‘enjoy ment and fun emerge from the experience. … Con verse ly, 
fun dies when any of the planes haven’t been adequately addressed’,32 effectively 
reducing fun to a predictable property after all.
It seems that HCI’s cybernetic heritage, and the paradigm of tracking, 
control and prediction as the only communication model continues to persist: 
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a pleasant experience is part of a deterministic system – it functions as a 
predictable response to a correctly designed stimulus. Fun, thus, becomes the 
fashionable update on ‘flashes’ or ‘blinks’,33 i.e. interface features that catch users’ 
eyes in the race for a prime slot in attention economy, where any competitor is 
only ever a mouse click away.34 Because of this continued reductive tendencies 
of the practice, progressive HCI/UX thinkers argue that it is time for a ‘third 
para digm of HCI’35 to emerge, which will embrace an integral approach to 
understanding the user experience such as embodied interaction and user’s 
situated meaning. Considering such intangible and emergent aspects could help 
understand the human technology interaction experience in the con tempo rary 
socio-technical environment in greater depth and, in turn, help engage with it.
Exploring the UX through a deeper look into game design and research, 
in my opinion, is particularly well suited not only to help us understand the 
powerful and com plex world of emotions in relation to this context, but to mark 
a watershed moment for the HCI and UX design community. The departure 
from an understanding of emotions solely as reactions to interaction encounters 
in favour of their pro duc tive potential plays a crucial role in this paradigm 
shift. Going beyond a sim plis tic under standing of the qualita tive aspects of the 
UX, such as emotional feedback, it overcomes the paradigms of measurement 
and predictability in digital interaction prac tice, and problematizes residual 
de ter mi nis tic and reductionist thought models, while working towards a fluid 
emergent and evolving frame work.
In the next section I will explore the various concepts of emotion to arrive at 
a multifaceted under standing of experience. It is informed by a cross-reading of 
po pu lar HCI literature, game and inter action studies and cog ni tive psycho logy, 
especially educational psychology and learning sciences. A focus on the latter 
allows me to discuss a user group that has been ignored so far both by traditional 
and pro gres sive interaction design communities: competently co-producing 
‘new media-literate’ and creative digital participants. This discussion could help 
extend the current interchangeable and nondescript use of ‘fun, pleasure and 
enjoyment’ in UX practice into a wider-ranging ‘experience’ vocabu lary as well 
as establish them as distinct markers outlining a rich experience landscape. 
Similarly, a critical reading of Csikszentmihalyi’s concept of flow36 in human 
engagement, utilizing neuroscientific accounts of human attention, attempts 
to debunk the fictitious conception that derives from the appropriation of flow 
by UX design, which suggests that the components of flow could act as design 
parameters.
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Towards a richer understanding of fun and engagement
In their article ‘The Semantics of Fun’ Marc Hassenzahl and Mark Blythe37 tackle 
a few issues that current UX and interaction design discussions grapple with: the 
indiscriminate use of fun, enjoyment and pleasure in describing user experience, 
the lack of structured theories to apply these terms more explicitly and the need 
to deploy these concepts competently to design for engaging interaction experi-
ences. By introducing fun and pleasure as polarities, with many shades between 
them, they help us think about user experience and complexity of emotions: 
here, ‘fun’ is aligned with distraction and ‘pleasure’ with absorption. Inves-
tigating their scale from a psychological, political and contextual perspective, 
the authors develop connotations such as ‘triviality, repetition, [and] spectacle’ 
for fun and ‘relevance, aesthetics, [and] commit ment’ for pleasure. While 
pleasure seems to benefit from more substance, and fun seems to stand for the 
flee ting enjoyment and volatile experiential aspects, there is no judgement on 
the quality of experience, as in ‘en gaged is good and distraction is bad’.38 The 
authors point out that this scale merely caters for the varying needs of users, 
i.e. some times to be engaged and sometimes to be distracted. In addition, they 
touch on the derogatory dimension of fun, when it is used to belittle, as well 
as its political and subversive poten tial: fun can be used as a distraction in the 
workplace, where it ‘can be seen … as a  resistance to the rigid de mar cation 
between work and leisure’.39 In the context of media industries, fun has become 
a commodity that can be bought and consumed.
Pleasure, contrarily, is seen as a more fulfilling and deep form of enjoyment. 
Here Blythe and Hassenzahl’s discussion overcomes a potentially reductionist 
stance on several accounts. First, they add a contextual dimen sion. Secondly, 
aesthetic pleasures in their work account for shared cultural and social values 
of ex perience (as opposed to the execution of the interface). Thirdly, the 
concepts of progression and commit ment that they use seem particularly well 
suited to distinguish user experience from the usability factor ‘satisfaction’, 
rather than setting them as somewhat synonymous. Commit ment as part of 
the pleasant experience helps overcome challenges in interaction, a view that 
is echoed in game studies: Lazzaro, for example, distin gui shes between ‘hard 
fun’ and ‘soft fun’.40 ‘Hard fun [is] the overcoming of obstacles [and] compel ling 
challenges that demand sophisti cated strategies’, while variants of ‘soft fun’ 
include the enga ging, enjoyable and the social aspects of sharing a game.41 
Next, Hassenzahl and Blythe turn to progression, for them an essential aspect of 
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experience: it is a generative concept that ‘stimulates [and] surprises’. ‘Surprise 
marks the central difference between satisfaction and pleasure. Satisfaction 
is the emotional consequence of confirmed expectations, whereas pleasure is 
the consequence of deviations from expectations’.42 Discussing surprise also 
marks a significant departure from predication. Certainly, not all surprises 
are pleasant, yet ‘unexpectedness’ has the exciting potential to open new 
directions and generate new perspectives. Pine and Gilmore, authors of the 
industry classic The Experience Economy, agree that surprises are key to trans-
forming mundane encounters into memorable experiences.43 Throughout their 
discussion, Hassenzahl and Blythe stress the contextualization of experiences as 
imperative, and that it is impossible to design experiences; one can only design 
for them.44
While their discussion is helpful when attempting a multi face ted take on fun 
and pleasure as part of the user experience, the route they choose to illustrate 
the psychological dimension of engagement comes across as uncriti cal. They 
refer to Csikszentmihalyi’s concept of flow45 as one of the few psycho logical 
accounts of pleasure, which is surprising for two reasons: first, flow marks a 
state of intensity, a mode of atten tion and, thus, the emotion of pleasure may 
be an after-effect of flow, but does not have to be,46 and secondly, more up-to-
date and better researched work that has been published on the subject since 
1990,47 such as neurophysio logical accounts of the interaction between human 
beha vi our and pleasure is not mentioned or used. Thus, flow is essen tially a state 
of continued high alert ness, which is triggered by the re lease of neurotrans-
mitters. To be exact, ‘dopamine “fixes” attention, makes thin king more effi cient, 
and also mediates fee lings of elation and pleasure’.48 While the con cept of the 
flow can act as a metaphor for an intensely en gaged ex perience, and, as we 
will see later, promotes the impor tance of this state for learning and creativity, 
re duc tive tendencies can creep in when looking at the components of flow as 
a checklist or design guide for the ‘optimal experience’: a close match between 
skill and chal lenge, clear goals and con stant feedback to control the perfor-
mance.49 Consequently a reduction of flow to a set of conditions to be satisfied 
revives the simplistic models of experience HCI has long been suffering from.
Yet, while flow might not be the all encompassing answer to designing 
a pleasant UX, its connection to intense experiences can also be linked 
to plea sure’s dar ker side: obsession and addiction. Video games present a 
good example. Neuro-imaging studies of video gamers showed that rapid 
shifts be tween different salient perceptions increased the release of dopamine 
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du ring game activities50 resulting in the feeling of pleasure; MRI scans during 
(simple)51 video games showed intense activity in brain regions associated with 
addiction.52 Such intense ex periences are prone to backlashes in flow producing 
burnout or ‘gamers’ regret’.53 Hence exploring all aspects of intensity in users’ 
experien ces, beyond the equilibrium of superficial pleasantness, leads to a 
multifaceted understanding of emotions as part of users’ experience in inter-
action, and a richer notion of enga gement. Indeed, it is this potential for the 
intense experience the game industry success fully taps into that ma kes game 
inter action a cultural and commercial benchmark for contempo rary inter action 
design.
Fun and games; from HCI’s fictitious cyborg to the 
complexity of creativity and co-creating users
As already discussed, it is tempting to view games mechanically as rule-based – 
reward systems. But once the focus shifts to the quality of such rules as simple, 
open and therefore variable and flexible, their full potential for intense human 
engagement unfolds. Tom Chatfield’s investigation of fun in video games forms 
an important part of the research on the emotional complexity and intensity 
in the gaming experience. Chatfield starts by discussing func tio nal gaming 
aspects and concepts dear to HCI and UX designs’ heart: rule-based systems, 
simple inter actions and fre quent feedback, with added ‘visceral thrills’ for 
excitement. The novelty lies in the ways in which he ties them in with their 
expan sive anta gonists. Chatfield notes insightfully: ‘we are rule-loving crea tures 
and this love extends into play’,54 but essentially ‘emergent behaviours are central 
to video game theory’,55 as game play is closely related to disco ve ry, experi-
mentation and open-ended exploration.56 Similarly, sim ple inter actions are 
not linearly repeated facilitators of ‘ease of use’,57 but are central to emer gent 
beha viour. Vis ceral feedback (e.g. jaw dropping sounds and attractive images), 
albeit fun, cannot drive or sus tain engagement, because such repe ti tive short-
lived ‘kicks’ quickly flip plea sure into exhaustion. In stead of interpreting 
‘reality’ as realistic representations of perceptions, Chatfield points out that the 
most successful games are realistic in terms of the range of social inter actions 
they offer.58 Ultimately, he argues that pleasure in the context of gaming is 
closely inter twined with mea nin gful (inter)action beyond instant gratification 
or skill optimization: ‘[l]earning (…) is per haps the most vital [human] trait in 
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evolutionary terms’.59 Video games can feed this evolu tionary need by acting as 
‘lear ning engines’ for the kind of learning that occurs in the context of game 
play ing: active, iterative and experiential learning in a non-functional context 
with time set aside.60
Recent pub lications in learning sciences, a branch of cognitive science 
that focuses on education, support Chat field’s assertions about video games’ 
potential to facilitate active and experiential lear ning, their strong so cial and 
evolutionary standing, and the importance of non-functional context and 
the expanded time frame. Guy Clax ton, a professor at the learning science 
department in Bristol, offers an explanation for the relationship be tween evolu-
tionary history and a non-functional context: complex organisms, such as 
fish, can detect, register and make use of patterns, such as rock formations, to 
avoid the dangers they might face at low tide. The next step up is moving from 
passive pattern reception to active exploration through curio sity: rats as well as 
monkeys are proactive when it comes to interaction with their environment. 
‘Being recep tive, attentive and experimental’ are evolutionary functions built 
into the brain, and unless there are more pressing issues at hand, no further 
encouragement is needed.61 This means that once fed, rested and, when the 
survival is secured, complex organisms, including humans, will start to explore, 
experiment and play, circumstances and time permitting.
The neuroscientist Antonio Damasio shares Claxton’s perspective both in 
terms of his evolutionary approach and in perceiving emotions as active drivers 
of our behaviours (and not as simple re actions to stimuli). Damasio distin-
gui shes between emotions and feelings in order to discuss the com plex inter play 
be tween our non-conscious and conscious affects. Emotions are automatic 
actions of the body, some of which literally set the body into motion (as in the 
above-mentioned exploratory excursions). They range in scale from basic, in 
the case of reflexes, to, in complex organisms, high level emotions, such as joy, 
fear, shame and other, and spark into our consciousness as feelings, in particular 
to indicate needs or point at change. Indeed, Damasio’s widely accepted ‘somatic 
marker hypothesis’ illustrates crucial impact of emotions on cog ni tive pro cesses 
in efficient decision-making.62 More over, sole emo tional reasoning ‘can promote 
outcomes [i.e. actions] that could have been derived ra tio na lly’.63 In other words, 
non-conscious decision-making can lead to action that is per fectly reasonable, 
but derives from (the much faster) affective rather than conscious cognition. 
Last ly, we not only think, but also learn, uncon scious ly. Such implicit learning 
(i.e. intuitive and unstruc tured), Claxton notes, can be superior to explicit 
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learning (structured and rational learning) when it comes to dealing with 
complex patterns of contingency, such as puzzles, the Rubrik’s cube or gaming.64 
Sometimes implicit learning is the precursor to conscious knowledge; at other 
times it pro du ces tacit knowledge that stays in the un con scious.65 Either way, 
these explorations by neural and lear ning sciences esta bli sh cognition and 
learning as deeply intertwined conscious and non-conscious pro cesses, and 
experiential learning as an active process, driven by the inquisitive trait of our 
emotions.
It is now clear that the concept of the flow connects to lear ning in a complex 
and fundamental way: in mo ments of intense focus our rapid shifts of attention 
not only oscillate between conscious perception and cog nition, but also their 
non-conscious ‘shadows’, as Damasio calls them. Hence, the con cept of the flow 
works on a metaphorical level to describe an intense ly engaged ex peri ence, yet 
its plea sure or the effects of experiential learning it produces cannot be re duced 
to the successful feedback mechanism that clo ses the loop of self-orga nizing 
skill optimi za tion in auto telic, i.e. especially suitable, per sonalities. Instead, 
pleasure in this context opens up to include active exploration and learning of 
the new and to creativity. The me taphor and concept of the flow is helpful when 
it is connected to a dis torted sense of time that defies the Newtonian stop watch. 
It would exceed the scope of this chapter to discuss time from a qualitative 
perspective in terms of the ex peri enced time (where time flies or takes ages), 
but such time is, nevertheless, an important condition of creative experience. 
Time pressure, on the other hand, where efficiency becomes synonymous with 
‘as fast as possible’, channels the brain into the familiarity of repetition, where 
experimentation, exploratory learning, creativity and fun cease.
Active, iterative and experiential learning exceeds a Cartesian view of skill 
optimization on several accounts: it is a dynamic, embodied, emergent and 
creative experience, in which processes and goals are intimately connected. 
Goals here are not determined destinations; they evolve and thus become 
emergent properties them selves. James P. Gee, a linguist focusing on learning, 
identifies 36 lear ning prin ciples video ga ming teaches, and indeed ac tive 
learning tops his list, closely followed by situated meaning making, cri tical 
learning and collabo ration.66 These selected principles are indi ca tive of the 
three streams in relation to which his work can be situated: situ ated cognition, 
new media li te ra cy and implicit learning, as discussed above. The streams do 
not compete, but over lap and com plement each other. In the context of this 
chapter, situ a ted cog nition illustrates the contextual and creative nature of 
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(learning) experien ces; im pli cit lear ning adds to the emergent non-conscious 
per ception; cog nition and deci sion-making complement their tradi tio nally 
favoured conscious counterparts; and new media literacy focuses on the active, 
pro ductive and social aspects of gaming.
Gee’s active learning enriches the common notion of ‘learning by doing’ 
with the idea that people actively cre ate meaning by selecting interactions that 
are intimately connected to their phy si cal, so cial and temporal contexts. This 
situated perspective essentially defies the idea of learning by in struc tion and 
replaces it with an embodied account of learning. Damasio’s so ma tic marker 
theory asserts that bodily physio lo gi cal and cog ni tive processes in information 
processing are deeply intertwined, and emotions are crucial in driving efficient 
decision-making. John McCarthy and Peter Wright discuss embodied cognition 
in the context of HCI: in their account, the felt and embodied (or aesthe tic)67 
experience is ‘open and unfi na li za ble’, ‘a dynamic pro cess of be coming open to 
the future’,68 i.e. one that is fundamentally contextual and creative. Plea sure here 
is affilia ted with a fulfilling and meaningful aesthetic experience. Yet, al though 
ful filment signifies intense experiences that oscil late indivisibly between rules 
and uncer tain ty, plea sure and challenge, fun and frus tra tion, the creative power, 
disappointingly, does not exceed the realm of expe rience. Here, the crea tive 
potential of emotions is re duced to shaping our percep tions, choosing how to 
react and, conse quen tly, how to adapt. This take on evolutionary processes is 
reminiscent of the procrustean attempts of HCI in the 1980s to fit the user to 
the ma chine – then by instruction, now by reflexive adaptation.
Using Pine and Gilmore’s model of ‘experience realms’,69 one could say that 
Mc Car thy and Wright’s aesthetic experience stops at the educational realm, 
where participants actively ab sorb experiences, but does not reach out into 
escapist experiences,70 in which participants not only actively shape their 
experiences, but also their environment. The claim that the grea test potential 
for active and involved partici pation lies in the con text of networked online 
communities and gaming71 is echoed in Jane McGonigal’s argument. For her, 
since the ‘reality is broken’ (where reality consists of unin spi ring listless chores), 
there is a ‘mass exodus’ of those escaping into alternative (i.e. game) spaces, 
as they offer what we crave: en gaged, fulfilling and blissful productivity.72 Gee 
claims that ac tive lear ning in ga ming is always joined by critical learning, a 
concept that suggests that we not only under stand systems, apply rules and 
creatively produce action within constraints, but we are also com pe tent enough 
to cri ti que and ma ni pulate the meta-levels of the systems’ design grammars.73 
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Design gram mars consist of in ter nal (e.g. rules, structures) and external (e.g. 
social practices, jargon) struc tures, both of which are com posed of tangible 
and intangible components. Examples for such critical and social prac tices 
in gaming are plentiful and range from developing a variety of strategies to 
over come chal len ges, such as glitches and bugs, to reaching out into the social 
space by reading or down loading cheats, patches and mo di fying (modding) 
games. Modding is an accepted and commer cial ly en couraged form of collabo-
rative hacking, in which peer produced hacks can be shared, down loaded 
and installed. Some companies offer built-in modding tools, while others 
provide source codes or code pieces (magic armour or sexy clothing for female 
characters in role games are popular choices).
Game production companies not only endorse players’ individual creativity, 
but treat it as a source of inno vation to be employed during production 
processes. In other words, they create a space for collabo rative innovation which 
involves both players and designers. Beta tes ting is exten sive and commonly 
open to the game commu nity, not only to detect faults or test ro bust ness, 
but to ignite and harvest players’ critique and innovative ideas. Blizzard, the 
company behind World of Warcraft,74 openly cultivates this prac tice as part of 
its inno vation strategy, relying on a large-scale collaborative process as tens of 
thousands of their subscribers partici pate in beta ga ming .75 Blizzard executives 
are clear that this policy is not unproblematic and can pro duce frictions (third 
party comments sometimes challenge game developers). Yet, these ten sions 
highlight the potential of users’ creativity: an experi men tal study demonstrated 
that partici pating users not only generated more original ideas than expert desig
ners, but also assessed innovative ideas differen tly from the com pany.76 Apart 
from challenging the notion of crea tivity as a property belonging to expert desig
ners, such participatory design spaces can act as examples of open and working 
collaborative ex peri ences that engage players intensely through their creativity.
Given the above, Jenkins’ stance becomes clearer: Jenkins claimed that 
focusing on the more obvious aspects of fun in gaming experiences ignored the 
wider conse quences of a newly developing wider ‘media literacy’ – ‘a cultu ral 
model of a digi tally active, participative, collaborative and distributed working 
youth culture’.77 Participants and consumers have developed not only into 
discer ning recipients, but also competent co-creators. Even in 2005, 60 per cent 
of American teens could be considered media crea tors.78 They not only produced 
audiovisual digital media, mash-ups or mods, but also used networked media 
to run campaigns, organize events or test innovative business models. Jenkins 
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is very clear that his primary focus is not on the technical aspect of gaming, but 
the cul tural implications this practice generates, and in particular new forms of 
collaboration and creativity: ‘interactivity is a property of the technical; while 
participation is a property of culture’.79
Following from the above, it can be stated that games are not only appro-
priated to convey conventional teaching material, but deconstructed to arrive at 
new teaching models and principles that promote critical enquiry and partici-
pative and creative cultural practices. For HCI and UX, ex panding the single 
dimen sion of fun into the multiple facets of engage ment offers an oppor tunity 
to en gage both with the challenges users face as they create and change digital 
culture, and the challenges and changes that these new media-literate user 
groups bring about.
Conclusion
The theme of science fiction used in this chapter serves both as a critique 
of the instrumental and rationalistic modelling of the human in HCI and a 
metaphor to illustrate a genuine belief that a playful exchange between science, 
technology and culture can become an exciting productive space, oriented 
towards innovation. Science fiction also deems the cybernetic dream of self-
organization to be fictitious, as cybernetics regards happiness as an equilibrium. 
Instead, the metaphor I use aligns fun with the complexities of unpre dictably 
and change. A richer understanding of the human can be achieved by drawing 
upon its evolutionary origins as they depict human species as complex and 
social organisms, driven to play, creativity and innovation. Looking at gaming 
shifts the focus in new media interaction from the mechanics of its production 
to the cultures it is producing. In turn, using fun could support the strands of 
HCI and UX that are oriented at first wave cybernetics in reconsidering their 
inherited reductive understanding of the scientific method and opening up to 
richer and more complex models.
Dealing with fun helps support the develop ment of a richer model of 
engage ment. Con cep tually, it challenges ratio na listic assump tions that creative 
thought is a sole property of logical and conscious processes. For HCI/UX 
practice, drawing upon fun’s fickle potential of distraction leads to work on a 
multi faceted engagement model where options range from light-hearted and 
pleasant to intense, creative and active engage ment. An ex pan ded vocabulary 
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should be used to support dis cussions of revised and enriched ideas of fun, 
pleasure, creativity, learning, surprise and exploration. Understanding emotions 
as active and driving forces and taking into account the evo lutio na ry frame work 
posing creativity as an evolutionary force encourages the adjustment of HCI 
and UX practices to wards the collabo rative design pro cess of emer ging partici-
pa tory cultures. In addition, drawing upon game studies shows that the engaged 
experi ence does not only morph binary satisfaction into a qualita tively rich 
enga gement, but also makes it become intertwined with learna bi lity, a tradi-
tional key usability factor in interaction design.
Fun, in turn, emerges from the above as a multifaceted thing: connected to 
pleasure, emotion, distraction, absorption and obsession, unexpectedness and 
exhaustion, experiential learning and creativity, it resists dualisms and check-
lists and feeds upon the complexity of distributed experiences.
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A Fun Aesthetic and Art
Annet Dekker
Introduction
The neon sculpture HAHA HIHI (1993) adds a refreshing note to the cacophony 
of advertising signs and tacky shops in Schiphol airport. HAHA HIHI is a 
chandelier by John Körmeling and instead of using candles it shows the words 
‘HA’ and ‘HI’ in bright neon colours. Körmeling has been called an architect, 
a visual artist, an inventor and a freethinker. The range of his work is equally 
diverse: light sculptures, comic strip-like drawings with visual and verbal 
witticisms, sketches of viable and imaginary structures, models and uncon-
ventional solutions to spatial planning problems (such as Happy Street for the 
World Expo 2010 in Shanghai). Körmeling is at his best in the public space and 
urban planning areas. His unique working style and surprising perspective on 
everyday things convey the relativistic humour that emanates from his works. 
Körmeling exposes the absurdity and banality of everyday life by means of 
rapid associations. He makes complex citations understandable and simple 
facts grotesque. HAHA HIHI laughs at the people who move like ants through 
the airport. At the same time it encourages people to pause and reflect on their 
environment and their behaviour in the building. Evoking a smile or a frown 
even if just for a moment, Körmeling’s works are simple yet rigorous, and his 
tactics are always friendly.
In another location, on deserted landfills in Berlin, near rubbish bins, 
garbage bags and refuse, computer screens suddenly flicker into life. The old, 
grey and now clunky looking cathode ray tube (CRT) screens show net art 
works: C.R.E.A.M. (2010) by Evan Roth, therevolvinginternet.com (2010) by 
Constant Dullaart, Super Mario Clouds (2002) by Cory Arcangel and, the 
oldest of the quartet, 404 (1997) by JODI. This is Aram Bartholl’s Highscreen 
(2011), a public intervention, in which he revived computer screens that had 
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been dumped in Berlin’s wastelands. Bartholl is well known for his projects 
and performances, which try to interestingly displace phenomena of the digital 
world into the physical environments alien to them. Although it is generally 
acknowledged that digital structures undergird and define the running of 
society in ways that make the distinctions between the digital and the offline 
obsolete, the shift between the digital and the physical material unfolding in its 
functions in relation to many other histories, practices, tendencies and habits 
may be seen as a conflictual, revealing rupture. From this perspective, Bartholl’s 
main interest is in how digital communication and algorithms construct and 
change the physical space and vice versa, especially if one alienates the digital 
by imbuing it into a material other than the one of zeroes and ones. Works such 
as Speech Bubble (2007), in which volunteers with a large, speech text balloon 
on a stick trail people, or Tweet Bubble Series (2009), featuring Twitter texts that 
can be attached to a shirt, emphasize the limitations of the overt publicness that 
is prevalent on the internet, but looks absurd if the utterances are presented 
as physical objects wrapped around human bodies. With these works Bartholl 
shows how the digital and physical worlds can be seen as disconnected and how 
translations from one to the other lead to estrangement – unless you are in the 
game.
Unlike Bartholl’s previous works, Highscreen (2011) is less playful and acts 
as a cautious investigation of the ways in which computation becomes core to 
our lives.1 Although it still thrives on incongruence, Highscreen is also more 
subtle. The computer screens are old and have been discarded, but it is not just 
the plastic and metal that is thrown out, the art that goes with it is also left in 
the gutter. Some might consider it ironic that artworks that were never properly 
valorized by any official art institution end up as waste, materializing the 
metaphor, to be further destroyed forever. The work could be seen as just that: 
an act of irony, or perhaps dark humour. But the blinking 404 error message on 
one of the CRT screens will look familiar to many as the standard response code 
indicating that a website could not be found, and some people will be able to 
identify it as a work by JODI, the artist duo known for the subversive tweaking 
of software and exploration of the computer’s back-end. As such I would like to 
argue that for those who recognize the works on the screens, Highscreen moves 
from being ironic to becoming fun. What is fun then and in which ways is it 
more complex and multilayered than humour and irony? A more interesting 
question, perhaps, would be to see if fun is part of an aesthetic method, or has 
aesthetics of its own? Are these examples merely clever uses of a critical strategy, 
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or do they reflect a broader cultural sensibility that is lost on those who are not 
‘in the game’? Does such sensibility only become manifest in the complete and 
finalized work as an ‘effect’, or could fun also be seen as characteristic of the 
artistic practice, the process itself?
An aesthetics of fun
When writing about fun, one has to treat humour cautiously. A subject of many 
investigations, the question of humour goes back a long way.2 The notion of fun 
that I would like to explore does not exclude humour, the joke or playfulness; 
however, it does not stop there. What I am looking for is the kind of fun that 
reflects on and analyses processes to provide insights and inspire new thoughts. 
Fun in this sense relates to the fun of making and sharing. It is the fun that takes 
place processually and practically, as well as conceptually to arrive at startling 
events, projects and practices. The aesthetics of fun resides in such processes, 
whether prepared or accidental, spatial or code-based, terminal or open-ended, 
across scales, strata and time.
The installation HIHI HAHA first prompts an exploration of the aesthetic 
of fun by highlighting Körmeling’s interest in presenting work in places 
where people are not prepared for controversies, or where they can be taken 
by surprise. Although he is commenting on society, he is not criticizing the 
qualities of the material he uses or the relationships such material creates, nor 
is he opening up the production process for others to use or learn from. What 
matters for Körmeling is how the final presentation of the work functions in 
its context, which can be and often is funny. However, this is only one aspect 
of the aesthetics of fun. It is the repetitiveness and perseverance of Körmeling’s 
approach, which can be seen in other works such as Happy Street or Rotating 
House (2008) (a freestanding Formica house rotating on a roundabout), that the 
strategy fully reveals itself. He seems primarily interested in staging confronta-
tions between the expected and the grotesque through shock. Employing this 
as a method of presentation and performance, as well as perception, Highscreen 
seems to come slightly closer to what can be discussed as aesthetics of fun. 
To unpack this further I will analyse the works that are presented as part of 
Highscreen to see how they convey an aesthetic of fun.
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404
JODI, the Dutch/Belgium duo, achieved fame in the mid-1990s and continued to 
produce work that is hated, loved and misunderstood. 404 is a very good example 
of such work. The website opens to display a page titled %20Wrong and the ‘404 
message’ in the webpage, creating a short-lived panic in casual netsurfers, who can 
turn away, but those more familiar with net art projects can look for entrances. Some 
random clicking reveals that each of the numbers in ‘404’ leads to new screens: 
unread, reply and unsent. The sequence isn’t very promising. Nevertheless, using the 
reply option, Re: in the %20Unread page, will lead to a response being delivered – an 
encrypted version of the email that the visitor has just sent. What appears is a text 
without vowels, followed by a string of consonants and numbers that sometimes 
resemble words (the sht and fck are easily grasped). %20Unread relates to two things. 
On the one hand, it shows the act of censorship that is common on chat boards by 
using the same technology CGI (Common Gateway Interface). The CGI protocol 
returns the results to the web server in the form of a standard output, in this case 
without vowels and with additional underlying text. On the other hand, the output 
of the CGI can be seen as an act of Dadaist or abstract poetry.
Much as Dadaist, Constructivist and Futurist poetry was about liber-
ating fonts and language from their respective constraints, so Piet Mondrian 
Figure 11.1 Aram Bartholl, Highscreen [JODI] (2011) 
Source Photo by Aram Bartholl
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advocated a pure ‘plasticism’, stating that ‘Music tends toward the liberation of 
sound, literature toward the liberation of word’.3 Now programming is heading 
towards the liberation of computation. JODI release software and create 
openings through which it can pass on its ‘way to freedom’.4 Rhythm, syntax 
and letterforms were central to ‘plasticism’, which used punctuation marks 
and unusual text layouts to indicate how the text should be read or, better, 
voiced. Typography became an active visual instrument that emphasized form, 
meaning or sound. Similar strategies can be found in the work by JODI, where 
punctuation marks lose their neutrality and start speaking themselves. JODI’s 
abstract visualizations of code and use of punctuation comes very close to 
the Typo-plastieken (1925) of Pietro (de) Saga. Pietro (de) Saga, pseudonym 
of Stefi Kiesler, made several Typo-plastieken and Dactyloplastiek (1925) by 
repeatedly typing letters over each other to create visual forms. She sublimated 
the meaning of a letter to its abstract, visual image.5 Her works, as much as 
JODI’s works, can be appreciated best in conjunction with the Concrete poetry 
of the 1950s. Concrete poetry focused on language primarily as a material; 
concerned ‘less [with] an understanding of meaning than an understanding 
of arrangements’.6 JODI are also focused on computational arrangements, the 
structures of communication that perform at different levels and on extracting 
the meaning from non-significatory material, the processual performances of 
code.
JODI have a keen interest in protocols and re-use them in open ways. The 
protocol of 404 is the CGI, which is the focal point of the work and its struc-
turing framework. The second page of the work %20Reply displays the internet 
protocol address (IP address) of all the entries that have been made against a 
black backdrop. Certainly, nothing is just what it seems either: the text typed by 
the user appears beside its IP address, also in black. Here people can read all the 
entries that were made, though only if they are quick as the screen reloads after 
a few seconds to display the first page. Anonymity is cast aside by showing the 
IP address in bright green.
The final page %20Unsent is a repetition of the text that was typed in ‘reply’, 
but this time the vowels become visible: these are the remnants of what was 
not sent before. Below the text is an abstract image, concrete poetry, where 
little running rabbits (which link to the main page), numerals and punctuation 
marks create a visual that is recognizable, although meaningless. The meaning 
of 404 not found can only be understood by taking into account its network 
and software contexts. 404 works the protocol into the absurd. In the end, the 
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magician’s rabbit runs back, leaving the user confused, enacting and re-enacting 
the ridiculousness and exposure of browsing, emailing, digital work and leisure.
JODI’s work reflects on the structures and agreements that construct compu-
tational networks; and it is through the absurd that the political and aesthetic 
emerges out of code, software gestures, language and digital habits. JODI poke 
around, deleting brackets from markup language, unravelling the material. The 
aesthetic of fun here is twofold, appearing in JODI’s intentional methodological 
(ab)use of the material, which in its working fortifies the frustration of using 
and cruel pleasure of dispatching a perfect machine.
Super Mario Clouds
Another computer screen displays bitmapped white clouds that are endlessly 
inching across a blue sky. The work is Super Mario Clouds (2002) and it is one of 
Cory Arcangel’s early works. From the start of his career he has shown an interest 
in low-key techniques, outmoded computer games and early electronics. Super 
Mario Clouds is based on the legendary Super Mario Bros game released in 1985 
Figure 11.2 Aram Bartholl, Highscreen [Cory Arcangel] (2011) 
Source Photo by Aram Bartholl
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by Nintendo. Arcangel hacked the game and modified it so that the only visible 
elements are the blue sky and the white clouds moving across the screen. The 
main protagonist, Mario, all the obstacles and the landscape have been removed. 
Does this make the work fun? It might evoke a smile or a frown in people recog-
nizing the original game, who may wonder if it is an act of rebellion against the 
violence, or competitiveness of gaming, or ‘just a joke’. We can draw some other 
characteristics of the fun aesthetic out of it.
In 2002 Arcangel wrote the program, burned it on a chip, hacked an old 
Nintendo game cartridge, de-soldered one of the Nintendo graphics chips in 
the cartridge and soldered his new chip in its place. Because at the time it was 
not yet possible to put the video online, he made a gif that was distributed with 
a tutorial (complemented with humorous and informative comments) that 
explained his motives for making the work and included the source code behind 
the work as well as the instructions on how to construct the object.
In 2004, two years after the release, Arcangel made a short instructional 
video that explained, step by step, the creation of the work. The Making of Super 
Mario Clouds is made as an amateur video without slick graphics, camerawork 
or soundtrack. It merely shows Arcangel in his apartment making a cartridge; 
his intention, as he explains, was to give viewers ‘a feel for the process, in all 
its gloriously boring true detail’.7 The project was in line with projects that 
various members of the Beige [Programming Ensemble] were doing. Beige 
described themselves as an electronic music recording company and computer 
programming ensemble. Arcangel joined the Beige collective in the late 1990s.8 
Their concern was to create a wider acceptance of media art and democ-
ratize computer hardware and software. Moreover, they critiqued the stylized, 
restricted and pre-determined parameters of the machines that were shaping 
the ‘hyper-technologized’ world. Their philosophy was ‘Intentional Computing’, 
‘work in which the artist demonstrates a complete understanding of the 
machine he/she is composing on [from the CHIP to the display]’.9 Through 
hacking and modifying existing hardware and software they tried to stretch the 
allowances of the possible. In other words, they wanted to re-tune the unison in 
which creating artwork performs together with the tool or medium being used. 
It was about tunnelling into the computer and starting from the inside.
This approach does not significantly differ from that of JODI: both try to 
destabilize standardized and habitual environments produced by dominant, 
commercial computational systems. However, Arcangel’s main focus is on form 
and colour (and, in his more recent work, rhythm). Whereas JODI reveal code 
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as part of the work, Arcangel supplements the projects with tutorials and video 
documentaries detailing the creation and functioning of the work. However, the 
work itself, in its minimalist style, functions better than JODI’s as a traditional 
work of art. Arcangel brings something ‘human’ to the computer by ensuring 
that the work is never too slick and always has an ironic twist that many people 
will recognize. This could be seen as a populist approach. Whereas JODI take 
the ‘humanity’ out of the computer, making it ‘fun’ for those immersed in the 
processes constructing the computational functionality, Arcangel facilitates 
Figure 11.3 Aram Bartholl, Highscreen [Evan Roth] (2011) 
Source Photo by Aram Bartholl
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the work for the viewer. JODI double and triple frustration, whereas Arcangel 
works in the line of pop art and minimalism. When the art world met JODI, it 
did not know how to react, but when it saw Arcangel’s work, it recognized the 
‘fun’ and abstraction reminiscent of Andy Warhol.
But there is a more significant difference between the two artists, which 
concerns the experiencing of the work and the participation of their audience. 
JODI’s work can be confusing, but although Arcangel presents his work as open 
and free to use, presumably not many people followed his instructions. Arcangel 
does not sound optimistic himself recalling that the only reaction Beige received 
upon the release of their music album The 8-Bit Construction Set (2000), which 
contains programs, was from ‘a couple of kids from the Netherlands, and they 
were like “cool!” – but that’s about it. (...) There are only about five people in the 
world who have really ever done that [loading the cassette on to a computer]’.10 
Do people take part by witnessing, watching, looking or relaying?11 It can also 
be argued that JODI do not offer their audience the pleasure of looking at a 
nice image, but it is through actively engaging with their artwork, and doing 
the work of linking it with the computational environment in which it thrives 
and on which it comments, that an appreciation can emerge – an instructional 
exercise in its own right.
It is the exploration and the experience of the manual gesture – the doing 
it yourself – that resonates here. These processes are ‘forced’ by JODI, while 
Arcangel leaves it to the whims of the visitor. Both, though differently, employ 
the fun of working, touching, tinkering with something: the Do It Yourself 
(DIY) fun. The DIY attitude, facilitated by the Web, has given rise to a number 
of art initiatives that manifest themselves through online platforms. One person 
behind such an initiative is Evan Roth, co-founder of F.A.T. Lab, the Free Art 
and Technology Lab, and the author of the third work of Highscreen, C.R.E.A.M. 
(Cache Rules Everything Around Me).
C.R.E.A.M. (Cache Rules Everything Around Me)
C.R.E.A.M. by Evan Roth is a hypnotic collage of hundreds of graphics inter-
change formats (GIFs) found on the internet. Mashed together in a nine-minute 
video clip, they portray the internet at a particular moment in time. Single, 
animated GIFs often function as memes, cultural artifacts that spread virally 
on the networks. The term ‘meme’ was suggested by Richard Dawkins in the 
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The Selfish Gene (1976)11 to signify a unit of cultural information spreading and 
surviving analogously to a gene.12 In the tradition of memetics, Blackmore argues 
that beliefs and ideas are replicators, memes, which are copied from person to 
person and define people’s behaviour.13 She notes that technically everything 
on the internet can be seen as a meme, as the information circulating around is 
variable, selected and copied.14 The notion of the meme as a replicator is core to 
Roth’s practice and can be usefully explored in relation to the aesthetics of fun.
Roth started working as an artist around the same time as Arcangel and has 
also been involved in working in collaborative environments. He co-founded 
F.A.T. Lab, with James Powderly in 2007.15 It is impossible to offer a single 
definition of the lab; generally it is thought to be an ongoing experiment, 
conducted by artists, engineers, scientists, lawyers and musicians alike, that 
facilitates innovation, collaboration and critique. In the early years F.A.T. 
Lab was mostly visible in the United States and formed around a group of 
research fellows, artists in residence or others affiliated with Eyebeam Art and 
Technology Center in New York. The name F.A.T. Lab is reminiscent of E.A.T., 
the non-profit organization Experiments in Art and Technology16 that was 
launched in 1966 during the organization of 9 Evenings: Theatre and Engineering, 
a series of performances uniting artists and engineers.17 In an attempt to make 
people more active in the becoming of the technologically defined society, 
E.A.T. tried to bridge the gap between disciplines and specializations. Although 
this agenda is important to F.A.T. Lab, their approach centres on the specific 
usages of technology in the public domain by engaging with software and the 
questions of openness.
Whereas E.A.T. focused on the creation of large technological performances 
and installations, showcased in the design for the Pepsi Pavilion at the Expo 
’70, and resulting in a remarkable spectacle of artistic and engineering wizardry, 
F.A.T. Lab explores their material and presentational platforms to produce 
Firefox add-ons, plug-ins, silly objects or political GIFs. What can be read as a 
footnote to changes brought about by time, the emergence of software and the 
further re-configuration of the disciplinary formations, copyright, control and 
ownership arrangements becomes core to F.A.T. method. F.A.T. Lab examines 
the Web and takes advantage of the available material, writing small scripts and 
programs to retrieve and remix information. F.A.T. tweaks existing data and 
tools to comment on the way the Web is governed and can be used. As such it is 
the fun of ‘slight touch’ and sharing that becomes another aspect of the aesthetic 
of fun.
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The slight touch does not indicate that the political ideas of F.A.T. Lab are 
naive. F.A.T. has a strong position on the use and support of free and open 
source software. Code written by F.A.T. is open for others to use, is documented 
and improved upon during lectures and workshops. In fact, all the group’s 
processes and artworks become open and as such rely on other people’s input, as 
in open-source project development.18 Theo Watson, one of the members, says:
[it] is interesting to see this process being applied to Internet art, experimental 
projects and web memes. It is like open source project development but for 
those people more interested in pop culture and art than in programming 
software tools. It is open source for the masses.19
The ‘lightness’ of their approach also becomes manifest here, where the political 
starts acting virally. It is propagated and practised through memes (qualitative 
meme modulation)20 and as such can be seen as a tactical way of moving 
through mass and corporate culture.
It is through the active use of the meme as a method that F.A.T. Lab adds 
another dimension to the aesthetics of fun. Similarly to the above-mentioned 
group Beige, F.A.T. Lab uses existing amateur material that is remixed, adapted 
or merely re-contextualized. The result is always light hearted and, above all, 
fun. This is the fun of making, the fun of idiocy21 and nonsense that acts by 
topping the noise. The nature of memes as replicators is taken as a starting 
point and radically exploited. Using social networking platforms, F.A.T. Lab 
infiltrates the Web by being ‘dedicated to enriching the public domain one 
mutha-fuckin LOL at a time’.22 They achieve this by creating simple 2D glasses 
to escape the 3D hype or setting up a Speed Project site with a special widget to 
track time. The website demonstrates how to do as much as possible in under 
eight hours (a normal office working day), actively engaging in the mechanics 
of acceleration. Furthermore, members of F.A.T. try to mould the behaviour on 
online platforms by inviting others to comment and make their own additions, 
which can all become an art project in its own right. One such example is White 
Glove Tracking by Roth and Ben Engebreth that started in 2007. For this project 
they asked internet users to help isolate Michael Jackson’s white glove in the 
performance of Billy Jean. Rather than writing unnecessarily complex code to 
find the glove in every frame of the video (10,060 frames in total), they asked 
the audience to simply click and drag a box around the glove in one frame and 
upload it to their site. The ridiculous task of isolating the white glove allowed 
the data collection process to become fun and viral. The data set was released 
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as a text file as well as a Processing and Open Frameworks project for others to 
use. Although it can be argued that the use of memes and silliness is a strategy, 
a formula or a method, as with Körmeling, functioning by conspicuously 
tracking down what is available on the Web both technically and culturally and 
reclaiming it for their purposes, here idiocy and nonsense forcefully enter the 
aesthetics of fun.
therevolvinginternet.com
The Revolving Internet (2010) by Constant Dullaart engages the similar fun of 
idiocy and nonsense. The work is a clever trick, which places Google’s homepage 
in an iframe with Javascript changing the document object model (DOM) 
values, which causes the page to rotate on the screen. The work functions well 
in Highscreen where among the rubbish on the side of the road one can see the 
Google search engine interface tumbling around as if twisted by a whirlwind 
from a passing truck or bike. It is also a good example of Dullaart’s practice. His 
method lies in identifying recurring themes and motives of the computational 
practice and culture and re-contextualizing, alienating them.
Figure 11.4 Aram Bartholl, Highscreen [Constant Dullaart] (2011)
Source Photo by Aram Bartholl
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Often, Dullaart transforms banal images or tiresome website interfaces just 
enough to highlight some of their inherent ‘strangeness’. For instance, he has 
a collection of links to domain names on sale that no one would buy. Linked 
together by their shared status of semi-existence, they form the rubbish dump of 
the internet. In his Delicious account, Dullaart labels the poetic domain names, 
like www.baddomainname.com and www.hopeless.org as ‘ready mades’. His 
fascination goes further to dwell on the design of the ‘default settings’ of these 
sites. His ‘ready mades’ are, therefore, a reflection on the omnipresent stock 
photography and insipid typefaces.
With his practice Dullaart follows in the footsteps of previous net artists who 
elevated the formal aesthetic or unfrequented corners of the Web into art.23 By 
deconstructing the mundane in a playful, visual way Dullaart engages with 
contemporary internet culture indiscriminately. While being playful, his works 
also celebrate a certain coarseness that is practised on the networks and inverted 
to be thrown back at the audience.24 Although employing a methodology of 
fun that draws upon the absurd, the banal and the nonsensical, similarly to 
the F.A.T. Lab, it is primarily the way in which Dullaart positions himself in 
the landscape of the Web where the aesthetics of fun is most pronounced: as a 
member of surf-clubs. Surf clubs are the early twenty-first century’s answer to 
the rise of the Web 2.0. Whereas the earlier internet generation communicated 
mainly through listserv, using mailing lists, the ‘digital natives’ set up their own 
clubs.25 This new generation of artists uses devices such as continuous postings, 
real-time involvement and commenting on existing social network platforms, 
such as YouTube, Flickr or Facebook, while trying to define and maintain a 
shared aesthetic and a group identity. Surf clubs often use the blog format. Nasty 
Nets, Supercentral and Loshadka are small ‘gathering’ sites to which members 
upload found material, while others can comment, either textually or with 
images or video. Special software was written to simplify the upload of material, 
but the generic comment also functions as an essential component, becoming 
an aesthetic exploratory tool. The chronologically arranged commentaries form 
larger compositions or ‘lists’ of images.26 The artworks that arise from these 
collective processes are situated in continuum with other works, references and 
commentaries.
Constant Dullaart, as contributor to several surf clubs, emphasizes the shared 
and collective experience of this iterative process that exhibits an aesthetic of 
fun. It becomes evident in his YouTube series (You Tube as a Subject, 2008), 
in which he works with the icons that appear embedded in YouTube videos. 
246 Fun and Software
Positioned against the black background of a loading YouTube video, the image 
of a play button trembles as if in a sudden earthquake, bouncing from side to 
side, changing colours and strobbing like a mini disco lightshow, falling down 
off the screen, and finally fading into a blur. Keeping in line with the spirit of the 
comment and the pressure to be quick, soon after Dullaart uploaded his series, 
Ben Coonley responded with a new series, this time taking the dots that signal the 
loading time of a video as his subject. In turn, for an exhibition in 2009, Dullaart 
versioned this visual discussion by creating a physical copy of the loading dots, 
You Tube as a Sculpture.27 This time eight Styrofoam balls were hung in a circle 
against a black background, lit one after the other by eight spotlights and a 
simple disco light mixer. While the visitors were given the feeling of entering a 
loading YouTube video, they also started filming the balls and uploaded them 
to YouTube, thus, according to Dullaart, ‘completing the circle of production 
and reproduction’.28 The engagement first occurs online, then offline and returns 
again to the servers: ‘The success of the sculpture meant that audience members 
documented the sculpture and finally became the uploading medium for my 
participation in the visual discussion set in motion by You Tube as a Subject a 
few years earlier’.29 This circulatory human–machine process is fun found in the 
making across scales and by varying actors, who try to outwit each other, become 
the most original, but also by responding to each other and doing things together.
The comments were one of the biggest compliments I have received in my life. I 
felt like I really needed to make the videos and upload them before someone else 
did. But when the comments came into my inbox late at night, all seven of them 
one after another, notifying me of the responses made by Ben Coonley, I knew I 
had hit a nerve. I laughed myself to sleep. It was a great surprise.30
The value and meaning of surf art relies solely on the distributive qualities – the 
network of other people’s content and the means of its production and distri-
bution.31 It is in engaging with the material and the networks and employing 
and exploiting the structures such as memes that the art of surf club activity is 
constituted.
The most encouraging aspect of surf art is its distributive quality, the way in 
which it offers a new working practice, signalling a new aesthetics – one that 
is grounded in fun. Such fun has consequences for notions of authenticity and 
authorship.32 Dullaart states:
The authenticity and authorship of the original seems to be less clear when a 
response or another version of the original start to co-exist, but the general 
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impact of the shared idea becomes larger. The online tradition of linking back to 
the origin of the idea (the original post or video) is an important one, of course, 
but sometimes the response is more valuable than the original.33
These artists deal with iteration, versioning and repetition as part of a distributed 
practice. The quest for originality is still important, but is achieved in a different 
way, for example, by being the first to comment with a brilliant and funny 
idea or being reblogged. Such authorial recognition is often monitored by 
the larger group.34 Commenting also becomes a mechanism for establishing 
individuality, as participants combine shared meanings and tweak the shared 
parameters of the group in idiosyncratic ways. The structure of gaining and 
evaluating acknowledgement and esteem becomes rested within the devices of 
social media.35 Here, the aesthetics of fun turns into an aesthetic of (gaining and 
loosing) control.
A fun aesthetics
All the projects of Highscreen work with the aesthetics of fun. It ranges from, but 
is not limited to, fun as a methodology of aesthetic engagement with the compu-
tational systems that attempts to draw out of them the unexpected, paradoxical, 
absurd and annoying, as in the case of JODI, or the pleasure of the DIY as with 
Arcangel. The fun of surf clubs thrives on utilizing or parasitizing upon the 
software gestures, interaction devices and computational habits of social media 
and other computational structures, allowing artistic strategies to be built that 
are constructed on radical relationality. Such relationality is productive of and 
takes into account idiocy and nonsense, memes and virality, where fun becomes 
a form of engagement with internet cultures, as in F.A.T. Lab projects.
A fun aesthetics also thrives on free and open-source software approaches, as 
otherwise material cannot be shared, changed and appropriated. This does not 
mean that these works cannot be found on commercial platforms and networks. 
For some practitioners, those are the places par excellence, where the image of 
purity and perfection that has attached itself to computer interfaces, software 
and computational networks can be uncovered and explored. All of the above 
draw on ridiculousness, frustration, alienation, lightness and estrangement. To 
summarize, a fun aesthetics can be seen as methodological, procedural, crafty, 
relational, cultural and conceptual. It does not shy away from the political or 
social concerns and advocates forms of openness that allow for various kinds 
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of intervention, circulation and re-use. A fun aesthetics focuses on the inves-
tigation of the medium of computation and the internet, on the spaces and 
practices that are constantly changing and permanently moving. Fun, thus, 
enjoys a processual dynamics, both as a computational aesthetic form and as a 
collective practice.
There is much more to be said about the new generation of internet artists 
with regard to their aesthetics, their work with computational media and links 
to the earlier generation of internet artists and contemporary art in general. It is 
remarkable how well the second generation has found its way into art galleries 
and museum exhibitions. For building a proper understanding of this work, 
art critics and curators will have to move beyond conventional art aesthetics, 
which is too often about the form and look of a work, and start looking at how 
the project acts.36 This means opening up to a wider social, economic, political 
and computational arena in complex ways. This also raises another question: 
can distributed, processual and software-based works be exhibited at all? The 
vernacular style and technique may remain untouched, but the energy, surprise, 
agony and illusion will disappear. What remains is just a form of aesthetics, 
without fun.
The presentation of Highscreen reminds us of the carelessness with which 
significant artworks are treated. Canonical artworks are dumped, soon to be 
forgotten. This is a humorous gesture, albeit with a very serious undertone. 
Revisiting older websites in the course of this chapter makes it abundantly clear 
how many of the links are now dead. Perhaps fun does not last forever, but it 
certainly shows its face when least expected, be it online or in the gutter. Trying 
to find it means fumbling round in the dark.
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Material Imagination : On the Avant-gardes, 
Time and Computation
Olga Goriunova
The future is our only goal.
Varvara Stepanova and Alexander Rodchenko, Slogan from the 
newspaper Art of the Commune
Those who flick through the pages of old magazines for long enough know 
that each epoch had its own future, similar to the ‘Future in the Past’ 
of English grammar: as if the people of the past extend themselves into 
infinitude along a straight line, drawn through their own time at a tangent 
to eternity. Such a future never comes, because humankind walks into the 
future along a complex and barely comprehensible trajectory …[in these 
magazines] people from yesterday’s tomorrow … stand in their pumped up 
space suits next to the chubby rockets, and above them an arrow of a space 
shuttle blasting off glides in the pale zenith – a painfully beautiful Noon of 
humankind …
Victor Pelevin, ‘Soviet Requiem’, in Pineapple Water for the Beautiful Lady1
delay itself is the pure form of time in which before and after coexist.
Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition2
Introduction
This chapter explores the kinds of present time currently available and 
dominant as they are produced by the computational systems to be socially 
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and culturally lived and, vice versa, imagined by art and culture to become 
and enter the computational streams. Such present times necessitate specific 
forms of relationality between the past and the future, between computa-
tional processes and the avant-gardes, offering variable versions of the future. 
Re-configured enactments of the present in its relation to the past and to the 
future are analysed in this chapter through a close reading of some of the 
computational devices of digital signal processing. I then attempt to take a 
discussion of the avant-gardes beyond the discourse of Utopia. I am particu-
larly interested in the avant-garde as the provider of the multiplicities of the 
future, which I explore, among other examples, through some software art of 
the 1990s.
The starting point of the chapter is the sense of the loss of the future, the 
experience of the perpetual, expandable present. This kind of present results 
from changes in the mediation of time, and hence its construction, that have 
advanced beyond the ‘end of history’, and whose effects can be seen and are 
indeed understood through politics, analysis of financial instruments and 
trading algorithms or sociological methodologies.
For instance, Eyal Weizman maintains that there is a shift from the politics 
of justice to the politics of compassion, emitting ‘the culture of immediate 
and direct action …. a culture of emergency [in the now]’.3 ‘The specter of the 
worst [totalitarianism] shapes the politics of the present’, which then becomes a 
politics of the perpetual present, politics without a future.
‘When utopia seems dangerous, what remains is only the pre-emptive 
management of … risk’. 4 Here, the ‘perpetual economy of immanence’5 lacks 
the redemptive mechanism that is ‘in excess of all calculations’ as thought by 
the first theorizer of the least possible evil, St Augustine.6 In Weizman’s inter-
pretation of St Augustine, it can be maintained, it is the redemption that is the 
excess that used to provide a future.
Emma Uprichard explores the perpetual present as a ‘sticky time’ of the 
sociological imagination, which, through idiomatic methodological traps of 
computational methods and the abundance of digitally occurring, non-curated 
data, gets stuck in the present.7 She says:
The increased availability of real-time data sources increasingly means that 
‘to know’ becomes not so much about how to predict the future, but how to 
predict ‘now’, or better still, to know about now before now has happened. … 
[W]here the ‘past’ and ‘future’ increasingly become a matter of hours or days, 
and ultimately more like our present ‘present’, the present itself becomes more 
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and more plastic, to be stretched, manipulated, moulded and ultimately ‘casted’ 
by those who can access more of it in the supposed ‘now’.8
And further: ‘it is … possible to envisage a future of constant recursive presents, 
where we become stuck as we struggle to try to orientate ourselves according 
to redescriptions of the present as reconditioning the present’. Uprichard argues 
for becoming unstuck from a ‘constant series of “presents”’, from the plastic 
present, going beyond the ‘stickiness’ of time and temporality for a possibility 
of the futures to emerge.
The above are just two examples of the current conceptual unease in dealing 
with forms of time. Discussions of the avant-garde, on the other hand, have 
currently ceased their liveliness, as the avant-garde’s claims on the future are 
circumscribed to the utopian and, thus, considered failed and dismissed as 
illusory constructions belonging to a rational and dominating modernity with 
its Saint-Simonian will to progress. While Baudrillard, Virilio and Bifo, each 
from different positions, have claimed that the present had either speeded up or 
became illusory to the point that the future vanishes,9 such constructions call 
upon the conceptual power of both history, dealing with the past, and the avant-
garde, self-named to initiate the future.
Charity Scribner writes:
Until recently, utopian thought offered an alternative route away from implacable 
historical reality. Now, at the purported ‘end of history’ when time seems to 
pause in the eternal present, utopia veers into the longing for History itself … 
but also [the desire] to resuscitate the principle of hope that inspired much of 
the last century’s social and cultural production.10
Indeed, various futures offered by the avant-gardes may be understood more 
productively and with sufficient nuance if premised not on the concept of 
Utopia, and understood as primarily a political claim, ultimately linking the 
Reason of Enlightenment to the calculation of the Cold War, or the dreamworlds 
produced in the West and East alike, as Buck-Morss writes, under the guise of 
high modernism or industrial modernity and thus eternally undermined with 
the departure of the ‘faith into the modernizing process developed by the 
West’.11 The genre of Utopia linking Plato’s Republic, Thomas More’s Utopia and 
Chernyshevky’s What Is to Be Done? is much older than modernity itself and, 
beyond its importance for violent revolutions, is also profoundly connected to 
what Scribner, following Ernst Bloch’s three-volume oeuvre on Utopia, called a 
‘principle of hope’.
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In the same way that the discrediting of Reason does not halt thinking, 
connections between certain forms of the avant-garde, and especially the early 
Soviet avant-garde, with specific versions of Marxism, Hegelianism or the 
bleaker aspects of the Russian Revolution, must not obfuscate the recognition 
and recovery of the excessive, multimodal and luxurious reserve of potentiality 
offered by the avant-gardes. Buck-Morss specifically says, ‘catastrophic effects 
need to be criticized in the name of the …utopian hope … not as a rejection 
of it’.12
We could usefully regard the principle of hope as the operation of hope, 
therefore focusing on the process that makes the avant-gardes and the consti-
tution of the emergent futures. To distinguish the force of the avant-garde, itself 
a metaphenomenon not confined to art, from religion and post-secularism, 
sport or other spheres of activity, which Bloch considers when providing a 
comprehensive review of utopian thinking, I suggest calling the processes 
that sustain the avant-gardes and make them susceptible to the production 
of excessive plurality of the futures an operation of material imagination. The 
Russian word mechta means both dream and desire and harbours hope. The 
material imagination is not daydreaming, but a material work of imaginal 
production, that can lend itself to various kinds of capturing into amalgamative 
actualizations but whose potentiality is not used up by them.
The computational time of off-now
The avant-gardes used to be describable in terms of historical periods and 
conditions; they used to start and finish, and to recur. The concept of the avant-
garde, by the mere morphological construction of the word used to signify 
it, prescribes a spatial relationship to time stretched through the body of the 
onlooker.
The organization of time into forms of spatialization has been questioned by 
Bergson, a theme subsequently developed by Deleuze, arguing for a continuum 
of duration, especially when the actualization of the virtual is concerned.13 The 
chronological ordering of events of the duration of human life as intertwined 
with movement in space allowing for a different organization of a temporality 
has also been interestingly discussed by Haraway14 who follows Bakhtin in his 
concept of chronotope, or timespace.15 A chronotope, according to Bakhtin, 
organizes ‘real actuality’.16 The core to the chronotope is movement. Contrary 
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to an understanding of such movement as only that of the (human) body 
in space is a proposal by Adrian Mackenzie to regard algorithmic space and 
time through, for instance, the movement of ordering and sequencing, via 
‘code constructs such as loops’ and common data structures such as arrays.17 
Here, ‘algorithms organize informatic time’ and ‘enliven movements lifted 
out of everyday and existing social orderings’.18 The abstractions involved in 
the movement between computational input and output rely on topological 
transformation and re-ordering in time as ‘concentration or intensification of 
movements’.19
Computational time-space is a social form of time, but there is what 
Mackenzie calls the ‘crafting of computational time’, which attunes software in 
order for it to be synchronized with everyday time. Computational chronotopes 
thus exist within a social framing, but through attempts to ‘flow into everyday 
life’,20 through shifts, disjunctures and disconnections and, also, in the formation 
of topological strategies of continuity to align those different times.
Luciana Parisi writes about the urban design and topology of continuity in 
terms of ‘[anticipation of] the emergence of potential changes’21 in which an
‘[a]lgorithmic mode of planning defined by an extended apparatus of prediction 
[is] able not only to establish the condition of the present through the retrieval 
of the past data, but also... change these conditions according to data variations 
immediately retrieved from the environment.22
The predictive calculation of spatio-temporal emergence that Parisi analyses 
through focusing on the invariable function in computational planning is a 
route to understanding specific kinds of computational crafting of space-time, 
with detailed attention to the evolving structures of the real time and to the 
contingent temporalities, among others.
The technicity of time and spatio-temporality, rigorously commented upon by 
Mackenzie and Parisi,23 engenders a variety of technical mediations to generate 
ensembles which structure and construct lived time. The technical mediation of 
time here generates a regime ‘from which time and space unfold’.24 The compu-
tational mediation of time constituted in movements and operations afforded by 
delays, loops or predictive calculations flows into experienced time to produce 
new amalgams of time that structure lived reality by taking part in ensembles 
unfolding to produce it. Such an understanding of the production of lived 
reality draws upon a variety of scales: making new varieties of time available 
in a network of relationships between elements as artefacts (samples, pedals, 
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data structures, units, code constructs, software gestures); as processes (sorting 
and sequencing, ordering and buffering, calculating and predicting, producing, 
playing back); the clashing of times; and as bodies mediated by computation 
effect the ensemble produced and the kind of time being dominant.
The computational mediation of time, unveiled by Mackenzie through the 
analysis of code constructs such as arrays or sorting, can further be usefully 
exemplified in software gestures dealing with music and noise as sonic realities 
existing through their unfolding in time. The sonic time and the time of compu-
tation here double, triple and quadruple: as sound is stored, computed, output, 
layered in with synthesized noise – such times zoom in and out of each other, 
overlay and intersect.
The idea of real time in computation is a useful starting point. Real time 
can mean that changes to the process can be introduced in the course of, 
say, a performance, or it can relate to the time when audio samples leave the 
computer,25 a moment that is always behind logical time (that time corre-
sponding to computing operations applied at irregular intervals performed 
prior to samples being output for real-time synthesis). The time of real-time 
composition – live performance – is real time, but the control and audio compu-
tations are carried out in turn prior to, and in the pockets in between, real time, 
according to the order of logical time.
The reason for using logical time and not real time in computer music compu-
tations is to keep the calculations independent of the actual execution time of 
the computer which can vary for a variety of reasons, even for two seemingly 
identical calculations.26
So there is a real time and another real time running with delays and in parallel, 
and a buffer of different size and speed used for different purposes.
A multiplicity of the present time is actually a pre-digital idea:27 naturally 
occurring echoes or a reverberation in the bathtub are very simple non-digital 
examples. Electronic technology, in turn, has been used to record, process and 
analyse music since the 1940s,28 where most digital audio ‘effects’ have their 
predecessors. In general, as regards the computation of sound, the introduction 
of the personal computer cannot be seen as the unique starting point. Though 
there are some techniques which are only possible in the digital age, analogue 
synthesizers could do things to sound waves that digital synthesizers and 
computers carry on doing, and experimental work on early computers, mainly 
in universities in the late 1950s and 1960s, developed methods of audio analysis 
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and synthesis that were promptly implemented in the commercial digital 
synthesizers of the late 1970s – a parallel line to the delayed development of 
desktop software that would later do the same and more.
Still, audio effects relied on mediation by some form of storage or slight 
delay. Before the advent of powerful computers, synchronized magnetic tapes 
were used as the form of storage and slowing one tape, or in the case of a loop, 
using reel-to-reel tape to make a tape loop were the mechanics behind such 
effects. This was often done during a performance and worked into the sound, a 
process that could be further complexified by adjusting the position of multiple 
recording and playback heads in studio conditions.29
With analogue electrical equipment, sound waves were transformed, via a 
transducer, into their electrical representation, which was then amplified and 
transformed back into the physical form via a loudspeaker. Work on sound 
happened between transducer and loudspeaker. Distortion, for example, could 
be achieved by increasing the electric power supply to an amplifier, altering the 
shape of audio waves coming through it. Filter effects changed the frequency 
spectrum of the wave: modulation split the audio signal in two and altered one 
while leaving the other unaltered in order to then join them together. Here, an 
electronic representation allowed for a sonic transformation to take place, and, 
with time-based effects, it relied on a time-delay inaudible to the human ear, on 
the deep present.
Until 1995, with the storage of audio signals becoming overwhelmingly 
digital, ‘cutting, duplication, speed change and time reversal’30 remained, but 
other techniques of synthesizing and altering sound, such as waveshaping, 
became more powerful – especially true in the case of those relying on 
the computation of complex mathematical formulae. Equally, techniques of 
additive synthesis (adding a few sound waves together) were explored, with 
some research and experimentation into amplitude modulation in the 1960s 
by Stockhausen, frequency modulation in the 1960s by John Chowning of 
Stanford University and waveshaping synthesis in the late 1960s by Jean-Claude 
Risset, and Yamaha, with its synthesizers, already making use of some of 
these techniques in 1975.31 Still, some methods, such as wavetable synthesis 
and physical modelling, could only advance with digital signal processing 
technology and powerful computers.
Digital signal processing includes the delay (and buffer) as its fundamental 
data structure. It is the mediation of digital delay that is my key example of the 
computational crafting of new realities of time, as it is layered in with other 
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kinds of time in relation to which things perform. Delay is when the signal is 
shifted by d samples; the time shift equals a delay of d/r time units, where r is 
the sample rate.32 A digital delay line is a data structure that allows delay by a 
number of samples.
The digital delay line is the basis of many things in digital signal processing. 
Digital delay lines can be implemented as circular buffers (often used in data 
streaming) and are part of digital delay networks (which can be presented as 
time shifts or frequency domain alterations).33 A delay line itself can change 
over time as in the case of a variable delay line. The delay line is the founda-
tional structure of any filter since a delay network ‘designed specifically for its 
frequency or phase response is called a filter’.34 Furthermore, some application 
of filters can be used for Fourier analysis, resynthesis (additive synthesis) and 
subtractive synthesis. Digital delay lines are used in creating various kinds 
of audio effects and also in digital waveguide synthesis – a part of physical 
modelling synthesis first described by Avraamov as further introduced below.
The meaning of delays and buffers ranges from signifying elements in filter 
theory (such as in the digital delay line), being part of the process that produces 
sound, to referring to a form of computation that occurs in blocks (possibly 
outputting sound) to a rather more colloquial use, referencing the generic 
reliance of computational processes on timeshifts and redistribution. In this 
sense, they involve making copies of data, adding them together, going back to 
the calculation, storing the results up, storing the data as well as the computa-
tional process while it is in constant use in another location, and so on.
However different such uses are, the concepts and operations behind them 
take hold of time and make it work in rather new ways. With the digital delay 
line time runs unevenly. The previous slowing down and speeding up of sonic 
processes translate into the concentration and dilution of the present time. 
Present time becomes multiple: it slides apart to make space for the time of 
the calculation; real time expands; the delayed, the buffered is stored inside a 
pocket of the present, neither past, nor future, but what can be called off-now. 
The multiple present is seamful. Computational time adjusts through shifts 
and mismatches to the commonly held everyday present but, even below the 
20 or 30 milliseconds inaudible to the human ear, sonic computational events 
transform the experiential construction of time, which lures humans into the 
macro and micro states of time, into the enduring forms of the present.35
To the detriment of the Bergsonian project, software-based functions 
continue spatializing time, grounding it in geometrical space and movement,36 
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but they also draw out of time the capacity to take on new forms – to become 
pockets of time, to form loops in which the present is suspended, replayed, 
accumulated.
Goodman interprets Attali’s idea of sound as the medium of the future 
by suggesting a future that is not near or immediately next, but the one that 
‘virtually coexists … [with] the past and opens up to its futurity’.37 Such futur-
ology of anticipation, of listening in to, of prophecy, gains power when it is 
supplemented with the concept of an active, material and excessive production 
of the future. The avant-gardes do not only hear the hidden societal heartbeat, 
but also constitute multiplicitous versions of the future. Crucially, such a 
temporality of the avant-gardes seems to enter into direct conflict with compu-
tationally mediated time with the ambition to produce novelty that ruptures the 
present temporality and leaps into the open and emergent future.
Despite Arendt’s treatment of artistic work as instrumental, her concept of 
natality, an ability to initiate spontaneous novelty through action, in terms of 
the political understanding of freedom, can be usefully adapted to understand 
the futurity of avant-gardes.38 In fact, it is the early Soviet avant-garde or the 
more recent avant-garde of certain digital art finding a revolutionary aesthetic 
in and across the blossoming of digital technology that might be seen to have 
produced aspects of the spontaneous freedom that Arendt is drawn to. The idea 
of fun that this volume pursues has something in common with the radical 
and spontaneous novelty that Arendt attributed to political action and I would 
like to think in relation to the (digital) avant-garde. Fun can be seen as related 
to the avant-garde’s impetuous process of crafting the multiple futures. The 
initiation of the new constitutions of the future is a kind of fun that manifests 
or is disguised differently in every stratum in which it acts.
To the avant-gardes
The joint examination of computational time, avant-garde and the constitution 
of futures can offer a way of understanding the particular becoming of our 
digital reality. In fact, a claim I want to make here is that the avant-gardes 
operate within a different dynamic of unfolding wherein the avant-garde’s 
future-in-the-past39 becomes a means of the construction of our present and 
the future. The Future in the Past is a verb tense within English grammar that 
is used to describe what in the past was thought to be going to happen in the 
262 Fun and Software
future. The future of the avant-garde, ‘its only goal’, according to Rodchenko 
and Stepanova, becomes stuck in the past, while forever remaining the future 
– it thus has it own form of existence and a relation to our past and present 
production and the production of our past, present and future. It is through the 
avant-garde’s future-in-the-past that we have a range of futures, also a compu-
tational future, even if it currently seems to be happening all the time or not 
taking place at all.
A recent exhibition on the Russian sound technology pioneers of 1910–30s, 
curated by Andrei Smirnov and Liubov Pchelkina of the Theremin Centre, part 
of the Moscow Tchaikovsky Conservatory, makes a statement on the avant-
garde’s future-in-the-past succinctly clear: from the technology of ornamental 
sound proposed by Arseny Avraamov (1929–30), as popularized by the sound 
ornaments of Oskar Fischinger (1932), or Avraamov’s conceptualizations and 
formulae for physical modelling synthesis, as well as descriptions of methods 
for additive synthesis as mentioned above, to the early versions of motion-
tracking performed by Bernstein (1921–3), the innovations of the aesthetic 
revolutionaries of the beginning of the twentieth century had embarked on 
developing most of what could only be completed in the 1970s, 1980s or even 
1990s.40 More than that, it is the things that never led to further development 
and failed to complete that still retain the scintillating unattainability of art in 
the scale of their audacity in the creation of the novel material versions of the 
future – such as the ‘Symphony of Factory Sirens’ by Arseny Avraamov, a perfor-
mance of 50 locomotive whistles, steamship blasts, hydroplane engines, factory 
sirens and two artillery batteries with machine guns and cannon for percussion. 
Not that technical innovation or technocratic idealization is glorified by such 
a statement; it is rather a methodology of making new, the fun of mediated 
cross-species and cross-agent communal creativity transfiguring the present 
that remains, in some form, in the future that can be found, however perversely 
modified, in today’s creative industry policies, in the wishes of social network 
communities, in self-evolving art projects and in the plans of computationally 
mediated collective actions.
The avant-garde of early sound experimentation in the Soviet Union, among 
many other avant-gardes, strove to work according to a different logic, to offer 
a convergence between ‘revolutionary imagination and material form’,41 to cut 
through the material, technological, political, social and subjective, to the very 
core, the engine of the making of the world, in order to reverse-engineer, disas-
semble and reassemble it, to make a new one, or better, a few. Whether offering 
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an alternative version to capitalist modernity,42 or ‘bringing sensory form to 
utopian ideas’,43 such an excessive imaginary and material impulsion cannot be 
fully described through a closer engagement with society, power, technology or 
subjectivity; the engagement is with something more than society and politics, 
and beyond the technology at hand.
The avant-garde bites into the core of available means through which things 
become to create ways in which such processes of constitution can in turn 
become novel. The avant-garde is about assembling physical and metaphysical 
crossings at which being and becoming can be sustained in new ways. The 
avant-garde plugs into becoming before it is stratified and tries to bring about, 
not only a different actualization but a different mode of becoming. It does not 
only engage with the end-product, it rips open the process of its making in order 
to multiply, alter or affect the process and produce a materialist ontological 
revolution. Here, the aesthetics of the avant-garde participates directly in life. 
Both a reading of Nietzsche as a theorist of non-human-aimed art, of nature 
itself which has an art-state and a Guattarian notion of the aesthetic register 
that transforms and infects itself and other registers until they all function as 
aesthetic are useful orientations here.44 Not-just-art, larger than art, non-art, 
the avant-garde is not a political or social project any more than it appears as an 
aesthetic current. It goes beyond; as an inherent revolution in the manner of its 
actualization, it cannot fail.
To go back to the beginning of this section, the fact that the avant-garde 
exists as a vector directed at the future in relation to its present and seems to 
have failed to become present when its future passes does not mean that it is 
utopian. It means that it establishes a unique relation to time and to technology.
Future-in-the-past
Deleuze, through Bergson, argued that the present only exists through and by 
entering into a relation with its own past. ‘The present is not’,45 and it is through 
the past that the present is constructed. The past becomes the virtual through 
which every present, of which there are multiple, actualizes or becomes through 
differentiation. The present time is a duration, a becoming: it actualizes from the 
virtual along multiple lines (one or more of which can be stratification).
The ‘past co-exists with its own present on various levels’46 and ‘at the same 
time’.47 The present never ceases and goes back to itself as a past, which is here 
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an ‘ontological memory that is capable of serving as the foundation of the 
unfolding of time’.48
The present of the avant-garde, which is the future, is the line of actualization 
of becoming, which stays open. It is not a form of cosmic memory, an inspi-
ration, a shared ideology, a shared past. If such lines and manners are regarded 
as a future, it is only because there is a becoming involved, but it also implies 
that they cannot fail, because they are not circumscribed by the now. Time does 
not check on them whether they became, have failed to become or have become 
past. Their present is the pure manner of becoming, of differentiation, and such 
a present always remains a future even if it is in the past.
In the section on the novella in A Thousand Plateaus Deleuze and Guattari 
write, ‘They have a future but no becoming’.49 The future-in-the-past, by 
contrast, offers myriad becomings, but poses a question of what the future is. 
Early sound pioneers relate to something that will happen, which does not 
become a failed Utopia, a rigid trauma, but remains multiplicitous becomings. 
The present never exists because it immediately passes and becomes past; but 
the future cannot pass, especially when it is the future-in-the-past that never 
took place. With the avant-garde’s time, in the form of something that happened 
and avoided happening, we have a past that remains a future, that is becoming, 
dynamic and multiple. The future-in-the-past is always present, unlike the 
future, thus, in a certain way it is the only real future. It does not wither, it is a 
future at hand, a way to become, to be, a line, a modality, a technique, a device, a 
methodology. Such sets of manners of actualization cannot be described exclu-
sively as creative techniques to be exploited and subsumed. They offer futures, 
and of a sort that is still to be understood.
Buffered avant-gardes of the 1990s
It has often been argued that the conversion of avant-garde into mainstream 
no longer takes decades, and its recursion is rapid. There are many little 
avant-gardes, with scarce time to claim failure or success. When the material 
of culture is processed and advances through calculation, it acquires compu-
tational characteristics. A recursion or interslicing of the avant-gardes as they 
are computed is made prone to algorithms similar to those behind time-based 
effects: avant-gardes can be delayed to form an echo, played back and looped, 
sampled, filtered, stored, mixed with a live feed, synthesized or predictively 
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modelled. Visions realized, enquiries still pertaining to the future, past break-
throughs, a mixture of times are processed to be operated upon, among other, 
through the architectural-conceptual element of the delay, of the buffer. It is 
tempting to say that the novelty of the open futures, of manners of actualization 
is buffered; the future-in-the-past takes the form of the off-now, forming an 
immediate space, multiple real time, being stored, delayed, layered, fed back.
Software art and net art, a pair of futures of the past two decades, offered, 
as avant-gardes do, material imaginaries of human-technical networks to form 
novel realities. Shaping the roles of culture and art in relation to computa-
tional systems and vice versa, they conceptualized software agencies, tested 
its manifestations, imagination, habits; they described its social and political 
futures, its breakages. Rather than offering solutions, software art and its 
precursor – net art, commented on in other chapters of this volume – developed 
ways of thinking computation that revealed its increasingly central position in 
the processing of culture, society and subjectivity.
It is through projects such as Auto-Illustrator,50 a vector graphic design appli-
cation by Adrian Ward of Signwave that jointly won the Transmediale 2001 
artistic software award, that software ceased to be considered to be something 
contained within certain boundaries and acquired messiness, multiplicities in 
action, coupling human labour with other agents, including those within and 
outside the running code. When Auto-Illustrator comments ‘It’s boring. Choose 
another tool’ or offers advice on the fanciness of colour used, it does not only 
make work somewhat ‘fun’ but realizes, in material terms, the condition of culture 
subjected to computational processes, a human confronted with his/her own 
technical subjectification, the condition of technicity that has entered a renewed 
cycle of human genesis. Software art worked through and exploited software 
materiality, programmable creativity, multi-species distributions of agency, the 
conditionality of acts driven by the design of computational networks. All in all, 
if software art was not of foundational importance to software, as it existed in its 
massified form, it certainly became a form of material imagination that brought 
the art and culture of the 1990s and early 2000s closer to the realization of, and 
acting upon as well as creating, its own conditions.
A list of artists making Google Art, who were quickly hired by Google (one 
would be Douwe Osinga)51 or of software gestures subsequently implemented 
in major software applications (the wave-like movement of Mac OS X interface 
elements following a decade of ‘digital folklore’ projects breaking up the stability 
of WIMP interface design)52 might well be a good inventory to assemble, not 
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least for the cause of registering prior art – as such things become patented as 
part of a ‘look and feel’ design. Ideas and gestures that were appropriated, and 
that proliferated, could be discussed in detail, starting from those under the 
general header of ‘forerunners’ to social networking, blogs and the aesthetics 
of connection. Here Eva Wohlgemuth and Kathy Rae Huffman’s report on 
The Siberian Deal, essentially a text and image travel diary with a feedback 
option, HTML-ed and uploaded to the server (through FTP) (1995)53 could be 
mentioned alongside the Refresh project (1996), a painstakingly broken dream 
of decentralization, as if precipitating the development of RSS feed technology54 
and Heath Bunting’s semi-hoax CCTV project (1997) literally realized 13 years 
later.55 To pause for a while here, Bunting’s parodic invitation to monitor four 
webcam streams and report anything suspicious to local police via a form is now 
programmed into a piece of software available from the company Internet Eyes, 
which aims to use an ‘army of volunteers’ to watch and interpret CCTV footage 
online.56 Anti-utopian parody bypasses the original mixing times. Here, the 
technologies of digital signal processing, data compression, cameras, scenarios 
for interaction, fibre optics, interface design and others are all combined in 
the imagining and construction of a social user, a model of communication, a 
manner of spending time, a way to be as society. Here, sets of software opera-
tions are as important as their active participation in the construction of a 
user, and of those middle territories formed of people and networks, watching, 
processing the stream. Here, net art and software art come up with ideas for 
the culture to be, with ways for it to become: devices and gestures on the rise, 
marking scheduled human-technical updates.
The readiness and promptness with which the ideas thought up in certain 
currents of net art and exploratory art practices of the 1990s were embedded 
into commercial platforms and applications align these art movements with 
that of Russian Constructivism. As in the Russian Constructivism, with its 
focus on ‘real technical construction’ and the invention of the ‘productivist 
artist-engineer’, where drawings were also to function as technical blueprints, 
currents in net art and software art invented conceptual and computational 
gestures, personae and forms of communal actions in ‘productivist’ manners, 
either somewhat close to those of a technical plan, developed, played out 
with and put forth or as actual technical objects. Indeed, net art explored 
the computational undergirding of life coming about through computational 
means, with works acting as software functions, even if only imaginary, but 
ready to be reprogrammed and included in large software packages – similar to 
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Constructivism producing its projects in the spirit of integration into everyday 
societal lives. Constructivism seeking new societal structures through the work 
of material imagination can be seen as aligned with the computational art of the 
1990s and 2000s co-constructing and inhabiting the Temporary Autonomous 
Zones and the zones beyond. Here, not only can the visual language of new 
media be seen as descending from the avant-garde, as famously analysed by 
Lev Manovich,57 but also the aesthetico-political impetus. Furthermore what 
is shared is a sense of failure and stuffiness of reaction following suit (Stalinist 
nomenclature, in the case of Soviet avant-garde, and a neoliberal death dance of 
biopolitical co-option, in net art and software art). The unhelpful bitterness in 
the face of this almost immediate co-option of the avant-gardistic endeavours is 
another reason to try and think beyond this model, drawing upon the leaking 
and excessive operation of hope, of material imagination and its temporal 
configurations.
Certainly, it is not only the projects that became the (often commercial) 
present that matter. Things that did not become, that still remain a future, are 
even more important. As an example, the instruments and imagination of the 
Web Stalker browser by the I/O/D group (1997)58 conceptualized as a means of 
enquiry into the material structures of networks, of introducing perspectivalism 
in relation to the Web, such as in the ‘Crawler’ and ‘Map’ function, remain 
rather unimplemented, outside a domain of specialist software. The ‘Crawler’ 
crawls the target URL, proceeding to follow all the HTML pages that they link 
to, whereas the ‘Map’ visualizes the relation of pages within the website and to 
outside links. It has been used outside of art scenes, for instance, to track all 
child links and find hidden pages; something being taken further with Web 
crawlers and network analysis and visualization techniques applied to data 
obtained from social networking platforms. The future software functions here 
are the gestures of materially imagining a mode of technical being that feeds on 
engagement with computational infrastructures rendered thick and dense in 
the acts of using them which become one with modes of understanding them 
or indeed of producing such modes of being.
A combination of what became reality but ceases to pass and what remains 
a future but is presently neatly at hand, in relation to the avant-garde of old 
technical art forms, characterizes the contemporary landscape. The examples 
given refer to ideas mainly: concepts that call computational formulations into 
being, problems that necessitate software development. Such a claim can be 
seen to be one of the many ways in which this volume tries to reformulate the 
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relationship between computation and the history of concepts, programming 
and social sciences, software development and art. The fun of the avant-garde, 
stored up in the future-in-the-past or enlisted by predominant data structures, 
fills in the techno-human formulations of today as they unfold and roll over 
to institute tomorrow. Not only is the importance of avant-garde’s fun to be 
noticed here, so also is the changing shape of the novel actualizations of reality 
that they establish. If a computational mediation of the delay and buffer takes 
hold of the future-in-the-past looped in the multiple stretchy presents, new 
sets of problems and actions can be drawn: ones that institute breakages and 
discontinuity and are able to work through the present in order to draw out 
multiplicitous futures, destabilizing the delay, folding the loop.
There are still formulations, events and expressions that become past. A 
delayed future-in-the-past is joined by the once present and then passed, such 
as the celebrated democracy of HTML, a channel for everyone to raise their 
voice and make a statement. These means of enunciation are currently rendered 
useless if they are unsupported by the complications of contemporary web 
design and scripting or conversely if they are embraced in (mainly corporately 
owned) blogs and CMSs. In a similar vein, Zittrain warns of the dangers of 
the ‘appliancization’ of the internet, a condition in which the once indubitable 
open architecture of the Web and desktop computing is jeopardized and may 
effectively be closed into a ramified system of single-service appliances, granting 
little control and no place for manoeuvre in relation to what they are, can 
become or do to the user and the network.59
Past simple and past perfect, present, future in the past and future enter into 
a new interlocking machine, an agreement expressed most acutely in the form 
of computational systems and one that must be recognized if the becoming 
is not to be lost to just very few options in the face of technological temporal 
complexity. The software-based processing of time creates layers inside layers, 
well-managed or glitchy delays, parallel, intersecting and closed-circuited time 
structures. It is not only the enduring ephemeral described by Chun, but also 
a buffered present that cannot become either past or produce a future. Present 
and threatened, withered away, gone, left in limbo, multiplicitous futures form 
clusters whose temporal dimensions are confusing.
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Multiplicitous futures and the incomputable machine
Can there be the versions of the future that are not utopian? Can there become 
a present that fulfils the avant-gardes’ multiplicitous futures? Is computa-
tional time always the continuous present? Perhaps, in fact, the answer to all 
these questions should be negative. The vector of the future is not a temporal 
movement due to arrive at a state of completion. The avant-gardes are not 
reducible to the cause of an action, whether immediate or delayed. And the 
computability is never complete, but contains the incomputable.
Luciana Parisi comments on the computational construction of the future and 
Massumi’s work in the following way: ‘a preemptive mode of power foreclosing 
futurity into actualities is not the same as the incomputable machine of the 
event’.60 She argues that topological invariants in computation that pre-empty 
change through continuous variation and ‘[re-program] the event before it 
can happen’ are not the only existent computational reality, but, drawing from 
Whitehead, she suggests that the transduction of qualities into quantities is
infected with abstract non-denumerable relations of pure quantities, eternal 
objects: discrete yet permanent relations adding novel character to existing... 
relations… Each parametric extensive relation is hosting another order of 
quantities that cannot be contained by the number of its actual members.61
These are: ‘abstract quantitative order of relations’62 always escaping overall 
continuity; the dark spaces of ‘parasitic quantities’, discontinuity, contingency, 
the incomputable always included in the computational processing of matter. For 
Parisi, there is always, grounded in the logic and computational elements, the 
problematic and contingent that exceed the control and exhaust pre-emption. 
The computed continuous present includes the incomputable, the rupturing 
black holes of other times.
The other times that can burst through the buffered elastic present include 
those with the potentiality of the avant-gardes. The avant-gardes offer distinctive 
and intensive kinds of production of the multiplicitous becomings, the imaginary 
crafting of the futures. Such processes, such futures in the form of becomings, 
the multiple unfoldings into and of the future are not one, are in excess. As an 
excess, such reserve of material imagination also escapes buffering as much as 
it is subjected to it. The avant-garde’s multiplicities of the future, inclusive of 
multiple histories, still exist in the ruptures of today as an enactive force that 
cannot be fully lost to the perpetual present.
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The material working out of multiplicitous futures by the avant-gardes is not 
a dream that ‘comes against reality and fails to insert itself ’,63 but an operation 
of imagination. The force of such material imagination is not non-rigorous 
or intrinsically linked to domination, and the call upon its intensity is not 
nostalgic. It is indeed the avant-gardes’ multiplicitous futures that are the 
reserve and excess to be called upon when the construction of the multiple 
present is required, whether or not such a present (and the future) is to be 
posthuman, ecologically sustainable, transdisciplinary and ethical.64
In Author and Hero in Aesthetic Reality Bakhtin wrote that the future 
cancels out the present and the past, rather than following from them.65 What 
expression such an actualization will take, we shall see.
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